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Abstract
We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration of regional sports networks (RSNs)
with programming distributors in U.S. multichannel television markets. Vertical integration
can enhance efficiency by reducing double marginalization and increasing carriage of channels,
but can also harm welfare due to foreclosure and incentives to raise rivals’ costs. We estimate
a structural model of viewership, subscription, distributor pricing, and affiliate fee bargaining
using a rich dataset on the U.S. cable and satellite television industry (2000-2010). We use
these estimates to analyze the impact of simulated vertical mergers and divestitures of RSNs on
competition and welfare, and examine the efficacy of regulatory policies introduced by the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission to address competition concerns in this industry.
Keywords: vertical integration, foreclosure, double marginalization, raising rivals’ costs, cable
television
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1 Introduction
The welfare effects of vertical integration is an important but controversial issue. The theoretical
literature on the pro- and anti-competitive impacts of vertical integration is vast (cf. Perry, 1990;
Rey and Tirole, 2007; Riordan, 2008; Bresnahan and Levin, 2013), and typically contrasts potential
efficiencies related to the elimination of double marginalization (Spengler, 1950) and the alignment
of investment incentives (Willamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986) with the potential for losses
arising from incentives to foreclose rivals and raise their costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1983; Kratten-
maker and Salop, 1986; Hart and Tirole, 1990; Ordover et al., 1990). Despite a growing literature,
empirical evidence on the quantitative magnitudes of these potential effects, and the overall net
welfare impact, is still limited.
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This paper quantifies the welfare effects of vertical integration in cable and satellite television
in the context of high-value regional sports programming in the U.S. Whether the ownership of
content by distributors harms welfare has been at the heart of the debate over recently approved
(e.g., Comcast and NBC in 2011), abandoned (e.g., Comcast and Time Warner in 2015), and
proposed (e.g., AT&T and Time Warner in 2016) mergers in the television industry. The attention
that these mergers have attracted is partly due to the industry’s overwhelming reach and size: over
80% of the approximately 120 million television households in the U.S. subscribe to multichannel
television, and the mean individual consumes about four hours of television per day.1 Regional
sports programming is a large part of this industry, receiving $4.1 billion out of over $30 billion
per year in negotiated affiliate fees paid by distributors to all content providers, and an additional
$700 million per year in advertising dollars.2
Our focus on the multichannel television industry, and in particular regional sports program-
ming, is driven by several factors that create empirical leverage to address this question. First,
there is significant variation across the industry in terms of ownership of regional sports content
by cable and satellite distributors, also referred to as multichannel video programming distributors
(MVPDs). Although this variation is primarily at the national-level for most channels, regional
sports networks (RSNs) are present in smaller geographic areas, and there is useful variation in
ownership patterns both across regions and over time. Additionally, the industry is the subject of
significant regulatory and antitrust attention in addition to merger review, including the applica-
tion of “program access rules” and exceptions to this rule, such as the “terrestrial loophole” which
exempted certain distributors from supplying integrated content to rivals.
There are two key components of our analysis. The first is the construction of a comprehen-
sive dataset on the U.S. multichannel television industry, collected and synthesized from numerous
sources. The dataset comprises aggregate and individual-level consumer viewership and subscrip-
tion patterns, channel ownership and integration status, and prices, quantities, and channel carriage
“lineups” for cable and satellite bundles at the local market level for the years 2000 to 2010.
The second component is the specification and estimation of a structural model of the multi-
channel television industry that captures consumer viewership and subscription decisions, MVPD
pricing and carriage decisions, and bargaining between MVPDs and content providers. We signifi-
cantly extend the model of Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) by constructing an empirical framework
suitable for the analysis of vertical integration and mergers. Our model incorporates integrated
firms’ incentives to foreclose rivals’ access to inputs, the potential for double marginalization, and
the possibility of imperfect coordination and internalization within an integrated firm. This last
feature is one of the novel aspects of our approach, as we estimate, rather than impose, the de-
gree to which firms internalize the profits of integrated units when distributors make pricing and
channel carriage decisions, and channels decide to supply or foreclose rival distributors. Given our
1http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2016/nielsen-estimates-118-4-million-tv-homes-in-
the-us--for-the-2016-17-season.html, http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-
downloads/2016-reports/q3-2016-total-audience-report.pdf, accessed on March 13, 2016.
2SNL Kagan.
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goal to evaluate whether vertical integration improves or worsens welfare due to improvements in
internal efficiency or increases in foreclosure of rivals, taking this approach avoids building into our
model the assumption that these two effects actually happen to the extent predicted by theory. For
example, only very simple views of the firm imply that integrated firms behave as if they are under
unitary control, and managers of integrated firms may well either not consider or over-react to the
gains that can be reaped from foreclosure.
An important input into identifying these effects is our estimates of the change in distributor
profits from the addition or removal of an RSN from any of its programming bundles. We use the
relationship between distributors’ market shares and channel carriage, as well as observed viewer-
ship patterns and negotiated affiliate fees, to infer the values consumers place on different channels.
With the estimated profit effects in hand, the pro-competitive effects of vertical integration are
largely identified from the degree to which RSN carriage is higher for integrated distributors than
would be implied by the RSN’s profitability to the distributor; the anti-competitive foreclosure
effects are identified by lower RSN supply to downstream rivals of integrated RSNs.
We find that integrated distributors substantially but incompletely internalize the effects of their
pricing and carriage decisions on their upstream channels’ profits: we estimate that only $0.79 of
each dollar of profit realized by its integrated partner is internalized when an integrated MVPD
makes pricing and carriage decisions, or when integrated MVPDs and RSNs bargain with each
other. We also find that integrated RSNs fully (and perhaps more than fully) take into account
the benefits their downstream divisions reap when a rival distributor is denied access to the RSN’s
programming.
After estimating our model, we leverage its structure to examine the mechanisms through which
pro- and anti-competitive effects of vertical integration might occur. We do so by simulating verti-
cal mergers and divestitures for 26 RSNs that were active in 2007, and examining their effects on
equilibrium firm (carriage, pricing, affiliate fee bargaining and supply) and consumer (subscription,
viewership) decisions. We consider integration scenarios when program access rules—which ensure
that non-integrated rival distributors have access to integrated content—are effectively enforced,
and when they are not. When program access rules are enforced, our counterfactual simulations
capture the pro-competitive effects of integration from improved internalization of pricing and car-
riage decisions within the integrated firm. When program access rules are not enforced, our simu-
lations allow as well for integrated (typically cable) distributors to engage in foreclosure, denying
access to or charging higher prices for their owned RSN to non-integrated rival (typically satellite)
distributors.
Our results highlight the importance of program access rules in determining the effects of vertical
integration. In counterfactual simulations that enforce program access rules, we find that vertical
integration leads to significant gains in both consumer and aggregate welfare. These benefits
arise due to both lower cable prices (through the reduction of double marginalization) and greater
carriage of the RSN. Averaging results across channels, we find that integration of a single RSN
with effective program access rules in place would reduce average cable prices by 1.2% ($0.67)
3
per subscriber per month in markets served by the RSN, and increase overall carriage of the RSN
by 9.4%. Combined, these effects would yield, on average, a $0.43 increase in total welfare per
household from all television services, representing approximately 17% of the average consumer
willingness to pay for a single RSN. We also predict that consumer welfare would increase.
When program access rules are instead not enforced, we find that—at the estimated lower bound
for our “rival foreclosure” parameter—rival distributors would be denied access to an integrated
RSN in 4 of out of 26 cases; for the other 22 cases, the rival distributors continue to have access
but pay on average 18% higher affiliate fees than if program access rules were effectively enforced.
Together, failure to enforce program access rules leads to a reduction in both consumer and total
welfare of 1-2% of the average consumer willingness to pay for a single RSN. We find that the loss
is significantly larger in cases in which the rival distributors are denied access. The foreclosure of
satellite distributors tends to occur when the RSN is owned by a cable distributor whose market
share is large in the geographic region served by the RSN. Our counterfactual results suggest that
satellite distributors are excluded from carrying the RSN when the integrated cable distributor’s
share of households that it could serve exceeds approximately 85%.
On net, we find that the overall effect of vertical integration in the absence of effective program
access rules—allowing for both efficiency and foreclosure incentives—is to increase consumer and
total welfare on average, resulting in (statistically significant) gains of approximately $0.38-0.39
per household per month, representing 15-16% of the average consumer willingness to pay for an
RSN. In the 4 markets in which rival distributors would be denied access, gains are quite small
and cannot be distinguished from zero, while consumer and total welfare gains are positive and
statistically significant in the 22 cases in which exclusion does not occur in response to vertical
integration. Finally, stemming from the foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs effects discussed above,
rival distributors are predicted to be worse off; satellite surplus, in particular, falls 2.2% when
vertical integration occurs with program access rules, and by 3.2% without these rules in place.
Despite the richness of our empirical model, the effects that we document are only partial. Most
importantly, our model and analysis does not allow vertical integration to influence investments
made by RSNs and MVPDs (both those that integrate and their rivals).3 As emphasized in the
literature on investment effects of vertical integration (Bolton and Whinston, 1991; Hart, 1995), the
direction of these effects on consumer and aggregate surplus are ambiguous a priori (and remain
an important topic for future research).
Related Literature. Previous work studying the cable industry, including Waterman and Weiss
(1996), Chipty (2001), and Chen and Waterman (2007), have primarily relied on reduced form
cross-sectional analyses for a limited subset of channels and found that integrated cable systems
are more likely to carry their own, as opposed to rival, content. An exception is Suzuki (2009)
who studies the 1996 merger between Time Warner and Turner broadcasting. His analysis uses
3For example, the predicted negative impact on satellite distributors raises the possibility that widespread inte-
gration by cable distributors of RSNs might impact satellite distributors’ effectiveness as a competitor to cable to a
greater extent than admitted for in our analysis.
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time series variation in ownership, finding that vertically integrated channels were more likely to be
carried post merger and rival non-integrated channels were less likely to be carried.4 These studies
cannot, however, separate efficiency from foreclosure incentives, nor can they provide estimates of
overall welfare effects. For example, reduced carriage of rival non-integrated channels could reflect
either foreclosure effects or the impact of efficient increases in carriage of integrated channels when
channels are substitutes. We complement this literature on vertical integration in the cable industry
in two ways. First, building a structural model allows us to make welfare statements about the
impact of vertical integration and identify the mechanisms through which the effects work. Second,
we leverage a richer, panel dataset on consumer viewership and bundle subscription, and the pricing,
carriage, and bargaining decisions of channels and distributors.
This paper also adds to the growing empirical literature on the effects of vertical integration and
other vertical arrangements (e.g., Shepard, 1993; Hastings, 2004; Hastings and Gilbert, 2005; Villas-
Boas, 2007; Mortimer, 2008; Houde, 2012; Lee, 2013; Conlon and Mortimer, 2015; Asker, 2016).
As noted by Bresnahan and Levin (2013), despite a voluminous literature examining when vertical
integration occurs, relatively few papers have attempted to examine its positive and normative
effects.5 We build on existing approaches by estimating a model that explicitly incorporates avenues
for vertical integration to improve the efficiency of pricing and channel carriage decisions, and to
generate foreclosure or raise costs of rival distributors; and by providing estimates of the degree
to which integrated firms, in practice, act on each of these incentives.6 Using these estimates,
we are then able to estimate the net welfare impact of vertical integration that trades off these
pro- and anti-competitive effects. Finally, we develop methods for the estimation and simulation
of counterfactual scenarios in vertical markets characterized by bilateral oligopoly and negotiated
prices that can be applied in other related settings.7
Road Map. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an
overview of the U.S. cable and satellite industry and regional sports networks, and describe the
data that we use in our analysis. We present our model of the industry in Section 3, and detail
its estimation and our parameter estimates in Sections 4 and 5. We then assess the welfare effects
of vertical integration by discussing the implementation of and findings from our counterfactual
simulations in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Institutional Detail and Data
Our study analyzes the U.S. cable and satellite industry for the years 2000 to 2010 and focuses on
the ownership of “Regional Sports Networks” (RSNs) by cable and satellite distributors. In this
4See also Caves et al. (2013) who provide evidence that RSN affiliate fees are correlated with downstream MVPD
footprints.
5Notable exceptions include Ciliberto (2006), Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007) and Atalay et al. (2014, 2017).
6See also Michel (2013), who examines whether firms jointly maximize profits following a horizontal merger.
7For example, Ho and Lee (2017) adapt techniques developed in this paper to examine hospital and insurance
competition in health care markets.
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section, we describe the industry’s structure, RSNs, and regulatory policy during this period. We
then discuss the data that we use to estimate the model. The tables referenced in this section are
contained in Appendix A.
2.1 Industry Structure
In the time period that we study, the vast majority of households in the U.S. were able to sub-
scribe to a multichannel television bundle from one of three downstream multichannel video pro-
gramming distributors (MVPDs): a local cable company (e.g., Comcast, Time Warner Cable, or
Cablevision) or one of two nationwide satellite companies (DirecTV or Dish Network).8 Cable
companies transmit their video signals through a physical wire whereas satellite companies dis-
tribute video wirelessly through a south-facing satellite dish attached to a household’s dwelling.
The majority of distributors’ revenue comes from selling subscriptions to three different bundles
of programming: a limited basic bundle which retransmits over-the-air broadcast stations, an ex-
panded basic bundle containing 40-60 of the most popular channels available on cable (e.g., AMC,
CNN, Comedy Central, ESPN, MTV, etc.), and a digital bundle containing between 10 to 50 more,
smaller, niche channels. Our analysis focuses on the provision of multichannel programming, and
does not explicitly consider the bundling or sale of Internet or phone services by cable or satellite
distributors.9
Downstream distributors negotiate with content producers over the terms at which the distrib-
utors can offer the content producers’ channels to consumers. These negotiations usually center on
a monthly per subscriber “affiliate fee” that the downstream distributor pays the channel for every
subscriber who has access to the channel, whether the subscriber watches it or not.10
2.2 Regional Sports Networks
RSNs carry professional and college sports programming in a particular geographic region. For
example, the New England Sports Network (NESN) carries televised games of the Boston Red Sox
and the Boston Bruins. Metropolitan areas can have multiple RSNs. For example, in the New
York City metropolitan area, there are four different RSNs: Madison Square Garden (MSG), MSG
8Telephone MVPDs (primarily consisting of AT&T and Verizon) did not enter a significant number of markets
until 2007, at which point combined they had approximately 1.2 million subscribers according to financial filings; by
the end of 2010, they had 6.9 million out of 100.8 million total MVPD subscribers (FCC, 2013).
9This shortcoming arises for data and computational reasons. For reference, in 2007, according to the U.S. Census
Bureau Service Annual Survey, cable and other program distributors received 60% of their revenues from multichannel
programming distribution services, 16% of revenues from Internet access services, and 6% from telephony services;
other revenue sources included air time and installation and rental of equipment. During our sample period, Internet
access (telephony) services grew from 2% (1%) of cable distributor revenues in 2000 to 17% (8%) by 2010 while
programming revenues fell from 77% to 57%. While the fixed effects and unobservable demand shifters (ξ) that we
introduce later in our demand analysis should partially account for differences in Internet provision across distributors,
our counterfactuals will miss any effects of vertical integration that arise because of induced changes to distributors’
Internet packaging or pricing.
10As discussed in Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), payments between distributors and content providers are pri-
marily in the form of linear fees; fixed fee monetary transfers are rare, and if they exist, they are typically negligible
relative to the total payment.
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Plus, SportsNet NY, and Yankees Entertainment and Sports (YES). Some RSNs also serve multiple
metropolitan areas. For example, the Sun Sports network holds the rights to the Miami Heat and
the Tampa Bay Rays, amongst others.
According to industry estimates, RSNs command the second-highest per subscriber affiliate
fees after the national sports network ESPN. For example in 2010 Comcast SportsNet (CSN)
Philadelphia had per subscriber monthly fees that averaged $2.85 per month whereas highly-rated
national channels such as Fox News, TNT, and USA were around $1 per subscriber per month (and
ESPN over $4 per subscriber per month).
RSNs are sometimes owned by entities that also own downstream cable or satellite distributors.
Figure 1 shows RSNs’ ownership affiliations with downstream distributors over a 13-year period
for the RSNs in our data that were active in 2007. Many RSNs are owned, to some degree, by a
downstream distributor. For example, in 2007, downstream distributors had ownership interests
in 16 of these RSNs. The cable MVPDs that owned RSNs are Comcast, Cablevision, Cox, and
Time Warner. DirecTV, the largest satellite operator (and second-largest U.S. MVPD), indirectly
had stakes in numerous RSNs through its partial owners News Corporation and Liberty Media
Corporation.11 Ownership affiliations also vary over time, as RSNs may be (partially) acquired,
divested, or sold to other distributors.
2.3 Regulatory Policy
There are several key features of the regulatory environment for RSNs, and vertically integrated
content more generally, that are pertinent for our study. During our sample period, vertically
integrated firms were subject to the “Program Access Rules” (PARs), which required that vertically
integrated content be made available to rival distributors at non-discriminatory prices (subject to
final-offer arbitration if necessary). The PARs only applied to content that was transmitted to
MVPDs via satellite. This covered all national cable channels (which need satellite transmission
to cost-effectively reach cable systems around the country) and most RSNs. However, a handful of
RSNs transmitted their signal terrestrially (usually via microwave), thereby avoiding the jurisdiction
of the PARs. This was called the “terrestrial loophole” in the Program Access regulation. In
2007, only two long-standing cable-integrated RSNs were able to leverage the terrestrial loophole:
Comcast SportsNet in Philadelphia and SD4 in San Diego (owned by Cox Cable); in both cases, the
channel was not provided to satellite distributors.12 As a result, Major League Baseball (MLB),
National Basketball Association (NBA), and National Hockey League (NHL) games in Philadelphia
were only available on cable and not on DirecTV or Dish Network. Similarly in San Diego, MLB
games were available only through cable. This feature of regulatory history will be an important
11News Corporation and Liberty Media both had a partial ownership stake in DirecTV starting in 2003; at the
beginning of 2008, News Corporation completed an asset swap with Liberty in which News traded its stake in
DirectTV for Liberty’s stake in News.
12Time Warner Cable also employed the terrestrial loophole from 2006 to 2008 for the (then relatively new)
Charlotte Bobcats NBA franchise by placing some their games on News 14, a terrestrially delivered regional news
channel.
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source of identifying variation in our econometric estimation.
The PARs were introduced in 1992 and required renewal by the FCC every five years. They
were allowed to lapse in 2012 and replaced by rules giving the Commission the right to review any
programming agreement for anti-competitive effects on a case-by-case basis under the “unfair acts”
rules the Commission established in 2010 (FCC, 2012). The new case-by-case rules explicitly include
a (rebuttable) presumption that exclusive deals between RSNs and their affiliated distributors are
unfair. During our sample period (2000-2010), most integrated RSNs outside of loophole markets
had agreements to be carried by all MVPDs. However, even though PARs were in effect, there
were a few instances in which a cable-owned RSN was not carried by satellite distributors: e.g., in
2007, Comcast Sports Northwest, Comcast/Charter Sports Southeast, and Cox Sports Television
were not broadcast on satellite distributors.
2.4 Data
We collect a wide variety of data to analyze the effects of vertical integration. We have three
categories of data: (1) downstream prices, quantities, and characteristics of cable and satellite
bundles, (2) channel viewership data, and (3) channel affiliate fees and advertising revenues. We
briefly describe each in turn.
2.4.1 Downstream Prices, Quantities, and Characteristics
We combine data from multiple sources to construct downstream prices, quantities, and charac-
teristics. Our foundational dataset is the Nielsen FOCUS database. For each cable system, it
provides the set of channels offered (i.e., the channel “lineup”), the number of homes passed, the
total number of subscribers (to any bundle of channels), the owner of the system, and the zip codes
served. We use the years 2000 to 2010. We restrict our analysis to system-years in which the
system faced no direct competition from another cable distributor.13 We construct market shares
by combining the number of subscribers reported by FOCUS (divided by the number of households
in a market, obtained from 2000 and 2010 Census zip code data) with individual-level survey data
from household survey firms Mediamark Research & Intelligence (MRI) and Simmons, using MRI
data for 2000 to 2007, and Simmons for 2008 to 2010. Specifically, if a system-year had at least
40 survey respondents, we use the average of the market share from the FOCUS data and the
cable market share among the survey respondents; otherwise we use only the FOCUS data. We
eliminate any system-year for which we had less than 40 individual-level survey respondents in the
MRI/Simmons data and the FOCUS subscriber data were not updated from the previous year. We
use the remaining system-years to construct our markets.
13In our analysis, we focus only on markets in which there is a single cable and no other wireline (cable or telephone)
distributor. We do so because when a system faces competition from another wireline distributor, we do not know
the number of subscribers in the areas where the system faced competition relative to the areas where it did not. A
second wireline distributor is present in 6% of all system-year observations. Our maintained assumption is that the
omission of these markets does not affect the validity of our identifying assumptions or interpretation of results.
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For our analysis, we define a market for each year to be a set of zip codes served by a single
cable system and, by construction, both satellite distributors. For cable systems, we aggregate over
bundles within a system, focusing on total system subscribers. Our demand model is therefore a
distributor choice model, rather than a bundle choice model.14 We construct satellite shares within
each of our markets for DirecTV and Dish Network from the MRI/Simmons survey data.15 We
use historical channel offerings and prices for DirecTV and Dish Network collected via the Internet
Archive (archive.org). Satellite bundles are assumed to vary across markets only in the set of RSNs
carried. We assume that an RSN is carried by a satellite distributor in a given market if we observe
that the satellite distributor carries that channel in any market, and the RSN is “relevant” in that
market. We define an RSN to be relevant in a Nielson Designated Market Area (DMA)—and,
hence, in all markets within that DMA—if, across all cable systems within that DMA at least 30
percent of the teams carried by the RSN are not “blacked out.”16 During our sample period, the
average household subscribing to a cable distributor received 1.8 RSNs, and 80% of our markets
have one or two relevant RSNs that are available.
We combine multiple sources of information on cable television prices. Systems regularly post
prices on their websites and these websites are often saved in the Internet Archive. Following
industry practice, we refer to the set of channels offered at a given (incremental) price as a tier of
service and the combination of tiers chosen by households as the “bundle” that they buy.17 We
use the price of the expanded basic bundle, the most popular bundle chosen by households and the
bundle which typically contains all of the channels in our analysis. In addition to price information
on systems’ websites, we utilize newspaper reports of price changes which provide price information
at the local cable system level. Some newspapers report this information every time cable prices
change (typically yearly), providing valuable information about the history of price changes for a
single (often large) system or geographic family of systems owned by the same distributor. Finally,
cable systems typically have “rate cards” describing their current tiers, channels, and prices which
they use for marketing or to inform customers of changes in these offerings; they were used when
able to be found online. We searched the Internet for all such information about cable prices and
linked by hand the information obtained to FOCUS systems based on the distributor, principal
geographic region served, and other regions served as reported in the newspaper or listed on the
rate card. For system-years where we do not find a price from websites, rate sheets, or newspapers,
we link to the TNS Bill Harvesting database. The TNS data are individual-level bills for cable
14The FOCUS data only report total subsscribers to the system, and our subscriber data are not rich enough to
estimate bundle-specific quantities.
15We use a weighted average of state- and market-level satellite market shares, both calculated from the individual-
level MRI/Simmons data. If we have between 1-19 market-level observations, we weight the market-level share by
0.75 (and the state-level share by 0.25). If we have 20 or more market-level observations, we weight market-level
shares by 0.90. We dropped any constructed market whose total market share exceeded one or which, in the survey
data, had a zero market share for one of the satellite distributors (which happens naturally due to sampling error).
16DMAs are mutually exclusive and exhaustive definitions of television markets created by Nielsen and used for
the purchase of advertising time. Black-out rules are restrictions imposed by sports leagues that prevent broadcasts
of a team’s games in certain local markets. We use black-out information at the sport-team-zip-code level collected
from MLB, NBA, and NHL websites in 2014 to determine whether a team is blacked-out in a given market.
17For example, the expanded basic bundle consists of the limited basic tier and the expanded basic tier.
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service which report the company providing the service, the household’s expenditure, and their zip
code. For a given system-year, we use the mean expenditure for subscribers to that system if the
data contain at least 5 bills.18 These data also provide the level of any tax on cable and satellite
television services; we use state satellite taxes, which vary over time, as an instrumental variable
for price in our demand estimation.
Table A.1 reports the average price, market share, and number of cable, RSN, and total channels
offered across markets and years in our estimation dataset. We use 11 years of data, comprising
almost 7,000 market-years, with an average coverage of 39.7 million (over 35% of) U.S. households
per year.19 Average prices are quite similar across distributors, whether on an unweighted basis
or weighted by the number of households in the market. The satellite distributors generally offer
more channels on their Expanded Basic service than the local cable system, but a similar number
of RSNs.
Finally, we derive MVPD margins for Comcast, DirecTV, and Dish from their 2007 10K reports;
we use these as moments in our structural estimation.20
2.4.2 Viewership
We estimate demand using both bundle purchase and viewing data. We have two types of viewing
data. One type provides information at the individual household level, and the other reports
aggregate viewing decisions at the level of the DMA.
Individual household viewing data comes from the MRI and Simmons datasets described in the
previous subsection. Our MRI data report the number of hours watched for each of the sampled
households of 96 national channels from 2000 to 2007, while our Simmons data report the same
information for 99 national channels between 2008 and 2010. Our aggregate ratings data come
from Nielsen, which provides the percentage of households in a DMA watching a given program
on a given channel at a given time. Reported is the average rating for each of between 63 and 100
channels, of which 18 to 29 are RSNs, depending on the year, in each of the 44 to 56 largest DMAs
between 2000 and 2010.
Tables A.2 and A.3 report summary statistics for our viewing data. Table A.2 reports, for each
of our sources of viewing data, the mean rating for each of the 38 (non-RSN) national channels
18We only use bills which clearly delineate video programming costs (i.e., that separate it out from other bundled
services such as internet and phone), and use the average of a system’s revenue (excluding pay-per-view or one-time
charges) to construct prices.
19While we observe the complete population of channel lineups, incomplete reporting of subscriber information
in the FOCUS dataset and the inability to collect cable prices in some markets prevents us from constructing the
information we need in every U.S. cable market.
20We compute Comcast margins using video, advertising, and franchise fee revenues; programming expenses; and
sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses multiplied by both the video revenue share of total revenues
(to proportionately allocate expenses across Comcast’s other businesses) and the share of SG&A expenses that are
subscriber acquisition and retention related (computed from DirecTV’s reports). We compute DirecTV margins
using total revenues; and programming, subscriber acquisition, upgrade, and retention expenses. We compute Dish
margins using total revenues; subscriber acquisition costs; and the share of subscriber related expenses multiplied
by the share of non-SG&A costs (programming and service expenses) that are programming related (computed from
DirecTV’s reports). The computed values are {.539, .396, .413}.
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included in our econometric analysis.21 For example, the average rating for the ABC Family
Channel in the Nielsen data across the 747 DMA-years for which the information was recorded is
0.418 percentage points. This suggests that a household selected at random in one of these years
and DMAs would be watching the ABC Family Channel with probability 0.418 percent. While
small, this is above average for cable networks. Similarly, Table A.3 reports the average ratings for
RSNs; for example, CSN Bay Area’s average viewership is 0.41 percent. For RSN viewership, we
have additional information—also reported in Table A.3—about the average RSN rating by type
of distributor (i.e., cable or each satellite operator).
Our household-level data provide further details about average viewing of national channels
which are summarized in the remaining columns of Table A.2. The last column reports the share of
households on average across DMAs and years that report any viewing of that channel. As noted
in Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), this provides valuable information about whether a household
has any interest in a channel that we will use to inform the estimated distribution of preferences
for channels across households.
2.4.3 Average Affiliate Fees and Advertising Revenues
As described earlier, affiliate fees are the monthly per subscriber charges paid by distributors
to content providers for the ability to distribute the channel. SNL Kagan maintains a database
with aggregate information about individual cable television networks, both nationally-distributed
networks like CNN and ESPN as well as RSNs like the family of Comcast and Fox networks. We
obtain average affiliate fees paid by cable and satellite MVPDs to networks by dividing total affiliate
fee revenues by total subscribers. Table A.2 reports average affiliate fees for each of the 38 national
cable channels that we include in our analysis and Table A.3 reports the same information for each
of the RSNs in our analysis. The average affiliate fee in our data for the national channels is $0.30
per subscriber per month, while it is $1.64 for our RSNs.
Per subscriber advertising rates are determined for each channel by dividing total advertising
revenues by total subscribers (both provided by SNL Kagan).
3 Model
In this section, we present an industry model that predicts: (i) household viewership of channels;
(ii) household demand for multichannel television services; (iii) prices and programming bundles
that are offered by distributors; and (iv) negotiated distributor-channel specific affiliate fees. One
key output from the specification and estimation of our model is the impact on viewership and
demand of adding or removing channels from a bundle. This in turn informs the degree to which
firms internalize the profits of integrated units when making strategic decisions, and the incentives
of an integrated RSN to provide or withhold access to its content from rival distributors.
21The 38 national channels represent the top 36 channels by viewership which have ratings data for each year, plus
two smaller channels with sports related content (ESPN Classic and Golf Channel).
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3.1 Overview
We index consumer households by i, markets by m, and time periods by t. There are a set of
“downstream” multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) Ft and “upstream” channels
Ct active in each period t. The set of MVPDs active in a given market-period is denoted Fmt. We
will assume that each such MVPD f ∈ Fmt offers a single bundle of channels Bfmt ⊆ Ct in market
m and period t, where a household subscribing to this bundle pays a price pfmt and has access to
all channels c ∈ Bfmt.22 Since we assume that distributors offer only one bundle, f denotes both
the distributor and the bundle it offers for a given market-period.
We assume that in each period t (a year in our empirical work), decisions are made according
to the following timing: in stage 1 channels and distributors bargain bilaterally to decide affiliate
fees, and distributors set prices and make carriage decisions for each market in which they oper-
ate; in stage 2 households choose which MVPD, if any, to subscribe to in their market; and in
stage 3 households view television channels.23 We now provide details of each stage and further
assumptions, proceeding in reverse order of timing.
3.2 Stage 3: Household Viewing
We assume that households solve a time allocation problem to determine viewership. In particular,
household i in market m and period t subscribing to MVPD f ∈ Fmt allocates its time wift ≡
{wifct}c∈Bfmt∪{0}, where wifct is the time spent watching channel c (or devoted to non-television
activities if c = 0), to solve:
max
wift
vift(wift) =
∑
c∈Bfmt∪{0}
γict
1− νc (wifct)
1−νc (1)
s.t. : wifct ≥ 0 ∀ c ,∑
c∈Bfmt∪{0}
wifct ≤ T .
Parameters γict and νc ∈ [0, 1) govern consumer tastes for each channel c, where γict sets the level
of marginal utility of household i from the first instant of watching the channel, and νc controls
how fast this marginal utility decays with additional viewing. The parameter T represents the
total time available to the household. We restrict νc to be equal for all non-sport channels and
the outside-option, and equal for all sports channels (which include RSNs); i.e., νc = ν
S if c is a
22In the previous section, we explained why the data only permit us to look at demand for the most popular
(expanded basic) bundle offered by each distributor in each market. We do not model distributor within-market price
discrimination (e.g., by offering multiple channel bundles or a` la carte add-ons); see Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012)
for further discussion. As modeled here, vertical integration does not affect how distributors are allowed to price, nor
does it affect the ability of channels to price discriminate among distributors (who are charged a distributor-specific
affiliate fee and cannot resell access to the channel; see also footnote 35).
23Stages 2 and 3 of our model describe a discrete-continuous choice model of consumer behavior over distributors
and viewership (cf. Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Hanemann, 1984).
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sports channel, and νc = ν
NS otherwise.24 We parameterize γict as a function of channel-specific
parameters ρc ≡ {ρ0c , ρ1c} as follows:
γict =
γ˜ict with probability ρ0c , where γ˜ict ∼ Exponential(ρ1c)0 with probability 1− ρ0c ∀ c, t .
For RSNs, we scale γ˜ict by exp(γ
bbict + γ
ddic), where bict ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of teams
carried on RSN c that are “blacked-out” (i.e., unable to have games televised in household i’s
market), and dic is the average distance from household i to the stadiums of the teams shown on
RSN c (measured in thousands of miles).25 These terms allow for households to value an RSN
differentially if the household cannot watch some of the carried sport teams, or if the household
lives further away from the carried teams’ stadiums.
3.3 Stage 2: Household Distributor Choice
Each period, household i considers characteristics of the bundle offered by each MVPD f ∈ Fmt—
including the utility from watching channels in the bundle—when determining which distributor,
if any, to subscribe to. We specify household i’s utility conditional on subscribing to f as:
uifmt = β
vv∗ifmt + β
xxfmt + β
sat
if + αpfmt + ξfmt + εifmt , (2)
where v∗ifmt, referred to as a consumer’s viewership utility for the bundle offered by f , is the
optimized value from the time allocation problem in (1), xfmt are firm-state and year dummy
variables, pfmt is the per month price (including any taxes), and ξfmt is a scalar unobservable
demand shock for the bundle. Each consumer has a random preference for each satellite distributor,
βsatif , that is drawn from an independent exponential distribution with parameter ρ
sat
f ; we assume
that βsatif = 0 if f is a cable distributor.
26 We assume that the utility of the outside option of no
bundle is normalized to ui0mt = εi0mt, that εimt ≡ {ifmt}∀f is distributed Type I extreme value,
24Allowing for this parameter to differ between sports and non-sports channels is motivated by the observation
that sports channels receive higher affiliate fees than national channels for the same viewership ratings; we discuss
this further in Section 4.1.2. Our viewership model is equivalent to the Cobb-Douglas model used in Crawford and
Yurukoglu (2012) if νc → 1 for all c.
25RSNs may be carried by systems outside of a team’s local area for at least two reasons. First, an RSN may
broadcast games from different sport leagues with different black-out restrictions. For example, CSN Chicago is carried
on systems in Indianapolis even though Chicago Bulls games that the RSN broadcasts are blacked-out (Indianapolis is
Pacer’s territory), as the RSN also broadcasts Chicago Cubs games (which are considered in-market for Indianapolis).
The second reason is that RSNs also broadcast programming not subject to black-out restrictions, which include other
sports (e.g., racing, boxing, poker) in addition to sports news and specialized programming. We focus only on black-
out restrictions for MLB, NBA, and NHL teams. We ignore the NFL in our analysis since its games have only been
aired by national channels since the 1960s (CBS, NBC, Fox, ESPN, and the NFL Network currently own its television
rights).
26As we discuss in the next section, allowing for heterogeneity in preferences for satellite bundles assists our model
in matching observed distributor price-cost margins. Allowing for random satellite preferences to be correlated did
not significantly affect parameter estimates or our main counterfactual predictions.
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and that each household chooses the bundle with the highest value of uifmt.
27
The probability that household i chooses distributor f in market m is obtained by integrating
over εit for each household:
sifmt =
exp(βvv∗ifmt + β
xxfmt + β
sat
if + αpfmt + ξfmt)
1 +
∑
g∈Fmt exp(β
vv∗igmt + βxxgmt + β
sat
ig + αpgmt + ξgmt)
. (3)
The total market share for distributor f (in market m at time t) is then sfmt ≡
∫
sifmtdHmt(i),
where Hmt(i) is the joint distribution of household random coefficients (γ,β) in the market, and
the demand for distributor f is Dfmt ≡ Nmtsfmt, where Nmt is the number of television households
in the market.
3.4 Stage 1: Distributor Pricing, Carriage, and Affiliate Fee Bargaining
In Stage 1, all MVPDs and channels bargain over affiliate fees τt ≡ {τfct}∀f,c, where τfct represents
the period t fee that distributor f pays the owner of channel c for each of f ’s household subscribers.
Simultaneously, each distributor chooses the prices and channel composition of its bundle in every
market in which it operates.28 That is, we assume that bargaining occurs simultaneously with the
determination of distributor pricing and carriage decisions; we provide further discussion of this
assumption in Section 3.4.3. We assume that affiliate fees, bundle prices, and bundle compositions
are optimal with respect to one another in equilibrium.
We now discuss these optimality conditions in more detail, considering first distributors’ pricing
and carriage decisions (given the affiliate fee bargaining outcome), and then affiliate fee bargaining
(given distributor pricing and carriage).
3.4.1 Stage 1a. Distributor Pricing and Carriage
Each period, every MVPD f ∈ Ft chooses prices and the channels offered in each of its bundles
{pfmt,Bfmt}∀m:f∈Fmt to maximize its profits given negotiated affiliate fees τt. Profits for f across
all markets are:
ΠMft ({Bmt}m, {pmt}m, τt;µ) =
∑
m:f∈Fmt
ΠMfmt(Bmt,pmt, τt;µ) ,
where:
ΠMfmt(Bmt,pmt, τt;µ) = Dfmt×
(
ppre-taxfmt −mcfmt
)
+µ×
( ∑
g∈Fmt
∑
c∈Bgmt
OMfct×Dgmt×(τgct+act)
)
, (4)
27Our normalization allows for variation in the quality of the outside option (which includes local antenna reception
for television signals) across markets and time due to our inclusion of firm-state and year dummy variables.
28A given cable distributor f often operates in many markets, and is choosing its price and set of channels to
offer in each of these markets. Satellite distributors choose a single national price and channel bundle, with the only
potential variation across DMAs being the set of RSNs that are carried.
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(where we omit the arguments (Bmt,pmt) from demand terms for notational simplicity, and, as in
the rest of this section, Fmt also includes f). In expression (4), we denote by Bmt ≡ {Bfmt}f∈Fmt
and pmt ≡ {pfmt}f∈Fmt the set of channels and associated prices offered in market m, and by act
the expected per-subscriber advertising revenue obtained by channel c from bundles that carry c.
Firm revenues are derived from pre-tax prices, ppre-taxfmt ≡ pfmt/(1 + taxfmt), which are a function
of market-specific cable or satellite tax rates that are known and assumed to be determined ex-
ogenously. The term OMfct is a function of MVPD f ’s ownership share of channel c at time t; we
refer to f and c as being integrated if OMfct > 0, with full integration equivalent to O
M
fct = 1.
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The parameter µ, which we will estimate, captures the extent to which a downstream MVPD f
internalizes upstream affiliate fees and advertising revenues from its integrated channels.
The first component of (4), an MVPD’s profit function in a given market m, is standard: each
bundle has a price and a marginal cost (mcfmt) that determine its margin, and this is multipled
by its demand. We assume that each MVPD f ’s marginal cost in market m can be decomposed
into the sum of the per subscriber fees that f must pay to the various channels in its market-
bundle, and bundle-specific non-channel-related marginal cost, denoted by κfmt: i.e., mcfmt ≡∑
c∈Bfmt τfct+κfmt.
30 The second component of the profit function is non-standard, and represents
the degree to which a vertically integrated downstream unit values the profits that accrue to
its upstream (i.e., channel) units. These terms include per subscriber fees (τgct) and advertising
revenues (act) that accrue to integrated upstream channels from MVPD f ’s own viewers as well
as from viewers of other distributors g 6= f , and are multiplied by the ownership share variables
OMfct and parameter µ.
31 In the absence of any intra-firm frictions, µ would equal one, implying
that the downstream unit of an integrated firm perfectly internalizes its (fully) integrated upstream
units’ profits, and its strategic decisions maximize total firm profit. The parameter µ could also
be less than one, potentially representing divisionalization that could arise from ignorance, poor
management, optimal compensation under informational frictions, or any other conflict between
managers of different divisions within the same firm. By estimating µ we seek to uncover the extent
to which such internalization actually occurs in our setting.
Cable Pricing and Carriage. We will leverage necessary conditions on the optimality of cable
MVPDs’ pricing and carriage decisions in our estimation. Differentiating (4) with respect to pfmt
(and dividing by market size) yields the following pricing first-order condition:
∂ΠMfmt
∂pfmt
=
sfmt
1 + taxfmt
+
(
ppre-taxfmt −mcfmt
)∂sfmt
∂pfmt
+µ×
( ∑
g∈Fmt
∑
c∈Bgmt
OMfct
∂sgmt
∂pfmt
(τgct+act)
)
= 0 . (5)
29In Appendix C.1, we detail the construction of this and our other ownership variables (introduced later). For
our analysis, we restrict OMfct = 0 if c is not an RSN.
30Non-channel related costs include technical service, labor, gasoline, and equipment costs that are incurred on a
per subscriber basis.
31We omit portions of integrated channels’ profits that are not affected by f ’s pricing and carriage decisions, as
they do not affect the analysis. We also assume that channel c’s per subscriber advertising revenues in market m do
not vary across MVPDs, and that channel c’s marginal costs per subscriber are zero.
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With regard to carriage, a cable distributor’s optimal decision for an RSN is indeterminate when
no deal is reached between the distributor and that RSN: i.e., whether or not the distributor would
carry the RSN on a subset of its systems in the event the RSN were available is irrelevant when
the RSN is not available to the distributor at all. In our estimation, we will therefore make use
of bundle optimality conditions for cable operators only for channels with which they have an
agreement. Thus, we assume that the set of channels that are offered by each cable MVPD f in
each market m satisfies:
Bfmt = arg maxBf⊆Aft Π
M
fmt({Bf ,B−f,mt},pmt, τt;µ) , (6)
where Aft ⊆ Ct is the set of channels available to MVPD f : i.e., the set of channels for which f
has reached an agreement.
Satellite Pricing and Carriage. If instead distributor f is a satellite MVPD (DirecTV or Dish),
we assume that the distributor sets a single national price and bundle. This national satellite price
satisfies a similar optimality condition to (5) above. We assume that the bundle offered by a satellite
MVPD in any given market may differ from the national bundle only in the set of RSN channels
that are offered. In addition, we assume that satellite distributors adopt the strategy of carrying
any channel for which they have negotiated a deal (intuitively, since any deal that is reached should
make carriage profitable).32
3.4.2 Stage 1b: Bargaining over affiliate fees
Before describing how affiliate fees are determined, we specify the profits that each channel c
contemplates when bargaining with MVPD f . We assume that if f and c are integrated (i.e.,
OMfct > 0), c’s profits in market m are:
ΠCcmt(Bmt,pmt, τt;µ) =
∑
g∈Fmt:c∈Bgmt
Dgmt ×
(
τgct + act
)
. . . (7)
+ µ
∑
g∈Fmt
Dgmt ×
(
OCgct × (ppre-taxgmt −mcgmt) +
∑
d∈Bgmt\c
OCCcdt × (τgdt + agdt)
)
.
However, if f and c are not integrated, c’s profits in m are:
ΠCcmt(Bmt,pmt, τt;µ, λR) =
∑
g∈Fmt:c∈Bgmt
Dgmt ×
(
τgct + act
)
. . . (8)
+ µ
∑
g∈Fmt
Dgmt ×
(
λR ×OCgct × (ppre-taxgmt −mcgmt) +
∑
d∈Bgmt\c
OCCcdt × (τgdt + agdt)
)
.
In both (7) and (8), the first lines represent affiliate fees and advertising revenues that channel
c obtains from each bundle on which the channel is available in market m, and the second lines
32For RSNs, we make this assumption only in the RSN’s relevant markets.
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(b) Bargaining with Rival MVPD.
Figure 2: Examples of ΠCcmt when c bargains with MVPD f .
incorporate channel c’s potential profits from its integrated downstream MVPDs (based on OCgct,
a function of the ownership share of c held by MVPD g), as well as profits from other integrated
channels d of channel c (which depend on OCCcdt , which is a function of the common ownership
shares of channels c and d; see Appendix C.1 for further details).33 These integrated profits are in
each case multiplied by µ, the parameter capturing the extent of within-firm internalization across
divisions.
The one difference between (7) and (8) is that in the latter expression, which is relevant when an
integrated RSN c bargains with a non-integrated distributor f , any effects of the deal on downstream
distributors integrated with c are multiplied by the parameter λR ≥ 0. This parameter—our
“rival foreclosure” parameter—captures the extent to which channel c considers the benefits of
foreclosure (the denial of access to channel c) to its integrated downstream division g in its decision
of whether to supply f . This benefit arises because non-supply lowers the quality of f ’s bundle,
shifting demand to c’s downstream division g. By including and estimating a lower bound on this
parameter—rather than simply setting it equal to the theoretical value of 1—we aim to estimate
the extent to which foreclosure concerns actually motivate integrated RSNs’ supply decisions to
non-integrated downstream rivals.
In Figure 2, we provide an illustration of how channel c’s perceived profits when bargaining with
MVPD f may change depending on whether or not it is integrated with f . In Figure 2a, the dashed
square represents the fact that channel c is fully integrated with MVPD f (so that OMfct = O
C
fct = 1)
and another channel d; in this case, when bargaining with its integrated distributor f , channel c
will consider its own profits (denoted by picmt), consisting of affiliate fees and advertising revenues,
as well as profits of f and its integrated channel d (denoted by pif and pid), weighted by µ: i.e.,
ΠCcmt = picmt+µ× (pifmt+pidmt). In Figure 2b, channel c is instead integrated with another MVPD
g (and still channel d); for example, f may be a satellite distributor while g is a cable distributor
that owns channel c. In this case, channel c will consider its own profits picmt when bargaining with
f (now a rival MVPD), as well as those of its integrated units pigmt and pidmt, weighted by µ× λR
and µ, respectively: i.e., ΠCcmt = picmt + µ× ((λR × pigmt) + pidmt).
The parameter λR (multiplied by µ) thus captures the internalization of an integrated down-
stream MVPD’s profits when an integrated channel bargains with a non-integrated distributor. In
33In 2007, 4% of markets in our sample have two RSNs that are relevant and share a common owner; none have
three or more relevant RSNs that share a common owner.
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the case considered in Figure 2b, a higher value of λR increases channel c’s desire to raise down-
stream profits of its fully integrated distributor g, and lowers c’s gains from trade when bargaining
with the non-integrated rival MVPD f . This may lead to an increased affiliate fee (τfct) for the
rival distributor f . If the overall gains from trade are eliminated instead, it may lead to non-supply
of channel c to f altogether.34
Finally, when c is only partially integrated with a distributor, the internalization parameter µ
is multiplied by our ownership share variable in firms’ perceived profits: e.g., in the case of external
bargaining with distributor f when c is partially integrated with distributor g, c’s perceived profits
are ΠCcmt = picmt +µ×OCgct× ((λR× pigmt) + pidmt). We assume the same internalization parameter
µ is used by upstream units considering profits from either integrated downstream units or other
integrated upstream units, and by downstream units considering profits of integrated upstream
units.
Bargaining. We assume that, given channel c is carried on some of MVPD f ’s systems, the
affiliate fee τfct between distributor f and channel c maximizes their respective bilateral Nash
products given the negotiated affiliate fees of all other pairs and the prices and bundles for all
distributors. In other words, affiliate fees τt satisfy:
τfct(τ−fc,t,Bt,pt) = arg max
τfct
[ ∑
m∈Mfct
[∆fcΠ
M
fmt(Bmt,pmt, {τfct, τ−fc,t};µ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
GFTMfct(τfct,·)
]ζfct
(9)
×
[ ∑
m∈Mfct
[∆fcΠ
C
cmt(Bmt,pmt, {τfct, τ−fc,t};µ, λR)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
GFTCfct(τfct,·)
]1−ζfct
∀f, c ∈ Aft ,
where Mfct ≡ {m : c ∈ Bfmt} denotes the set of markets in which c is carried on f ’s bundle,
ζfct ∈ [0, 1] represents a firm-channel-time specific Nash bargaining parameter, and:
[∆fcΠ
M
fmt(Bmt, ·)] ≡
(
ΠMfmt(Bmt, ·)−ΠMfmt(Bmt \ fc, ·)
)
,
[∆fcΠ
C
cmt(Bmt, ·)] ≡
(
ΠCcmt(Bmt, ·)−ΠCcmt(Bmt \ fc, ·)
)
,
34When it does not lead to non-supply, a positive value of our rival foreclosure parameter λR will lead to an
increased input fee for non-integrated downstream rivals by reducing c’s gains from trade. This “raising rivals’ costs”
effect differs from that in Salop and Scheffman (1983) and Krattenmaker and Salop (1986): in those papers, the
supplier has all the bargaining power and is motivated by the effect that raising its input price has on downstream
prices to consumers. With our simultaneous timing, channel c instead considers consumer prices as fixed when it
bargains. Nonetheless, in equilibrium an increase in c’s input fee can lead the non-integrated downstream distributor
to raise its bundle price to consumers as we discuss further in Section 3.4.3. (Although in our main counterfactual
specifications we assume that national satellite prices are held fixed, we also consider as an extension cases in which
satellite bundle prices can adjust on a local level.)
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where we denote by Bmt \ fc the set of all bundles in Bmt with channel c removed from bundle
f . These last two terms represent the difference in either MVPD or channel profits in market m
if f no longer carries channel c, and accounts for induced changes in household demand. We will
refer to GFTMfct(τfct, ·) and GFTCfct(τfct, ·), which are the sums of these terms across all markets
Mfct, as the gains from trade for MVPD f and channel c coming to an agreement with affiliate
fee τfct. We assume that each MVPD and channel negotiate a single affiliate fee that applies to all
markets.35
In Appendix C.1, we show that when f and c share at most one common owner (which is the
case for all MVPD-channel pairs considered in our analysis), OMfct = O
C
fct ≡ Ofct. When this holds,
we can write the first-order condition of (9) for each channel c bargaining with MVPD f as:
(1− ζfct)×GFTMfct(τfct, ·) = ζfct ×GFTCfct(τfct, ·) ∀f, c ∈ Aft , (10)
which states that the equilibrium negotiated input fee τfct between channel c and distributor f
equalizes their (weighted) gains-from-trade.36
Alternatively, letting µfct ≡ µ × Ofct, observe that GFTMfct(τfct, ·) = GFTMfct(0, ·) − (1 −
µfct)
∑
m∈Mfct Dfmtτfct and GFT
C
fct(τfct, ·) = GFTCfct(0, ·)+(1−µfct)×
∑
m∈Mfct Dfmtτfct, where
we omit the arguments of Dfmt for convenience. Thus, we can rewrite (10) as:
[(1− µfct)τfct]×
∑
m∈Mfct
Dfmt = (1− ζfct)×GFTMfct(0, ·)− ζfct ×GFTCfct(0, ·) , (11)
which relates the “effective” total payments made by distributor f to channel c, given by the left
hand side of (11), to a weighted sum of the gains from trade due to agreement at τfct = 0, given
by the right hand side. The effective total payments nets out the µfct fraction of f ’s affiliate fee
payments to an integrated unit c that are not considered by f when making pricing, carriage, or
bargaining decisions (see (4)). Intuitively, the more that f gains from the relationship, the higher
the total (effective) payment that is made; the more that c gains from the relationship, the lower
the total payment. If f and c’s Nash bargaining parameters were equal, then ζfct = 1/2 and the
35We rule out the possibility that RSNs are able to negotiate market-specific affiliate fees for each distributor
(thereby engaging in a form of price discrimination across markets). Such richer pricing could reduce the degree of
inefficient carriage decisions present in these markets, and thereby alter the welfare effects of vertical integration. To
our knowledge, however, such contracts are not widely employed in this industry.
36 When f and c are bargaining with one another and µfct ≡ µ×Ofct 6= 1:
∂GFTMfct(·)
∂τfct
=
∑
m
∂ΠMfmt
∂τfct
= −(1− µfct)
∑
m∈Mfct
Dfmt ,
∂GFTCfct(·)
∂τfct
=
∑
m
∂ΠCcmt
∂τfct
= (1− µfct)
∑
m∈Mfct
Dfmt ;
thus ∂GFTMfct/∂τfct = −∂GFTCfct/∂τfct and (10) follows. The bargaining solution given by (9) is not defined if
µfct = 1; in this case, f and c perfectly internalize each other’s profits when bargaining with one another, and the
negotiated τfct is indeterminate. Finally, note that (10) implies that τfct is set to split the total gains-from-trade in
proportion to their bargaining weights; e.g., GFTMfct(·) = ζfct(GFTMfct(·) +GFTCfct(·)).
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total gain from trade would be split in half.
For estimation and our counterfactual simulations, we assume Nash bargaining parameters
ζfct = ζ
I or ζfct = ζ
E depending on whether c and f are integrated (Ofct > 0) and bargain internally
(I), or are non-integrated (Ofct = 0) and bargain externally (E). As we discuss in Section 3.4.3, the
efficiency of a vertically integrated firm’s pricing and carriage decisions depend on both ζI , µ, and
Ofct.
Example: Non-integrated Bargaining. Consider the case in which MVPD f and channel c
are both non-integrated entities that bargain with one another in period t. The negotiated affiliate
fee τfct that satisfies the Nash bargaining solution given by (11) solves:∑
m∈Mfct
Dfmtτfct = (1− ζfct)
∑
m∈Mfct
(
[∆fcDfmt](p
pre-tax
fmt −mcfmt\fc)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
GFTMfct(0,·)
(12)
− (ζfct)
∑
m∈Mfct
(
Dfmtact +
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt]
(
τgct + act
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
GFTCfct(0,·)
,
where [∆fcDgmt] ≡ Dgmt(Bmt, ·)−Dgmt(Bmt\fc, ·) denotes the change in firm g’s demand in market
m and time t if channel c was removed from firm f ’s bundle, and mcfmt\fc ≡
∑
d∈Bfmt\c τfdt+κfmt.
As before, the left hand side of (12) represents the total payment made by distributor f to channel
c. It is increasing in the additional profits (not including payments to c) that f receives from the
additional subscribers induced by the carriage of channel c (given by the first line of the right
hand side), decreasing in c’s advertising revenues due to f ’s subscribers (represented by the terms
Dfmtact), and increasing in c’s loss in profits from other distributors as a result of being carried
on f (as [∆fcDgmt] < 0 for g 6= f). This last term, given by [∆fcDgmt]
(
τgct + act
)
summed across
other distributors g, can be interpreted as an opportunity cost borne by channel c from supplying
distributor f , and relates the equilibrium affiliate fees that channel c receives from all distributors
to each other (Chen, 2001).
3.4.3 Remarks on Bargaining and Vertical Integration
Our bargaining solution assumes that each distributor-channel pair agrees upon an affiliate fee that
maximizes the Nash product of their gains from trade, given the agreements reached by all other
pairs. It is motivated by the model put forth in Horn and Wolinsky (1988), and used by Crawford
and Yurukoglu (2012) to model negotiations between MVPDs and channels. Other empirical papers
that employ this concept, referred to as the “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining solution, include Draganska
et al. (2010), Grennan (2013), Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), and Ho and Lee (2017).37
37While sometimes motivated as involving different bargaining agents for a firm in each negotiation, Collard-
Wexler et al. (2017) provide a non-cooperative foundation for this particular bargaining solution based on a model of
alternating offer bargaining in which a single agent bargains for each firm and can engage in multilateral deviations.
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Our model also assumes that bargaining over affiliate fees happens simultaneously with distrib-
utors making carriage and pricing decisions. This assumption greatly simplifies the estimation and
computation of our model. For example, we leverage the simultaneity of bargaining and pricing in
deriving (11), as there is no anticipated change in pfmt if τfct changes. Formally, one can think of
separate divisions of the distributor engaging in different functions or actions: e.g., a central division
bargains over affiliate fees, while local offices determine both pricing and carriage. Similarly, for a
vertically integrated entity, separate divisions handle bargaining by the upstream unit and pricing
by the downstream unit. Such timing assumptions have been used in Nocke and White (2007),
Draganska et al. (2010), and Ho and Lee (2017).38 An alternative timing assumption, more typical
in the literature on vertical contracting, would be to assume that affiliate fees are first negotiated,
and then distributor prices and bundles are chosen. This would alter firms’ perceptions of the
payoffs from off-equilibrium-path actions: e.g., when bargaining, firms would anticipate different
bundle prices to be set immediately if off-equilibrium-path affiliate fees or disagreement were real-
ized. While this alternative timing assumption would arguably be more realistic in our setting, and
would lead to different parameter estimates, these parameter estimates would still be determined
by trying to match the same patterns in the data as do our estimates; as such, the extent to which
our timing assumption might affect the conclusions from our counterfactuals, and the direction of
any such bias, is unclear.39 In summary, we believe our approach to be a reasonable approximation
with substantial computational benefits.40
Even with our simultaneous timing assumption, in equilibrium, all supply decisions must satisfy
the conditions put forth in (5), (6) and (10): i.e., bundle prices and carriage are optimal with respect
to equilibrium affiliate fees, and affiliate fees are negotiated while conditioning on equilibrium bundle
prices and carriage. In the case in which a distributor-channel pair is not integrated, this can lead
to double marginalization and inefficient carriage, so that their joint profit is not maximized, the
extent of which depends on the external bargaining parameter ζE . When instead the distributor
Our analysis differs from Collard-Wexler et al. in that agents negotiate over linear fees, τ , rather than fixed fees. In
Appendix B, we show how an extension of their model to our setting can be used to derive the necessary conditions
for non-integrated firms that we employ in estimation.
38This timing is also implicit in the analysis described in Rogerson (2014). Note that one implication of this
timing assumption, when combined with our approach to within-firm bargaining, is that we do not allow integrated
firms to coordinate their downstream divisions’ pricing and bundling decisions with an upstream channel’s bargaining
behavior with non-integrated distributors (e.g., a decision by the channel to refuse an offer from a non-integrated
distributor).
39For example, a sequential timing assumption would have several effects: (i) it would reduce distributors’ gains
from trade (since they could lower their price upon disagreement) and raise channels’ gains from trade (since the
price reduction would take subscribers from rival distributors from whom the channel earns affiliate fees); (ii) it
would create a benefit to the channel from agreeing to a lower affiliate fee (as this would reduce the distributor’s
downstream price); and (iii) it would create an additional incentive for an integrated RSN to raise the affiliate fee
to a rival distributor (as the rival would increase its price). As we discuss further in footnote 60, the effect in (iii)
is likely very small when the rival distributor is a national satellite channel. Effects (i) and (ii), on the other hand,
would likely lead to different values of ζE , ζI and µ, but these estimates would still be fitting patterns in the data
(such as the average affiliate fees of various RSNs and the differences in affiliate fees and pricing by distributors for
integrated versus non-integrated channels).
40Certainly neither timing assumption is completely accurate: for example, the more common sequential timing
may neglect the fact that carriage responses to affiliate fee changes may take time to implement, and that bundle
prices may be set on an annual or semi-annual basis.
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is integrated with the channel, the extent of inefficiency will depend on both the internalization
parameter µ and the internal bargaining parameter ζI (and the extent of the ownership interest).
The following example illustrates these points more concretely.
Example: Bargaining, Double Marginalization, and Vertical Integration To illustrate
both how our model leads to double marginalization and the determinants of the efficiency gains
brought by vertical integration, consider a simple setting with a single channel c and a single
MVPD f that operates cable systems in markets m ∈ Mf ≡ {m : f ∈ Fm} (where we ignore
time subscripts t for this example). In each market m, downstream demand is Dm(p) and per
subscriber costs—excluding the affiliate fee for channel c—are mcfm for the MVPD. Channel c
earns advertising revenue ac per subscriber. For simplicity, assume that each of f ’s cable systems
is a local monopolist, that channel c shares no common owner with any other channel, and that
carriage of channel c is optimal in all markets. Thus, we consider a classic vertical setting with
bilateral monopoly.41
Consider first MVPD f ’s bundle pricing decision given an affiliate fee τ for channel c. Let
µfc ≡ µ×Ofc, and let φm(mc) be the monopoly price in market m for an independent monopolist
distributor whose marginal cost is mc. Then, given τ , MVPD f will set bundle price
pm = φm(mcfm + (1− µfc)τ − µfcac) (13)
in each market m. In effect, f prices using the effective marginal cost mcfm + (1− µfc)τ − µfcac
which counts only (1− µfc) of every dollar paid to c in affilliate fees (making the effective affilliate
fee only (1− µfc)τ), and also counts as a benefit fraction µfc of every ad dollar channel c receives
because of f ’s subscribers.
Next, given the bundle prices {pm}m∈Mf , consider the bargaining between distributor f and
channel c when f ’s bargaining parameter is ζfc. The gains from trade (at an affiliate fee of zero)
for MVPD f and channel c, respectively, are
GFTMf (0, ·) =
 ∑
m∈Mf
(pm −mcfm)∆Dm(pm)
+ µfcac
 ∑
m∈Mf
Dm(pm)
 ,
and
GFTCc (0, ·) = ac
 ∑
m∈Mf
Dm(pm)
+ µfc
 ∑
m∈Mf
(pm −mcfm)∆Dm(pm)

where ∆Dm(pm) is the gain in f ’s subscribers in market m from reaching agreement with channel
c, and c earns advertising revenues based on f ’s subscribers only if it reaches an agreement with f .
Substituting these expressions into (11) and dividing by
∑
m∈Mf Dm(pm), the negotiated effective
41Implicitly, we hold f ’s deals with all other channels fixed.
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affiliate fee (when µ 6= 1) is
(1− µfc)τ = (1− ζfc(1 + µfc))
[∑
m∈Mf (pm −mcfm)∆Dm(pm)∑
m∈Mf Dm(pm)
]
+ (µfc(1− ζfc)− ζfc) ac . (14)
Double marginalization and efficiency in the integrated firm. Joint profit maximization for f and c
requires that the bundle price in each market m ∈Mf be
p∗m = φ(mcfm − ac), (15)
which has the downstream bundle price set considering both downstream marginal costs mcf and
upstream ad revenues ac. Examining (13), we see that joint profit maximization is achieved if
µfc = 1. When instead µfc 6= 1—which can occur if the internalization parameter µ < 1 or
ownership Ofc < 1—the extent of inefficiency depends on both µfc and the bargaining parameter
ζfc. To see this, note that (13) and (14) together imply that the price in each market m will satisfy
the fixed point condition
pm = φ
(
mcfm + [1− ζfc(1 + µfc)]
[∑
m∈Mf (pm −mcfm)∆Dm(pm)∑
m∈Mf Dm(pm)
]
− ζfc(1 + µfc)ac
)
. (16)
Thus, joint profit maximization is achieved provided that ζfc(1+µfc) = 1. For example, joint profit
maximization can occur in the case of non-integration (Ofc = 0) provided that ζfc = 1, i.e., if f
has all the bargaining power (in which case, τ = −ac). More generally, provided that the stability
condition φ′(·)(1− ζfc) < 1 is satisfied, the downstream bundle price is decreasing in ζfc(1 + µfc),
so when ζfc(1+µfc) < 1 we get double marginalization, where pm > p
∗
m. If joint profits in a market
are concave in the bundle price, the loss in joint profit increases as ζfc(1 + µfc) falls.
In the more complex environments that we study, where channel c also derives affiliate fee
revenue from satellite distributors that compete with f , having ζfc(1 + µfc) = 1 is no longer
sufficient to achieve joint profit maximization: efficiency now requires that µfc = 1 (which only
occurs when µ = 1 and Ofc = 1). The reason is that changes in f ’s bundle price now affect channel
c’s revenue from satellite distributor affiliate fees, and unlike channel c’s per subscriber ad revenues
ac, these effects are market-specific, depending on the extent of diversion between cable and satellite
in each market.42 Letting the marginal reduction in channel c’s satellite revenues from adding one
cable subscriber in market m be bcm, joint profit maximization now requires in each market m that
p∗m = φm(mcfm + bcm − ac). (17)
In contrast, a similar derivation to that above shows that when ζfc(1+µfc) = 1 the price in market
42The presence of other channels that share common owners with c can also generate market-specific effects.
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m will instead be
pm = φ
(
mcfm + (1− µfc)
[∑
m∈Mf (bcm − ac)Dm(pm)∑
m∈Mf Dm(pm)
]
+ µfc(bcm − ac)
)
(18)
which generally equals the joint profit-maximizing price only if µfc = 1.
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4 Estimation and Identification
In this section, we discuss the estimation of our model’s parameters and how they are identified
(given our modeling assumptions) from patterns in the data. We estimate all of our parameters
jointly in a single step; however, for exposition, we discuss our estimation procedure in two steps:
1. We estimate θ ≡ {θ1,θ2,θ3}, where:
(a) θ1 ≡ {ρ,ν, γd, γb}, where ρ ≡ {ρ0c , ρ1c}∀c and ν ≡ {νS , νNS}, determines household
viewership decisions by governing the distribution of γict, how fast marginal utilities from
viewership decay, and the viewership utility reductions due to black-outs and distance
to teams’ stadiums;
(b) θ2 ≡ {βv,βx,ρsat, α}, where ρsat ≡ {ρsatDirecTV , ρsatDish}, determines household distributor
choice;
(c) θ3 ≡ {µ, ζI , ζE , σ2ω} are parameters that affect firm incentives when pricing, bargaining,
and determining carriage of channels. Recall that the parameter µ governs the extent
to which integrated channels and distributors internalize profits across upstream and
downstream units. Finally, σ2ω is the variance of an error term that influences MVPDs’
carriage decisions in a manner that we discuss below.
2. We estimate {λPhilR , λSDR }, representing separate lower bounds for our rival foreclosure pa-
rameter in each of the markets in which RSNs took advantage of the terrestrial loophole (i.e.,
Philadelphia and San Diego).
To capture the impact of program access rules, we assume that λR = 0 in non-loophole markets and
estimate our first step parameters using only these markets. That is, we assume that the program
access rules effectively require integrated firms to ignore any foreclosure incentives in dealing with
non-integrated rivals.44
43Note that, consistent with our discussion above, (18) does yield a joint profit-maximizing price when bcm is the
same for all m, or when f is only active in a single market.
44We take this approach as a simple approximation to capture the effects of program access rules for both estimation
and counterfactual simulation. In practice in markets subject to program access rules, an integrated channel could
attempt to deny access to a rival distributor at the risk of triggering a binding arbitration process in which the
negotiated affiliate fees with other distributors might be used to determine the arbitrated price. Explicitly modeling
this process is beyond the scope of the current analysis, and we leverage the assumption that λR = 0 when PARs are
enforced for tractability. Furthermore, we do not attempt to estimate a value of λR ≥ 0 in markets where program
access rules are in effect given the absence of variation in the data that we believe would allow us to identify such a
parameter.
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Our estimation procedure conditions on the ownership structures of firms that are observed
in the data. We maintain the assumption that the integration status of a channel or distributor
does not directly affect viewership utility or distributor demand, and is not correlated with either
measurement error (e.g., in affiliate fees or markups) or market-level profit disturbances considered
by firms when bargaining or making pricing or carriage decisions.45 If these assumptions are
violated, then this paper’s predictions for the effects of vertical integration may be biased as these
predictions would not account for unobservable factors that led to observed ownership structures.
For example, if a channel and distributor are integrated for reasons outside our model (or in
anticipation of positive profit shocks), then counterfactually demerging that pair may understate
the benefits of integration. Likewise, if a channel and distributor are not integrated because of
unmodeled costs of integration, counterfactually merging them would overstate the benefits of
integration.
4.1 Estimation of Parameters θ1,θ2,θ3
4.1.1 Moments used in Estimation
We estimate the model parameters via GMM, using the following moments.
Household Viewership. For every RSN and 38 national channels in each year, we use the
difference between the following viewership moments observed in the data and predicted by the
model:46
1. Summing across markets, the mean viewership for each channel-year;
2. Summing across markets, the number of households with zero viewership for each channel-
year.47
Household Distributor Choice. For every year and market, we assume that the unobserv-
able characteristic for each distributor’s bundle is orthogonal to a vector of instruments: i.e.,
E[ξfmt(θ)Zmt] = 0, where the expectation is taken across all markets, firms, and years. For Zmt,
we include: firm-state and year dummy variables xfmt; the maximum fraction of teams carried
by the relevant RSNs in the market that are not blacked-out (to instrument for bundle utility
v∗fmt); and the satellite tax within the market, interacted with an indicator for whether the bundle
is offered by a cable or satellite distributor (to instrument for bundle prices pfmt).
48 We recover
45This does not rule out the possibility that integrated channels may differ in quality from non-integrated channels
(e.g., have different values of ρc), as we estimate time varying channel taste parameters.
46To avoid re-solving the viewership problem for every household for every evaluation of a candidate parameter
vector, we follow the importance sampling approach of Ackerberg (2009). See Appendix C.3 for further details.
47The MRI/Simmons data provides an estimate of the probability that a channel is never watched for national
channels. We regress this probability on viewership, and use the estimated relationship to predict the probability
that an RSN is never watched.
48The satellite tax changes that we use, by state year and percentage increase, are: CT 2003, 5%; FL 2002, 10%;
KY 2006, 5%; MA 2009, 5%; NC 2003, 7%; OH 2003, 6%; and UT 2003, 5%. We discuss these instruments further
in Section 5.2 and in footnote 65.
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ξfmt(θ) using the standard Berry et al. (1995) inversion to match observed and predicted market
shares (at each f,m, and t).
Distributor Bargaining, Pricing, and Carriage. First, for any θ, the vector of affiliate fees
{τfct} and bundle-specific marginal costs {mcfmt} can be directly computed using the optimal
pricing and bargaining conditions given by (5) and (10) (see Appendix C.2 for further details). We
use these predicted values of {mcfmt(θ)} and {τfct(θ)} in constructing the next set of moments
which we form using only 2007 data and values:
1. Average affiliate fees: For each RSN active in 2007 and four national channels (ABC
Family, ESPN, TNT, and USA), we minimize the difference between the model’s predicted
average affiliate fees across MVPDs and observed average affiliate fees: Ef [τfct(θ)]−τ oct (where
variables with an o superscript denote values of those objects that are observed in the data).
We weight estimated affiliate fees by national MVPD market shares conditional on observed
carriage of the channel to approximate expectations across MVPDs.
Deviations in these and the next set of moments for implied markups reflect both measurement
error in the data and sampling error, as our predictions are computed using a subset of U.S.
markets.
2. Implied markups: For each distributor f ∈ {Comcast,DirecTV,Dish}, we minimize the
difference between the model’s predicted MVPD price-cost margin and those observed in the
data: Em[(p
o
fmt −mcfmt(θ))/pofmt]−markupoft.
3. RSN Carriage: Equation (6) implies that every cable distributor f chooses the optimal set
of channels (from among those with which it has agreements) to include in each market m’s
bundle. We assume that distributor f ’s true per household profits (not per subscriber) in
market m are given by p˜iMfmt(·), where:
p˜iMfmt(Bmt, ·) ≡ [piMfmt(Bmt, ·)− ωfmt(Bfmt)] , (19)
and piMfmt(Bmt, ·) represents our (the econometrician’s) estimate of a firm’s per household
profits. The term ωfmt(Bfmt) represents a mean-zero i.i.d. bundle-distributor-market-time
specific disturbance; we assume that ωfmt(·) ∼ N(0, σ2ω).49
If channel c has negotiated an agreement with some firm f : (i.e., f carries c on its bundles in
some non-empty set of markets), then firm f ’s optimal carriage decision given by (6) implies
49We interpret ωfmt(·) as the difference between our estimated profits and those used by a local system operator
when determining carriage decisions; we assume that these disturbances are not accounted for by a distributor when
pricing or bargaining with channels.
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Table 1: Regression of RSN Carriage on Integration Status, Distance, and Blackout Percentage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VI Ownership Share 0.404*** 0.435*** 0.293*** 0.171**
(0.0674) (0.0837) (0.110) (0.0852)
% Teams not Blacked Out 0.412*** 0.399*** 0.429*** 0.477***
(0.0494) (0.0586) (0.109) (0.107)
Avg Distance to RSN’s Stadiums -0.559*** -0.630*** -0.838*** -0.795***
(103 mi) (0.100) (0.117) (0.238) (0.284)
Years 2000-10 2007 2007 2007
Systems All Systems All Systems Has P Q Has P Q
Has Deal No No No Yes
Observations 154,121 12,246 1,132 1,052
R-squared 0.615 0.616 0.670 0.639
Notes: Linear probability regression where the dependent variable is whether a cable system carries an RSN in a
relevant market in 2007. Specifications differ by sample used, where “Has P Q” restricts attention to systems for which
price and quantity data is available, and “Has Deal” restricts attention to system-RSN pairs where the MVPD has a
deal with the RSN (i.e., carries the RSN on at least one other system). All specifications use DMA, RSN and (when
appropriate) year fixed effects. Inclusion of system demographic controls (race, population density, average income,
household ownership) did not appreciably change point estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standards errors
are reported in parenthesis, and are clustered by DMA.
that: (
[∆fcpi
M
fmt(Bmt ∪ fc, ·)]− [∆fcωfmt(Bfmt ∪ fc, ·)]
)
≥ 0 ∀m : c ∈ Bfmt , (20)(
[∆fcpi
M
fmt(Bmt ∪ fc, ·)]− [∆fcωfmt(Bfmt ∪ fc, ·)]
)
≤ 0 ∀m : c /∈ Bfmt ,
where [∆fcpi
M
fmt(Bmt, ·)] ≡ piMfmt(Bmt, ·)− piMfmt(Bmt \ fc, ·), [∆fcωfmt(Bfmt)] ≡ ωfmt(Bfmt)−
ωfmt(Bfmt \ fc), and Bmt ∪ fc denotes the set of all bundles Bmt where c is added to bundle
f .50 That is, these inequalities imply that in any market in which c is carried by f , f obtains
higher profits from carrying than by dropping c (holding fixed prices and carriage decisions
of other firms); similarly, in any market where c is not carried, f obtains higher profits from
not carrying than by carrying c.
Given our assumptions on the distribution of ωfmt(·), it follows that:
Pr(c ∈ Bfmt) = Φ([∆fcpiMfmt(Bmt ∪ fc, ·)]/(2σω)) , (21)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
We construct several moments based on the model’s predicted carriage probabilities. First,
we construct moments based on indirect inference (cf. Gourie´roux and Monfort (1996)) that
match the predicted to observed relationship between carriage of a relevant RSN by a system
and (i) the ownership share of the RSN by the system’s MVPD, (ii) the distance of the
system to the RSN’s teams’ stadiums, and (iii) the fraction of teams on the RSN that are not
50In cases where c ∈ Bfmt, this definition implies that Bmt ∪ fc = Bmt.
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blacked-out. Table 1 presents the results of a linear probability regression predicting whether
a cable system carries a relevant RSN in our data. We find that carriage of an RSN by a cable
system is increasing with the share of the RSN owned by the system’s MVPD, and decreasing
in the distance between the system and the RSN’s teams’ stadiums and in the fraction of
teams that are blacked-out. We perform the same regression using the predicted carriage
probabilities from our model, and match the estimated coefficients for vertical integration,
distance, and the fraction of teams not blacked-out from this regression to the coefficients in
specification (4) in Table 1.51
Second, we calculate the probability that an RSN is carried by a cable distributor in a relevant
market, and match the probability that is observed in the data to that predicted by our model
via (21).52 Third, we set ∂Lcarriage/∂σω = 0, where Lcarriage is the predicted log-likelihood
of the observed market-level RSN carriage decisions by cable MVPDs, given by:
Lcarriage =
∑
c∈CRt
∑
fm:c∈Aft
(
1{c∈Bfmt} × log Pr(c ∈ Bfmt) + 1{c/∈Bfmt} × log Pr(c /∈ Bfmt)
)
,
where CRt denotes the set of RSNs, and Aft are the set of channels available to MVPD f .
4.1.2 Identification
We now provide a discussion of variation in the data that help identify the parameters of our model
(given the assumptions and moment restrictions that we employ).
Viewership and Distributor Choice Parameters (θ1,θ2). We believe that our estimate of
ρ, the parameters that govern the distribution of channel tastes, is determined primarily by viewing
behavior: i.e., channels watched by a larger fraction of households will tend to have higher values
of ρ0c (the probability that a channel delivers positive utility), and those that conditional upon
being watched are watched more often will tend to have higher values of ρ1c (the mean of the taste
distribution). Since we do not possess ratings for RSNs at the market level, we believe black-out
and distance parameters (γb and γd) are determined from other sources; we defer discussion of
these parameters until the end of this subsection.
We believe that variation in bundle market shares as observed bundle characteristics and prices
change is the primary source of information about parameters governing household bundle choice
(α, βx and βv). Table A.1 summarizes the variation in prices and channel carriage across markets.
State satellite taxes are used as an instrument for price, and the fraction of blacked-out teams on
RSNs in each relevant market is used as an instrument for viewership utility (as firms may respond
51We focus on the “Has Deal” specification as our model does not predict the probability of carriage for a system
if the MVPD and channel do not have a deal.
52E.g., if there are only two RSNs A and B, and A is carried on cable in 30/40 of A’s relevant markets, and B is
carried on cable in 25/60 of B’s relevant markets, the probability than an RSN is carried by a cable distributor in a
relevant market is 0.55.
29
0
1
2
3
4
In
pu
t F
ee
s
0 .005 .01 .015 .02 .025
Ratings
 Non-Sports  Sports
Sports and Non-Sports
Monthly Input Fees vs Ratings
Figure 3: Negotiated monthly affiliate fees and viewership ratings.
to local demand shocks when determining carriage). We believe that observed cable and satel-
lite pricing margins provide the main source of identification for satellite preference heterogeneity
(ρsat).53
We supplement bundle market share variation with observed average affiliate fees for each
channel. Our model predicts that a channel obtains higher affiliate fees if its presence has a greater
impact on households’ viewership utility when determining bundle choice (see (2)), as this implies
that the channel generates larger gains from trade with distributors. Thus, observed affiliate fees
provide information regarding the distribution of channel tastes and their scaling into viewership
utility. In particular, we believe that the observed relationship between affiliate fees and ratings is
the primary source of information for our “decay” parameters (νSc for sports channels and ν
NS
c for
non-sports channels). Our choice to allow different values of decay parameters for sports and non-
sports channels is motivated by the data, illustrated in Figure 3. Sports channels have consistently
higher negotiated affiliate fees than non-sports channels with similar ratings; our model is able to
match this pattern by attributing a higher initial utility γic and a higher decay rate ν
S to a sports
channel that has the same ratings as a non-sports channel.54
Bargaining, Pricing, and Carriage Parameters (θ3). The Nash bargaining parameters
{ζE , ζI} relate negotiated affiliate fees to distributor and channel gains from trade. If the ex-
ternal Nash bargaining parameter ζE = 0 (so that distributors obtain no surplus when negotiating
with a non-integrated channel), the bargaining first-order conditions given by (11) imply that af-
filiate fees between any distributor and non-integrated channel would be determined solely by the
53Under a standard logit demand system without preference heterogeneity, there is a strict relationship between
product market shares and price elasticities; in these models, allowing for product-level preference heterogeneity can
assist in rationalizing larger observed markups by reducing implied price elasticities for given market shares.
54For computational reasons, during estimation we restrict νS to lie on a discrete grid while allowing all other
parameters to vary freely; see Appendix C.3 for further details and robustness tests. See also the discussion in the
appendix of Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) which examines a variant of this model using Monte Carlo simulation.
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(a) CSN New England (b) CSN Mid-Atlantic (c) CSN Chicago
Figure 4: Carriage by Comcast and non-integrated cable MVPDs of three Comcast-integrated
RSNs across cable systems in 2007. Dots represent carriage by a system, X’s represent no carriage.
Black markers represent Comcast systems, grey markers represent non-Comcast cable systems.
distributor’s gains from trade; fees would not be affected by advertising revenues or factors entering
solely the channel’s gains from trade. Thus, controlling for viewership, we believe that the extent
to which average affiliate fees vary with advertising revenues for non-integrated channels provides
information about the value of ζE .55
Next, although the internalization parameter µ enters into the computation of several moments
(including any moment based on affiliate fees or marginal costs), we expect that its value is pri-
marily determined by our RSN Carriage moments and the higher observed carriage rates between
integrated distributors and channels (captured in the regressions in Table 1): as µ increases (holding
all other parameters fixed), our model predicts that distributors have a greater incentive to carry
an integrated channel for a fixed contribution of the channel to downstream profits. We believe
that black-out and distance parameters, γb, γd, are determined in a similar fashion to µ. In addi-
tion, given µ and ζE , the level of average affiliate fees for integrated channels should then provide
information about the value of the internal Nash bargaining parameter ζI . While the internally
negotiated affiliate fee between an integrated distributor and channel is not directly observed, it
can be recovered from the channel’s average affiliate fees across all distributors (which is observed)
and its average affiliate fee from non-integrated distributors only (which is a function of µ, ζE and
the channel’s gains from trade from those distributors).
An example of the variation in the data that we leverage is illustrated in Figure 4, which presents
the integrated and non-integrated carriage of a Comcast integrated RSN in three different regions
of the U.S. In these regions, cable systems in markets close to the RSN’s teams’ stadiums almost
always carry the RSN; systems far away most often do not. However, in markets located a moderate
distance away, these RSNs are much more likely to be carried on Comcast-owned systems than on
non-integrated systems.56 These maps also indicate that non-carriage is much more likely in areas
55The relationship between average affiliate fees for non-integrated channels and their estimated joint gains from
trade with distributors also provides information about the value of ζE .
56For example, in Figure 4a, all Comcast systems in northern Vermont carry CSN New England (black dots)
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where the teams on the RSN are blacked-out (as in New York for CSN New England, Pennsylvania
for CSN Mid-Atlantic, and Michigan for CSN Chicago).
Finally, the variance of carriage disturbances σ2ω affect only the value of our carriage moments.
As this variance increases (holding all other parameters fixed), the predicted carriage probability
for any channel approaches 1/2 as predicted carriage decisions become based purely on noise. We
thus believe that lower values of σ2ω indicate that our model’s predicted changes in distributors’
profits from carriage can be used to predict observed carriage decisions.57
4.2 Estimation of Lower Bounds for Rival Foreclosure Parameter
To recover lower bounds for our rival foreclosure parameter λR, we will use information provided
by markets in which distributors are able to exclude competitors from carrying an integrated RSN
channel—i.e., terrestrial loophole markets. The markets we focus on are Philadelphia and San
Diego, the channels in question CSN Philadelphia (owned by Comcast) and 4SD (owned by Cox),
and the competitors excluded from carriage are satellite distributors DirecTV and Dish.
Observe that because these two markets both had total exclusion of satellite distributors, we
will only be able to estimate lower bounds on λR, which we will denote by λ
Phil
R and λ
SD
R for each
market. Intuitively, for each market, the lower bound will be the lowest level of λR at which there
are no mutual gains from trade between the RSN and either satellite distributor (i.e., the value of
λR at which the gains from exclusion exceed the gains from carriage). In general, however, whether
there are gains from trade between an RSN and a satellite distributor depends on the satellite firm’s
beliefs about whether, if it is supplied, the other satellite firm will also be supplied. In Appendix B
we show that a necessary condition for non-supply, regardless of the satellite firm’s beliefs, is that
the joint profit of the RSN c and the two satellite firms g and g′ is reduced when both satellite
firms have access to the RSN, which can be stated as:
∑
m∈Mc
[
[∆gc,g′cΠ
M
gmt({Bomt ∪ {gc, g′c}},pomt, τ˜ ; µˆ)] + [∆gc,g′cΠMg′mt({Bomt ∪ {gc, g′c}},pomt, τ˜ ; µˆ)] . . .
+ [∆gc,g′cΠ
C
cmt({Bomt ∪ {gc, g′c}},pomt, τ˜ ; µˆ, λR)]
]
≤ 0 , (22)
where Mc represents the set of c’s relevant markets. The left-hand side of (22), which we refer to
as the “three-party surplus,” represents g, g′, and c’s joint gains from trade from both g and g′
being supplied with channel c and carrying the channel in all of c’s relevant markets, and τ˜ equals
the predicted values of affiliate fees τˆ (·) except that τ˜gct = τ˜g′ct = 0.58
whereas most non-Comcast systems (grey dots for systems that carry the RSN, and grey X’s for those that do not)
do not carry CSN New England. In Figures 4b and 4c, non-carriage by non-Comcast systems occurs much closer to
the RSN’s teams’ stadiums than for Comcast systems: there is a higher ratio of grey X’s to grey dots near Washington
DC and Chicago than of black X’s (non-carriage by Comcast systems) to black dots.
57Note that our intuition behind the determination of µ relies on carriage rate differences between non-integrated
and integrated firms, whereas σ2ω relies on carriage rate levels for either non-integrated or integrated firms.
58Specifically, we show that in an alternating offer bargaining game of the form studied by Collard-Wexler et al.
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For each of the loophole-market cable-integrated RSNs that do not contract with the satellite
distributors (CSN Philadelphia and 4SD), we estimate the corresponding lower bound that holds
for any beliefs held by a satellite firm about whether the RSN will also be supplied to the rival
satellite firm by finding the lowest value of λR that makes (22) hold.
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Incentives for Exclusion. It is instructive at this point to discuss the competing forces that
would induce a cable provider to withhold its integrated RSN from a satellite provider. This is
equivalent to understanding why the gains created when satellite distributors are supplied with the
RSN may be offset by the losses incurred by the integrated cable provider.
The primary gains-from-trade contemplated when a satellite distributor g is supplied with the
RSN are through potential market expansion effects from carriage: i.e., if consumers who previously
did not subscribe to any MVPD now would if satellite were to carry the RSN. Each household that
substitutes from the outside good to g would generate additional industry profit equal to the level
of g’s margins plus any additional advertising revenues generated by those households watching the
RSN.
The primary losses generated by supplying g with the RSN would be incurred by the RSN’s
integrated cable distributor if households substituted away from the integrated cable provider to
g. Although these consumers would generate profit for g, insofar as cable margins are higher than
those of satellite providers (by 10+ percentage points in our data), any household that switched
from cable to satellite as a result of supplying satellite with the RSN would reduce industry profit
by this difference in margins.60
Consequently, factors that make exclusion of satellite by an integrated cable owner (for λR > 0)
more likely include: (i) a smaller share of consumers that are not subscribers to any MVPD and
lower advertising rates (thereby reducing the potential gains generated by market expansion); (ii)
a larger cable “footprint” (market share) in the RSN’s relevant market area; (iii) closer substi-
tutability between satellite and cable distribution; and (iv) a larger differential between cable and
satellite margins (all of which would exacerbate the losses from business stealing by satellite from
cable). For all such factors, lower values of λR (closer to 0) cause any losses incurred by the RSN’s
integrated owner to be internalized less by the RSN when bargaining with g, reducing the likelihood
of exclusion occurring.
(2017), if the three-party-surplus is positive, then RSN c has a deviating pair of offers {τ˜gc, τ˜g′c} to both satellite
distributors that both will accept regardless of their beliefs over whether, if they are supplied, their rival will also be
supplied, and that will increase c’s profits. See Appendix B for a formal derivation and discussion of the idea behind
this result.
59An alternative would be to assume that when approached by the RSN to negotiate supply, a satellite firm holds
the belief that the rival satellite firm will not be supplied. The approach we employ instead provides a lower bound
for λR that holds for any beliefs.
60 Our timing assumptions rule out the possibility that an integrated channel contemplates the possibility of raising
the rival g’s price through “raising rivals’ cost” effects (cf. Salop and Scheffman, 1983). However, for a single cable-
integrated RSN whose rivals are satellite distributors that set a single national price, this effect would be small as an
increase in the RSN’s affiliate fee would only affect satellite distributors’ costs in a small portion of their markets.
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Table 2: Estimates of Key Parameters
Parameter Description Estimate SE
Viewership νNS Viewership Decay, Non-sports 0.59 0.00
Parameters νS Viewership Decay, Sports 0.95 -
θ1 γ
b Fraction of Teams Blacked-out -0.58 0.31
γd (103mi) Distance -0.93 0.27
Bundle Choice α Bundle Price -1.00 0.44
Parameters βv Bundle Viewership Utility 0.14 0.07
θ2 ρ
sat
DirecTV (10
2) DirecTV Exponential Parameter 0.42 0.23
ρsatDish(10
2) Dish Exponential Parameter 0.49 0.27
Pricing, Bargaining, σ2ω Variance of Carriage Shocks 0.00 0.00
Carriage and ζE Bargaining, External 0.28 0.03
Foreclosure Parameters ζI Bargaining, Internal 0.37 0.06
θ3, λR µ Internalization 0.79 0.09
µ× λPhilR Internalization & Rival Foreclosure, Philadelphia 1.11 0.14
µ× λSDR Internalization & Rival Foreclosure, San Diego 0.94 0.11
Notes: Selected key parameters from the first and second step estimation of the full model, where parameter νS is
estimated separately via a grid search (see Appendix C.3). Additional viewership parameters contained in θ1 are
reported in Appendix Table A.4; state-firm and year fixed effects in θ2 are not reported. Asymptotic GMM standard
errors are computed using numerical derivatives and 1500 bootstrap draws of markets and simulated households to
estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the moments. Estimates and standard errors for µ × λPhilR and µ × λSDR
are for the lower bound of these parameters.
5 Results and Parameter Estimates
Estimates of selected key parameters of our model are reported in Table 2. We discuss our estimates
primarily through how they influence predicted moments relating to consumer viewership and
subscription patterns, firm pricing and carriage decisions, and negotiated agreements.
5.1 Viewership Parameters
The willingness-to-pay (WTP) for each channel can be derived by computing the contribution of
a given channel to bundle utility for each household (v∗ijt in (2)), multiplying it by our estimates
of parameters βv/α to convert it into dollars, and averaging across households (as households have
different tastes (γict) for each channel, which are distributed according to parameters ρ).
61 We
report estimated values of these parameters and WTPs in 2007 for all channels in Appendix Ta-
ble A.4. We also depict the distribution of household WTPs for nine national channels, conditional
on being positive, in Figure 5a, with the fraction of households with positive valuations listed for
each channel. Although most national channels have average WTP values below $1 per month (and
other than sports channel ESPN, none exceed $2), the pattern is very different for RSNs: none are
predicted to have average WTP values less than $1 per month, and over 70% are greater than $2.
Our estimates of the RSN distance-decay parameter γd and blackout parameter γb are negative,
61We compute the average WTP for channels relative to a synthetic bundle that includes every national channel
carried by at least 60% of systems in 2007, and by using 20,000 simulated households. When computing the WTP
for an RSN c, we add the RSN to the synthetic bundle and use the average values of bict and dic across all markets
that carry the RSN.
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(a) Histograms of monthly WTP (conditional on being positive) for selected national channels.
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Figure 5: Predicted willingness-to-pay (WTP) for channels (2007 values).
and imply that consumers derive less utility from watching an RSN both (i) the further they are
from the teams carried on the RSN, and (ii) the greater the fraction of teams that are blacked out.
We predict that increasing the average distance of a household from an RSN’s teams’ stadiums from
0 to 100 miles reduces that household’s value of the channel by approximately 9%.62 Figure 5b
illustrates this pattern, and plots the predicted average WTP in 2007 for four different RSNs as
62As distance is measured in thousands of miles, being further away by 100 miles scales utility by exp(γˆd × 0.1).
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Table 3: Elasticities and Margins
Elasticity of row with respect to price of column: Cable DirecTV Dish
Cable -1.69 0.30 0.19
DirecTV 2.16 -2.90 0.13
Dish 3.18 0.22 -4.15
Outside Option 5.52 0.26 0.16
Predicted Margins
Mean Comcast Margin 0.66
Mean DirecTV Margin 0.48
Mean Dish Margin 0.45
Logit Demand Price Coefficients
OLS Logit Price Coefficient -0.004** (0.002)
IV Logit Price Coefficient -0.080*** (0.025)
Semi-Elasticity of row with respect to
removal of ESPN from column: Cable DirecTV Dish
Cable -18.90 3.86 2.36
DirecTV 54.82 -19.52 1.11
Dish 51.16 1.85 -19.67
Outside Option 17.27 0.22 0.14
Notes: This table reports predicted mean price elasticities, predicted margins for Comcast and the two satellite
distributors, the estimated price coefficient from a logit demand regression without (OLS) and with (IV) the use of
price instruments (where standard errors clustered at market level), and semi-elasticities from dropping the national
channel ESPN. For logit demand estimates, **, *** represent significance at the 5% and 1% levels.
the distance from a household to an RSN’s teams’ stadiums increases.63 Similarly, we predict that
subjecting half of the teams that an RSN normally broadcasts to blackout restrictions reduces
consumers’ valuation of the channel by 25%.
Finally, we estimate νNS to be different than νS . The lower estimated value of νNS implies
that consumers’ marginal utility from watching non-sports channels falls slower than for sports
channels; in turn, this implies that consumers derive higher utility from sports channels than non-
sports channels if they choose to spend the same amount of time spent watching each. Our model
thus predicts that sports channels receive higher negotiated affiliate fees for the same viewership
ratings, as depicted in Figure 5c for the year 2007.
5.2 Distributor Choice Parameters
All reported coefficients in θ2 are statistically significant at the 5% level, and have the expected
sign: consumers negatively respond to price (α), and positively respond to the indirect utility they
receive from a bundle’s channels (βv).
At the top of Table 3 we report the average own- and cross-price elasticities that are predicted
by our model. Demand for the average cable system is more inelastic (-1.7) than for satellite (-2.9
63Each point in Figure 5b corresponds to a market in which the RSN is carried in 2007, and the WTP for each
market is computed by averaging over 160 simulated households per market using that market’s value of bict and dic.
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and -4.2), which is consistent with higher cable market shares and margins that are both observed in
the data and predicted by our model.64 Estimated values of ρsatDirecTV and ρ
sat
Dish indicate consumers
have substantial heterogeneity in their valuation for satellite bundles (a standard deviation of ap-
proximately $40 per month); as discussed earlier, such heterogeneity assists the model in matching
observed Comcast, DirecTV, and Dish price-cost margins. The implied average predicted margins
are given in the second panel of Table 3.
To illustrate the efficacy of instruments described in the previous section (which include satellite
taxes), the third panel of Table 3 reports the results from a logit demand regression.65 Instrumenting
for price yields a 22 times larger estimated price coefficient, consistent with the presence of a positive
correlation between prices and unobservable bundle characteristics.
The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the semi-elasticity for MVPDs and the outside option given
the removal of ESPN from each type of distributor (cable or either of the two satellite providers).
For example, the removal of ESPN from DirecTV’s bundles implies that its own market share
would fall by 19.5%, while those for cable and Dish would increase by 3.9% and 1.8% respectively.
This implies that for every 1000 households that would leave DirecTV if it lost access to ESPN,
920 would substitute to cable, 67 would substitute to Dish, and 13 would go to the outside option.
These types of diversion figures, and in particular those to cable, play a central role in the incentives
of an integrated cable provider to deny access to a rival satellite distributor.
5.3 Pricing, Bargaining, Carriage and Foreclosure Parameters
We now discuss the parameters contained in θ3 which govern a firm’s pricing, bargaining and
carriage decisions, as well as our rival foreclosure parameter λR.
First, we estimate that the variance of firms’ bundle-market-time specific profit shocks (σˆ2ω) is
neither economically nor statistically significant. We estimate that channels capture more than
half of the gains from trade when bargaining, although less with integrated distributors (ζˆI = 0.38)
than non-integrated distributors (ζˆE = 0.28).
64Our estimates can be compared to Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), who estimate household demand for satellite, basic
cable, premium cable, and local antenna using 2001 data; they obtain an expanded basic cable own-price elasticity
of -1.5, and an overall satellite own-price elasticity of -2.5. They do not observe cross-sectional variation in prices for
satellite distributors, and rely on Slutsky symmetry to identify satellite price elasticities. Our estimated own-price
elasticity for cable is similar, and the overall satellite own-price elasticity implied by our own- and cross-price elasticity
estimates for DirecTV and Dish, computed at average market shares during our sample period (see Table A.1), is
-3.2.
65 For 20,784 firm-market-year bundles, the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market shares for the
bundle to the outside option, and the OLS regressors are firm-state and year fixed effects, channel fixed effects for
all channels contained in the bundle, and price. The excluded instruments for price in the IV regression are the
satellite tax within the market interacted with an indicator for whether the bundle is offered by a satellite or cable
distributor, and the maximum fraction of teams not blacked out within the market across all RSNs for which the
market is relevant. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments in the first stage regression of price is 425.4; the
t-statistic for satellite taxes interacted with a satellite distributor indicator in the first stage price regression is 35; and
the R2 from the regression is 0.52. Additionally, an important input into distributor demand elasticities with respect
to carriage is the coefficient on mean viewership utility in the distributor choice utility equation in (2). The first
stage regression of v∗fmt on the same set of instruments for price results in an F-statistic on the excluded instruments
of 389.4; the t-statistic for the maximum fraction of teams not blacked out is 33; and the R2 from the regression is
0.56.
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Our estimated value of µ indicates that firms internalize a substantial fraction, but not all, of
the profits of other integrated units when making decisions. Only $0.79 of each dollar of profit
realized by its integrated partner is internalized when an integrated MVPD makes pricing and
carriage decisions, or when integrated MVPDs and RSNs bargain with each other. The discussion
in Section 3.4.3 suggested ζfc × (1 + µfc) as a (rough) measure of the alignment of downstream
carriage and pricing decisions with joint profit maximization for a channel and MVPD.66 Our
estimates imply that this quantity is 0.28 with non-integration, and 0.66 with a fully-integrated
channel. This difference is statistically significant at standard confidence levels. Moreover, we
reject both µˆ = 1 and ζˆI × (1 + µˆ) = 1, indicating that integration does not lead to full joint profit
maximization.
Our estimated lower bounds for µ × λPhilR and µ × λSDR are 1.11 and 0.94. Figure 6 graphs
the total three party surplus—given by the left-hand side of (22)—between the integrated channel
and the two satellite distributors in the two loophole markets we examine (Philadelphia and San
Diego). We see that for values of µ×λR lower than 0.94, it is not an equilibrium for either channel
to exclude both satellite distributors as there would be a profitable deviation, for some negotiated
set of affiliate fees, for the channel to be supplied. However, for values between approximately
0.94 and 1.11, we can rationalize exclusion in San Diego but not Philadelphia. Only for values
of µ × λR ≥ 1.11 does our model rationalize exclusion in both of these loophole markets. These
results indicate that integrated channels’ supply decisions vis-a`-vis non-integrated rival distributors
are significantly affected by foreclosure incentives; these weights placed on the benefits of rival
foreclosure for the channel’s integrated distributors are not stastically significantly different from
1.67
6 The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration
In this section we use our model’s estimates to examine how vertical integration affects affiliate fee
negotiations (including whether supply occurs at all), distributors’ pricing and carriage decisions,
and—ultimately—firm and consumer welfare. We focus on 26 RSNs that were active in 2007, 13 of
which were (at least partially) integrated with a downstream distributor (10 with a cable MVPD,
3 with DirecTV).68 Of these integrated RSNs, two—CSN Philadelphia and 4SD—were owned by
cable distributors in “loophole” markets, and were not provided to satellite.
For each of these RSNs we simulate market outcomes for the year 2007 that would have occurred
66Specifically, ζfc × (1 + µfc) = 1 would lead to joint profit-maximizing carriage and pricing decisions when the
MVPD operates in a single market.
67Given µˆ = 0.79, these estimates imply that λPhilR is at least 1.4 and λ
SD
R at least 1.3, which corresponds to the
integrated channel placing more weight on its integrated distributor’s benefits from foreclosure than the channel and
distributor place on each other’s profits when pricing, making carriage decisions, and bargaining with each other.
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that either of these values differ from 1: the 95% confidence interval for
λˆ
Phil
R is [0.97, 1.93] and λˆ
SD
R is [0.82, 1.70].
68We exclude from our analysis 3 cable-integrated RSNs (CSN Northwest, Comcast/Charter Sports Southeast, and
Cox Sports TV) and one independent RSN (YES) that did not supply satellite providers in markets where PARs
were in effect, as our model does not explain this exclusion.
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Figure 6: Three-party surplus between the integrated cable MVPD, DirecTV, and Dish as a function
of µ× λR in Philadelphia and San Diego.
in the RSN’s relevant markets under the following three integration scenarios: (1) Non-integration,
(2) Integration with PARs, and (3) Integration without PARs.69 More specifically:
(i) Non-Integration: In this scenario, we assume that µ = 0 and λR = 0 so that all firms behave
as if they are non-integrated (i.e., no MVPD or channel internalizes the profits of any other
unit).
(ii) Integration and PARs: In this scenario, if the RSN being examined is non-integrated in
the data, we assign full ownership of the channel to the largest cable MVPD in that RSN’s
relevant markets; if the RSN is integrated, we do not change its ownership structure. We then
assume that µ is equal to our estimated value µˆ = 0.79, but that λR = 0: i.e., we assume that
integrated distributors and channels partially internalize each other’s profits when bargaining
with each other over affilliate fees, and when the integrated distributor is pricing and making
carriage decisions, but that program access rules prevent the channels from considering the
benefits of foreclosure to its integrated distributor when bargaining with rival distributors.
(iii) Integration and no-PARs: In our final scenario, we follow the same setup as in the “In-
tegration and PARs” scenario, but assume that λR = λˆ
Phil
R , the larger of our two recovered
lower bounds.70 The RSN therefore internalizes the profits of its downstream integrated units
when bargaining with other downstream distributors, and thus may find it unprofitable to
supply downstream rivals.
69We simulate the equilibrium under all three scenarios for each RSN, including whichever scenario occurred in the
data for the RSN.
70The value of λR must be at least λˆ
Phil
R to rationalize the non-supply of the satellite distributors that we observe
in both Philadelphia and San Diego. If λR > λˆ
Phil
R , foreclosure incentives would be larger than those considered here;
we explore the effects of larger values of λR in Section 6.3.
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For each integration scenario and each RSN, we solve for a set of bundle prices, carriage deci-
sions, and negotiated affiliate fees that satisfy the necessary equilibrium conditions given by equa-
tions (5), (6), and (11). Under non-integration and integration with PARs (scenarios (i) and (ii)),
we assume that all RSNs are supplied to all distributors.71 Under scenario (iii), where channels are
integrated but PARs are not in effect, we also solve for the RSN’s equilibrium supply decision. To
determine whether or not each rival distributor is supplied with the channel, we test which supply
outcomes (e.g., if a cable integrated RSN supplies both, neither, or either one of the two satellite
distributors) are consistent with equilibrium.72
In our main counterfactual results, we assume that a change in ownership for a single RSN
does not cause national satellite prices to adjust, and we thus hold satellite prices fixed at observed
levels. In Section 6.3, we also examine counterfactuals under the alternative assumption that
satellite prices are determined at the DMA level, and may adjust across our integration scenarios.
Further computational and implementation details are provided in Appendix C.4.
6.1 Potential Effects
Before proceeding, it is instructive to highlight the effects of vertical integration that are captured
by our model and that we attempt to quantify. Our model emphasizes three main supply-side
decisions: (i) negotiations over supply and affiliate fees between channels and distributors, and
both (ii) channel carriage (conditional on supply) and (iii) bundle pricing by distributors.
Suppose, then, that MVPD f integrates with RSN c, and that there is a rival MVPD g. The
following effects of vertical integration are admitted in our setting:
1. Bargaining Effects and Foreclosure: When integration occurs there are effects on both
internal and external bargaining. As discussed in Section 3.4.3, we expect the effective internal
affiliate fee paid by the integrated distributor f to fall when integration occurs: i.e., our 0.79
estimated value of µ indicates that the RSN and distributor f internalize (most of) each
71Aside from the two loophole RSNs, all other RSNs in our counterfactuals were provided to all distributors in
2007.
72At the set of affiliate fees, prices, and carriage decisions that satisfy the necessary equilibrium conditions under
each potential supply outcome, for each cable-owned channel in scenario (iii) we test: (a) whether supplying both
satellite providers is an equilibrium by examining if there are positive bilateral gains from trade between the RSN
and each satellite provider given that the other satellite provider is supplied; (b) whether supplying only one satellite
distributor is an equilibrium by examining if there are positive gains from trade between the RSN and the supplied
satellite distributor given that the other satellite provider is not supplied, and if there are no bilateral gains from
trade between the RSN and the non-supplied satellite distributor given that the other satellite provider is supplied;
and (c) whether supplying neither satellite distributor is an equilibrium by examining if the three-party-surplus given
by the left-hand side of (22) is negative. For all RSNs but two, exactly one supply outcome was robust to these tests.
For two RSNs, exactly two supply outcomes satisfied these tests: for CSN Philadelphia, they were the non-supply of
both satellite distributors and the supply of only DirecTV; for NESN, they were the non-supply of both or supply
of both. We report results assuming that the outcome with the least supply is chosen (as this outcome maximized
the integrated firms’ profits given our parameter estimates). For each of the three RSNs owned by DirecTV, we
determine supply by verifying that the bilateral surplus generated by the RSN’s supply of each cable MVPD in the
RSN’s relevant markets as well as Dish Network is positive (where surpluses are computed at updated levels of affiliate
fees, prices, and carriage decisions).
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others’ payoffs. Of course, in equilibrium, the internal affiliate fee is also affected by any
changes in carriage and pricing as these can change both f and c’s gains from trade.
The effects of integration on external bargaining will depend on whether PARs are in effect
or not. When PARs are in effect, RSN c ignores any benefits to its integrated distributor f ’s
profits from denying access to rival distributor g, just as if c was not integrated. However, the
negotiated affiliate fee to g may still be affected by changes in f ’s carriage and prices, which
can affect g’s benefit from getting access to c, and by any change in the internal affiliate fee
that c receives from f (which would alter how supply of g affects c’s profit).
Finally, when c bargains with the rival MVPD g and PARs are not in effect, c internalizes
the lost profit of its integrated downstream distributor f if g is supplied (since λR > 0). As
a result, the gains-from-trade that accrue to c by supplying g are reduced from what they
would be under either non-integration or in the presence of PARs, potentially leading to
a higher negotiated affiliate fee τgct or—if gains-from-trade are eliminated altogether—non-
supply. Again, however, any induced changes in carriage and pricing can also affect negotiated
input fees.
2. Carriage Effects: When vertical integration occurs, the fact that µ is positive makes the
integrated f internalize the effects of its carriage of RSN c on c’s profit. As carriage is likely
to increase c’s profit due to the increase in affiliate fees earned from f (although an offsetting
effect is that f ’s carriage of c may lower c’s affiliate fee revenues earned from g, by reducing
g’s market share), integration may lead f to increase carriage of RSN c. The net impact on
carriage will also depend on equilibrium price adjustments and whether rival distributors are
still supplied with the channel.
3. Pricing Effects: As with the carriage decision, an integrated f will internalize effects of its
pricing on RSN c’s profit. This is likely to push f toward charging a lower bundle price—i.e.,
reducing double marginalization—as a lower price will increase f ’s market share, and hence
the affiliate fees that c collects from f (although, as described above, there is a potentially
offsetting effect from any reduced affiliate fees earned from g, as in Chen 2001). In addition,
changes in carriage will have a separate effect on f ’s pricing; for example, if carriage increases,
the resulting increased bundle quality is likely to push f to increase prices in those markets
where c is added to its bundle relative to what its prices would have been absent the carriage
change.
Thus, while we expect integration to increase carriage and reduce double marginalization by
integrated distributors, and the absence of PARs to increase foreclosure of and affiliate fees paid
by rival distributors of integrated firms, confounding effects are present that may upset these
expectations. Moreover, even if the directions of these effects are as expected, their magnitudes,
and their overall impacts on consumer and aggregate welfare remain empirical questions that our
counterfactual simulations aim to address.
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Table 4: Simulated Market Outcomes for Selected RSNs
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
CABLE INTEGRATED RSNs
CSN PHIL Cable Mkt Share 0.64 0.8% 1.8%
Comcast [0.62,0.65] [0.2%,2.4%] [0.6%,4.0%]
Pop 4.25M Sat Mkt Share 0.18 -0.5% -10.4%
Footprint 90% [0.17,0.19] [-3.3%,-0.2%] [-14.8%,-0.5%]
WTP $4.99 Cable Carriage 0.95 1.6% 0.4%
[0.62,0.97] [0.0%,53.8%] [-6.2%,52.9%]
Cable Prices 54.31 -0.5% 0.9%
[53.28,55.42] [-1.5%,0.9%] [-1.4%,1.8%]
Foreclose: 85% Aff Fees to Sat 2.26 3.6% -
[1.00,2.64] [-9.4%,7.0%] -
Cable + RSN Surplus 30.19 0.2% 0.9% 1.1% 6.5%
[14.57,32.67] [0.0%,2.4%] [0.3%,13.7%] [0.4%,3.3%] [3.0%,20.5%]
Satellite Surplus 4.29 -0.9% -0.8% -2.1% -1.8%
[1.26,4.70] [-3.4%,-0.4%] [-2.4%,-0.5%] [-4.8%,-1.1%] [-4.5%,-0.9%]
Consumer Welfare 31.21 0.6% 3.9% -2.9% -18.1%
[16.82,34.81] [0.2%,2.0%] [1.4%,12.7%] [-3.3%,1.5%] [-21.8%,9.9%]
Total Welfare 65.69 0.3% 4.0% -1.0% -13.4%
[31.14,71.73] [0.1%,1.9%] [2.0%,25.2%] [-1.1%,1.1%] [-15.6%,14.7%]
MSG Cable Mkt Share 0.63 3.3% 3.3%
Cablevision [0.62,0.67] [0.3%,4.8%] [0.2%,4.7%]
Pop 11.7M Sat Mkt Share 0.18 -4.3% -4.3%
Footprint 42% [0.17,0.18] [-7.1%,-0.4%] [-8.1%,-0.4%]
Pred WTP $2.32 Cable Carriage 0.68 10.5% 10.5%
[0.67,0.87] [-2.5%,18.5%] [-3.1%,18.5%]
Cable Prices 59.40 -2.4% -2.4%
[56.80,60.81] [-3.5%,0.0%] [-3.5%,0.2%]
Foreclose: 1% Aff Fees to Sat 1.22 -3.3% 22.4%
[0.42,1.28] [-5.9%,10.4%] [17.1%,53.4%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 30.64 0.3% 4.4% 0.5% 6.8%
[14.61,34.12] [-0.1%,0.6%] [-1.6%,7.4%] [0.0%,1.3%] [0.4%,14.6%]
Satellite Surplus 4.16 -4.2% -7.5% -5.5% -9.9%
[1.24,4.48] [-7.2%,-0.5%] [-12.1%,-0.9%] [-8.5%,-1.2%] [-14.3%,-2.4%]
Consumer Welfare 33.80 3.1% 44.6% 3.0% 44.3%
[18.38,38.14] [0.3%,4.3%] [4.4%,66.3%] [-0.4%,4.3%] [-6.3%,66.0%]
Total Welfare 68.60 1.4% 41.4% 1.4% 41.2%
[32.06,76.01] [0.1%,1.9%] [3.4%,60.9%] [0.1%,1.9%] [2.5%,60.7%]
NON-INTEGRATED RSN
NESN Cable Mkt Share 0.61 7.6% 9.4%
*Comcast [0.59,0.65] [1.6%,11.2%] [2.7%,12.5%]
Pop 5.20M Sat Mkt Share 0.13 -7.8% -22.3%
Footprint 85% [0.12,0.14] [-12.6%,-1.8%] [-26.5%,-7.2%]
WTP $6.91 Cable Carriage 0.92 6.2% 3.6%
[0.68,0.98] [0.0%,33.1%] [-0.5%,38.1%]
Cable Prices 56.73 -4.7% -3.9%
[54.24,57.88] [-6.6%,-0.5%] [-6.0%,0.6%]
Foreclose: 96% Aff Fees to Sat 3.32 3.1% -
[1.23,3.79] [-12.6%,16.9%] -
Cable + RSN Surplus 28.38 0.9% 3.6% 2.0% 8.2%
[13.68,31.36] [0.1%,2.4%] [0.9%,10.6%] [0.7%,4.0%] [5.4%,16.7%]
Satellite Surplus 2.96 -8.3% -3.5% -10.9% -4.7%
[0.84,3.24] [-13.2%,-1.8%] [-5.5%,-1.3%] [-13.9%,-3.0%] [-6.3%,-1.7%]
Consumer Welfare 28.36 6.4% 26.5% 3.3% 13.5%
[15.54,31.97] [1.4%,10.0%] [8.2%,40.8%] [-1.7%,7.1%] [-9.0%,29.2%]
Total Welfare 59.70 3.1% 26.5% 2.0% 17.0%
[29.79,65.84] [0.5%,5.1%] [7.8%,43.7%] [-0.2%,4.5%] [-2.5%,37.5%]
Notes: Scenarios (i)-(iii) correspond to the integration scenarios described at the beginning of Section 6. Beneath the RSN
name is either the name of the RSN’s owner (observed or, if non-integrated, assigned, which is denoted by ∗), the number
of television households in the RSN’s relevant markets, the MVPD owner’s footprint (% of households passed) in the RSN’s
relevant markets, and the estimated mean consumer WTP for the RSN. Scenario (i) reports household weighted averages over
all relevant markets for each RSN, where all levels except for market shares and cable carriage are in $/household/month.
Scenarios (ii) and (iii) report changes from scenario (i), where %∆lvl (respectively, %∆WTP ) represent changes from scenario
(i) expressed as a percentage of changes in household weighted averages of levels (respectively, estimated mean consumer WTP
for the channel). Affiliate fees to satellite are reported conditional on supply; missing values indicate foreclosure. 95% confidence
intervals, constructed from 150 simulations, are reported below each figure; the fraction of simulations in which the RSN is
predicted to foreclose at least one rival distributor under scenario (iii) is reported last under each RSN’s name (“Foreclose: %”).
Results for all other RSNs are contained in Appendix Tables A.5-A.10.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Individual RSN Results
As an illustration of the kinds of effects we see for individual RSNs, Table 4 reports market shares,
channel carriage, cable prices, firm profits, and consumer and total welfare across our three differ-
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ent integration scenarios for three RSNs: CSN Philadelphia, a cable-integrated RSN located in a
terrestrial loophole market; MSG, a cable-integrated RSN located in a non-loophole market; and
NESN, a non-integrated RSN. Below each RSN name is the MVPD that owns the channel (or is
assigned ownership under integration scenarios (ii) and (iii) if the RSN is non-integrated, denoted
by a * next to the assigned owner’s name), the number of households and the MVPD owner’s
“footprint” (the percentage of these households that the MVPD “passes” or plausibly could serve)
in the RSN’s relevant markets, and the estimated mean consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for
the RSN.
The values shown for scenario (i), corresponding to no vertical integration (“No VI”), are
household weighted average levels across an RSN’s relevant markets; with the exception of market
shares and cable carriage, reported numbers are in dollars per household per month. For integration
scenarios (ii) and (iii), “VI PARs” and “VI No PARs” respectively, we report changes from non-
integration scenario (i) either as a percentage of non-integration levels (denoted %∆lvl) or as a
percentage of the mean WTP for the RSN (denoted %∆WTP ). A missing value for “Aff Fees to Sat”
indicates that the RSN is predicted to be withheld from the two satellite distributors. Confidence
intervals are constructed by taking 150 draws from the joint distribution of the estimated coefficients
and re-computing the equilibrium for each draw. The fraction of the scenario (iii) draws for which
the RSN is predicted to foreclose and not supply at least one rival distributor is also shown last
under each RSN name (“Foreclose: %”).
For each of the three RSNs shown in Table 4 vertical integration with PARs in effect leads the
integrated distributor to increase carriage and reduce its bundle price at our point estimates, and
in each case we can reject a zero effect for at least one of the carriage or price effects. Cable’s
market share increases in each case, and satellite’s share decreases; as well, satellite surplus falls,
consumer welfare increases, and total welfare rises (all such effects are statistically significant).
When integration occurs without PARs in effect, two of these three RSNs—CSN Philadelphia
and NESN—deny access to both rival satellite producers. Despite this exclusion, only for CSN
Philadelphia are the point estimates for the effects of vertical integration on consumer and total
welfare negative, and for neither of these two RSNs can we reject zero net consumer and total
welfare effects. For the third RSN, MSG, the two satellite distributors continue to have access
to the RSN, although paying higher affiliate fees (22.4% higher according to our point estimates,
and statistically significantly different from zero). For all three RSNs, vertical integration without
PARs in effect lowers the satellite distributors’ profits by between 2-11% (statistically significant
in each case).
Results for all other RSNs are contained in Appendix Tables A.5-A.10. Overall, the outcomes
for different RSNs display considerable heterogeneity.
6.2.2 Average Results
We now turn to the average effects of vertical integration. Table 5 reports market outcomes for
each of the three vertical integration scenarios, averaged across RSNs and weighted by the number
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Table 5: Average Simulated Market Outcomes Across All RSNs
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI) (vs. VI PARs)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
ALL RSNs
Cable Mkt Share 0.60 2.1% 2.2% 0.1%
[0.59,0.62] [0.4%,2.6%] [0.4%,2.6%] [-0.2%,0.3%]
Sat Mkt Share 0.20 -2.0% -2.7% -0.8%
[0.20,0.21] [-2.6%,-0.4%] [-4.1%,-0.8%] [-2.6%,-0.0%]
Cable Carriage 0.72 9.4% 8.6% -0.7%
[0.66,0.80] [3.1%,21.5%] [0.8%,19.1%] [-4.4%,0.9%]
Cable Prices 55.10 -1.2% -1.1% 0.1%
[54.25,55.90] [-1.5%,-0.1%] [-1.4%,-0.0%] [0.0%,0.3%]
Aff Fees to Rivals(a) 1.36 -0.7% 17.1% 18.0%
[0.54,1.45] [-3.2%,4.4%] [11.0%,28.5%] [12.1%,28.6%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 23.04 0.3% 3.1% 0.6% 5.0% 0.2% 1.9%
[11.13,25.17] [0.1%,0.6%] [1.4%,5.4%] [0.2%,0.9%] [2.6%,8.1%] [0.1%,0.5%] [0.5%,4.2%]
Satellite Surplus 5.10 -2.2% -4.3% -3.2% -6.0% -1.0% -1.7%
[1.56,5.51] [-3.1%,-0.5%] [-6.7%,-0.3%] [-3.9%,-1.0%] [-8.4%,-1.1%] [-1.3%,-0.4%] [-2.5%,-0.6%]
Consumer Welfare 30.99 1.5% 18.0% 1.3% 16.2% -0.2% -1.7%
[16.15,34.47] [0.3%,1.8%] [5.5%,23.8%] [-0.1%,1.5%] [-1.3%,20.4%] [-0.7%,-0.1%] [-8.4%,0.0%]
Total Welfare 59.13 0.7% 16.8% 0.6% 15.3% -0.1% -1.5%
[27.59,64.41] [0.1%,0.9%] [5.4%,22.2%] [0.0%,0.8%] [0.8%,18.7%] [-0.2%,-0.0%] [-6.4%,0.1%]
# Foreclosed: 4/26 [0,9]
Notes: Average simulated market outcomes across the 26 RSNs in our analysis, weighted by the number of households
in each RSN’s relevant markets. Percentages are the averages of percentage changes across RSNs, weighted by the
number of households in each RSN’s relevant markets. “# Foreclosed” reports the number of RSNs that are not
provided to rival distributors under (iii) VI No PARs. See Table 4 and main text for additional details.
(a) “Fees to Rival” represents average affilliate fees (to the satellite MVPDs for cable-integrated RSNs, and to cable
MVPDs and the rival satellite distributor for satellite-integrated RSNs) conditional on supply in each relevant scenario.
of households in each RSN’s relevant markets. The structure is the same as in Table 4, with
the following adjustments. First, “Aff Fees to Rivals” represents the weighted average of the
affiliate fees charged to the integrated MVPD’s rival distributors (weighted by the number of
households in each of the RSN’s relevant markets), conditional on the channel being supplied to
those distributors. These rival distributors are the two satellite distributors if the channel is cable-
integrated; if instead the channel is DirecTV-integrated, these rivals are the cable distributors in
the RSN’s relevant markets and Dish. Second, “# Foreclosed” represents the number of RSNs that
are not provided to at least one rival distributor for the case of integration without PARs in effect
(integration scenario (iii)). Third, in the rightmost two columns, we report the weighted average
change in predicted outcomes between scenarios (ii) and (iii); these changes are expressed both as
percentages of scenario (ii) levels and of an RSN’s estimated mean WTP, and isolate the impact
of program access rules given integration. All reported percentages are the averages of percentage
changes across RSNs, weighted by the number of households in each RSN’s relevant markets.
Efficiency Effects: Reduction of Double Marginalization and Increased Carriage. We
first focus on the potential efficiency gains from vertical integration. These are highlighted by the
differences between integration scenario (ii) with PARs and non-integration scenario (i), reported
in the second and third columns of Table 5.
Across all RSNs, we predict that integration of a single RSN when PARs are in effect yields on
average a (statistically significant) 9.4% increase in carriage of the RSN by cable distributors.73 It
73This average includes carriage changes by cable operators for the three satellite-owned RSNs.
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also results on average in a (statistically significant) 1.2% decrease in cable prices (corresponding
to an average $0.67 reduction in the price consumers pay).74,75 As discussed in Section 6.1, pricing
reductions arise primarily from the reduction of double marginalization. However, there are offset-
ting effects that may mitigate downward pricing incentives: integrated distributors now internalize
affiliate fees paid by rival MVPDs, and (as we have noted) carriage of the RSN by cable providers
increases when the channel is integrated (thereby increasing the utility delivered by bundles in
certain markets). Even so, cable prices fall on average.76
We find that joint RSN and integrated cable surplus increases on average when moving from
non-integration to integration with PARs: when a cable MVPD is integrated (and since µˆ is greater
than 0), its pricing and carriage decisions will partially internalize RSN profits (even if, under PARs,
the channel does not act upon rival foreclosure incentives). Satellite surplus, on average across all
RSNs, falls by 2.2% when RSNs are integrated with PARs in effect.77 Consumer welfare and total
welfare increase by, on average, 1.5% and 0.7% respectively (18.0% and 16.8%, respectively, as
percentage gains of WTP for the RSN). The change in total welfare represents an average increase
of $0.43 per household per month. Each of these changes is statistically significant.
We find that consumer welfare gains arise primarily from lower cable prices: if we hold cable
prices fixed at non-integrated levels and re-compute equilibrium outcomes (including carriage and
affiliate fees) under integration with PARs, average consumer welfare gains across all RSNs are
0.3%; holding fixed carriage rates at non-integrated levels and re-computing equilibrium outcomes
yields average consumer welfare gains of 1.5%.78
Foreclosure Effects: Raising Rivals’ Costs and Exclusion. The comparison of scenarios
(ii) and (iii), shown in the last two columns of Table 5 provides the impact of removing PARs given
that RSNs are integrated, and isolates the impact of foreclosure incentives on market outcomes.
Allowing foreclosure is predicted to reduce both consumer and total welfare from the integration
scenario with PARs by 0.2% and 0.1%, respectively; both are statistically significant, and represent
average changes of 1.7% and 1.5% as a percentage of the WTP for the RSN.
The reduction in welfare from the absence of PARs stems primarily from two effects. The
first occurs when an RSN is completely withheld from rival MVPDs. Though we predict that
none of the three DirecTV-owned RSNs would choose to exclude cable providers, we predict that
74The values reported for scenarios (ii) and (iii) in Tables 4-5 are the (household weighted) averages of percentage
changes, not the percentage change in the average levels. Thus, the average $0.67 decrease in price that we describe
here does not equal the product of the values in the first and second columns of Table 5.
75Though integration of most RSNs yields less than a 1% decrease in cable prices, there are several cases where
price decreases are larger: e.g., integrating NESN with Comcast, reported in the bottom panel of Table 4, results in
average cable prices falling by nearly 5% (corresponding to an average reduction in the price consumers pay of $2.67)
due to NESN’s high estimated affiliate fees to Comcast (predicted to be approximately $4.70 per month).
76In fact, we find that average cable prices do not increase for any individual RSN upon integration in the presence
of PARs.
77This percentage includes both cable and satellite integration of RSNs, although it is primarily reflecting cable
ownership of RSNs. In Appendix Table A.7, we report market outcomes for the three satellite integrated RSNs.
78These partial effects, calculated from the same non-integration baseline, do not sum to the total equilibrium
effect when prices, carriage, and affiliate fees adjust.
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Table 6: Welfare Changes From Foreclosure
Percentage change in levels between (ii) VI PARs and (iii) VI No PARs
%∆ Consumer Welfare %∆ Total Welfare
Are Rival Distributors Excluded -1.95*** -0.72***
(0.53) (0.22)
N 3900 3900
R2 0.52 0.52
Notes: Regression where the dependent variable is the percentage change in either consumer or total welfare in
levels between integration scenarios (ii) and (iii) (with and without PARs in effect). Each observation is an RSN-
counterfactual simulation (26 × 150). Specifications include RSN fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at RSN
level, and ∗∗∗ represents significance at the 1% level.
Table 7: Probability of Exclusion
Exclusion of Rival Distributors by Integrated RSN (Without PARs)
Footprint of Integrated Owner 0.67**
(0.25)
WTP for RSN 0.07
(0.05)
N 26
R2 0.29
Notes: Linear probability regression where the dependent variable is whether rival distributors are denied access to
an RSN under integration scenario (iii) without PARs. Each observation is an RSN. Specification includes a fixed
effect for whether the RSN owner is a cable operator. ∗∗ represents significance at the 5% level.
3 out of the 14 RSNs integrated with a cable provider in the data (the two loophole RSNs and
CSN New England) and one previously non-integrated RSN (NESN) would exclude both satellite
distributors.79 Conditional on integration occurring, exclusion of a rival distributor is associated
with a negative change in welfare: Table 6 reports results from a regression of the change in
consumer and total welfare between VI scenarios with and without PARs on whether or not rival
distributors are denied access to the RSN. Results indicate that the exclusion of rival distributors
is associated with a 1.9% and 0.7% reduction in consumer and total welfare, which roughly equals
the predicted average welfare gains from integration with PARs (%∆lvl in scenario (ii)).
To examine when exclusion is more likely to occur, Table 7 reports results from a linear prob-
ability regression of whether rival distributors are denied access to an RSN when PARs are not in
effect; the footprint, or percentage of households in the RSN’s relevant markets that the integrated
distributor can serve, is positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with the discussion
in Section 4.2 (i.e., larger cable footprints increase the potential losses incurred by an integrated
cable provider from supplying the RSN to rival satellite distributors), and reflects the fact that the
cable owners for the four RSNs that are predicted to foreclose satellite distributors all have greater
than an 85% footprint.
The second effect that reduces welfare arises when an integrated RSN still supplies rival dis-
tributors but raises their affiliate fees, which in turn affects downstream distributor pricing and
79The 95% confidence interval for the number of RSNs that exclude is [0,9].
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carriage. Table 5 indicates that affiliate fees for integrated RSNs charged to rivals, conditional
on supply, increase on average by a statistically significant 18.0% from the levels predicted when
PARs are in effect.80 Even though we have assumed that satellite distributors do not adjust their
prices in our counterfactuals, higher satellite affiliate fees can negatively harm consumer welfare by
inducing the integrated cable owner to increase its own downstream prices or reduce its carriage.
Intuitively, if a cable-integrated RSN increases its affiliate fees with satellite distributors, then the
RSN’s downstream cable MVPD sees a greater benefit to its integrated RSN from raising its price
or reducing its carriage, which will move subscribers to the now higher-paying satellite distributors.
Indeed, we find that cable prices increase, on average, by a small, but statistically significant 0.1%;
carriage falls in our point estimates by 0.7%, although this change is not statistically significant.81
Overall, removing PARs reduces satellite firms’ surplus by a statistically significant 1.0% beyond
the reduction caused by integration when PARs are in effect.
Net Effects. The comparison of scenarios (iii) and (i), shown in the fourth and fifth columns
of Table 5, gives the overall net impact of integration of RSNs when PARs are not in effect. On
average across all RSNs, the efficiency effects dominate the foreclosure effects when examining
consumer and total welfare—both increase by approximately 1.3% and 0.6%, representing 15-16%
of the total WTP generated by an RSN.82 This is driven by an increase in RSN carriage (9% on
average) and a reduction in cable prices (1.1%). However, satellite market shares and profits are
predicted to fall by 2.7% and 3.2%, respectively, when RSNs are integrated.83
Looking separately at the 4 markets in which exclusion occurs at our point estimates, consumer
and total welfare increase on average by small amounts (0.4% and 0.3% respectively) and we
cannot reject zero effects. In contrast, consumer and total welfare rise on average by a statistically
significant 1.4% and 0.7% respectively in the 22 markets in which exclusion does not occur.
6.2.3 “Perfect” Internalization
Although we reject that integration leads to full joint profit maximization, we have also conducted
our counterfactual simulations using our main parameter estimates under the assumption that µ =
λR = 1.
84 Our findings are broadly similar: examining average changes between integration without
80In some cases this increase represents an increase of nearly $0.50 per month per subscriber, as with CSN Mid-
Atlantic (see Table A.6).
81This effect is discussed in Chen (2001). As a specific example, Comcast, the owner of CSN Mid-Atlantic, increases
its own price of a bundle by $0.11 between scenarios (ii) and (iii) as a result of negotiating a significantly higher
affiliate fee for CSN Mid-Atlantic from satellite distributors.
82On average, consumer welfare rises by $0.39 and total welfare by $0.38 per household per month.
83These average net welfare changes mask considerable heterogeneity in the point estimates for individual RSNs.
For instance, we find that foreclosure effects dominate for consumer welfare in the terrestrial loophole markets, where
4SD and CSN Philadelphia are predicted to exclude both satellite distributors, and reduce consumer welfare by 8-18%
($0.13-0.90) of the average WTP generated by the channel. On the other hand, average net consumer welfare gains
from integration for some RSNs reach approximately $1 per household per month (e.g., $1.03 for MSG and $0.94 for
NESN).
84For our simulations, we set µ = 0.99 (which insures that internal negotiated affiliate fees are not indeterminate
when Ofct = 1; see footnote 36) and ζ
I = 1/(1 + µ).
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PARs and no integration (scenarios (iii) and (i)), we find that consumer and total welfare gains are
slightly larger than at our estimated values of µ and λR (1.5% and 0.7%); this is attributable to
larger increases in carriage (10.6%) and reductions in cable prices (-1.3%). These differences are
not statistically significant.
6.3 Robustness
Internalization and Rival Foreclosure Parameters. We conducted our counterfactuals under
the assumption that our rival foreclosure parameter λR equals the largest estimated lower bound
across the two terrestrial loophole RSNs. However, it may be that this bound is not binding, and
the value of λR is much larger. To understand the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, we
have compared the average percentage change in consumer and total welfare between integration
without PARs and no integration (scenarios (iii) and (i)) for different values of λR at our estimated
parameter values. Under our main specification when λR = λˆ
Phil
R = 1.4, the predicted average
changes in consumer and total welfare are 1.3% and 0.6%; at λR = 2, they are 0.4% and 0.3%,
and at λR = 3, they are -0.2% and -0.03%. Thus, our rival foreclosure parameter would need to
be significantly larger than our estimated lower bounds for the predicted overall average welfare
effects from vertical integration (without PARs) to be reversed.
We also have estimated our model under the restriction that µ = λR = 1.
85 Although µ = 1 is
rejected at our main parameter estimates, we find that our main counterfactual results are broadly
unchanged; for the welfare figures reported in Table 5, all obtained percent changes in levels are
not statistically different from those obtained using our unrestricted parameter estimates.
Satellite Re-Pricing. Our consideration of one vertical merger or divestiture at a time motivated
our holding satellite distributors’ prices fixed in our primary counterfactual specification—i.e.,
as each RSN is only active in a subset of markets, changes brought on by adjustments in its
ownership might not warrant a change in either satellite distributor’s national prices. However,
were integration to increase nationally and lead to foreclosure or higher affiliate fees charged to
satellite distributors in many markets, we may expect satellite prices to adjust, thereby altering
our predicted welfare effects. To address this concern, we repeat our counterfactual simulations
under the alternative assumption that satellite prices for both DirecTV and Dish are chosen at the
DMA (as opposed to national) level, and can adjust across integration scenarios (see Appendix C.4
for implementation details).
In Appendix Table A.11, we report market outcomes averaged across all RSNs from these addi-
tional simulations. When satellite prices are allowed adjust, they fall on average by approximately
1.0% when RSNs are integrated and PARs are not in effect; compared to the predicted changes
when satellite prices are held fixed (Table 5), the negative impact on satellite market shares and
surplus is slightly mitigated, as is the increase in negotiated affiliate fees (e.g., when moving from
non-integration to VI without PARs, affiliate fees to rivals increase by 16.5% on average as opposed
85For estimation, we restrict µ = 0.99 and ζI = 1/(1 + µ) (see previous footnote).
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to by 17.1% when satellite prices are held fixed). Nevertheless, none of the predicted levels or
changes are statistically different from the case in which satellite prices are held fixed. In addition,
our main findings also do not change.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a framework for the analysis of vertical integration and merg-
ers, and applied it to examine the welfare effects of—and regulatory policy regarding—vertical
integration of high value sports content in the U.S. cable and satellite television industry. The
framework accounts for consumer viewership and subscription decisions, distributor pricing and
carriage decisions, and channel-distributor bargaining over affiliate fees. Most importantly, it al-
lows for vertical integration to reduce double marginalization and increase carriage as well as result
in foreclosure of rivals from integrated content or raise their costs of carriage. We also allow for
imperfect internalization of incentives across integrated divisions within a firm.
Our main results are as follows: (i) vertical integration leads to welfare gains when program
access rules are effectively enforced; (ii) failure to effectively enforce program access rules for inte-
grated RSNs leads to consumer and total welfare losses; (iii) in the absence of program access rules,
predicted efficiency effects of vertical integration outweigh foreclosure effects on average, resulting
in net consumer and total welfare increases compared to non-integration; (iv) welfare gains from
vertical integration in the absence of program access rules appear to be largely absent in cases in
which exclusion of rival distributors occurs, but positive when rivals continue to have access to the
RSN; and (v) rival distributors are harmed when an RSN becomes integrated.
As we have noted previously, our analysis is partial and can be extended in a number of di-
rections. First, our model has focused on comparing the efficiency effects of vertical integration
to potential foreclosure of downstream distributors by integrated channels, and does not examine
the foreclosure of “upstream” rival channels by an integrated distributor.86 Second, investment
effects—both on the part of content providers and distributors in channel, programming, and dis-
tribution service quality—may change upon integration (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Bolton and
Whinston, 1991; Hart, 1995), and are absent from the current study. As noted in the introduction,
the impact of such investment effects on welfare is ambiguous, and is the subject of future work.
Our estimates and counterfactual exercises also relied on a number of modeling assumptions regard-
ing bargaining, the form of affiliate fee pricing, and the effects of program access rule enforcement
that could usefully be further examined. Finally, incorporating additional responses to vertical
integration, examining how predictions might be impacted by weakened information sharing or
misalignment of incentives within the firm, and documenting and measuring the strength of these
vertical integration effects in other industries remain promising areas for future research.
86See, e.g., Waterman and Weiss (1996) who provide reduced form evidence that integration reduces carriage of
rival channels. This finding could be due to foreclosure, but could also arise simply because the increased carriage of
the integrated channel makes carriage of the rival channel less attractive. Our model does include the possibility of
the latter effect, but does not incorporate any mechanism that might cause foreclosure of rival channels, such as an
impact on the integrated channel’s advertising revenues.
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A Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Sample Statistics - Prices, Market Shares, and Channels
Unweighted Weighted by HHs
# Obs Mean StdDev Min Max Mean StdDev Min Max
Total Markets 6,928 6,928
Average Households (millions) 6,928 39.7
Cable
Year 6,928 2004 2.9 2000 2010 2004 2.8 2000 2010
Price 6,928 $50.67 $10.31 $8.67 $130.96 $52.20 $8.86 $8.67 $130.96
Market Share 6,928 0.628 0.162 0.001 0.965 0.639 0.135 0.001 0.965
Cable Networks 6,928 67.0 18.1 0 101 72.1 14.8 0 101
RSNs 6,928 1.6 0.8 0 5 1.8 0.9 0 5
Total Channels 6,928 68.6 18.4 0 103 73.8 15.0 0 103
DirecTV
Year 6,928 2004 2.9 2000 2010 2004 2.8 2000 2010
Price 6,928 $52.76 $6.36 $46.05 $76.73 $52.66 $6.08 $46.05 $76.73
Market Share 6,928 0.090 0.060 0.002 0.499 0.091 0.063 0.002 0.499
Cable Networks 6,928 79.4 10.4 66 97 79.8 10.2 66 97
RSNs 6,928 1.9 1.0 0 7 1.9 1.0 0 7
Total Channels 6,928 84.3 10.9 69 107 84.7 10.7 69 107
Dish
Year 6,928 2004 2.9 2000 2010 2004 2.8 2000 2010
Price 6,928 $53.43 $4.81 $44.28 $68.33 $53.47 $4.63 $44.28 $68.33
Market Share 6,928 0.062 0.054 0.000 0.472 0.058 0.052 0.000 0.472
Cable Networks 6,928 69.4 13.3 54 91 70.0 13.1 54 91
RSNs 6,928 1.8 0.9 0 6 1.7 0.8 0 6
Total Channels 6,928 73.7 13.9 56 99 74.4 13.6 56 99
Notes: Reported are the average price, market share, and number of cable networks, Regional Sport Networks (RSNs),
and total channels for the local cable operators as well as the two national satellite providers serving each of our
markets. Markets are defined as the set of continuous zip codes within a cable system facing the same portfolio of
competitors. We exclude (the relatively few) markets facing competition between cable operators. All the data cover
the years 2000-2010. To be included, we required information on each of price, market share, and channels. Cable
system subscriber and channel information is from the Nielsen FOCUS dataset. Cable system price information is
drawn from the Internet Archive, newspaper reports, and the TNS Bill Harvesting database. Satellite system channel
and price information is drawn from the Internet Archive. Cable and satellite subscriber market shares are estimated
from the MRI (2000-2007) and Simmons (2008-2010) household surveys and Nielsen FOCUS dataset. See the text
for more details.
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Table A.2: National Cable Channels: Affiliate Fees and Viewership
Affiliate Fees Viewership
Kagan Nielsen Ratings Combined MRI / Simmons
Years Mean StDev Min Max Obs Mean Obs Mean SDev Frac > 0
ABC Family Channel 11 $0.19 $0.02 $0.16 $0.22 747 0.418 277,535 0.344 1.149 0.176
AMC 11 $0.22 $0.02 $0.20 $0.25 747 0.491 277,535 0.351 1.183 0.156
Animal Planet 11 $0.07 $0.01 $0.06 $0.09 747 0.275 277,535 0.344 1.108 0.203
A&E 11 $0.21 $0.03 $0.16 $0.26 747 0.664 277,535 0.472 1.373 0.230
BET 11 $0.14 $0.02 $0.11 $0.17 747 0.382 277,535 0.184 1.017 0.070
Bravo 11 $0.15 $0.03 $0.11 $0.20 747 0.277 277,535 0.169 0.804 0.092
Cartoon Network 11 $0.14 $0.03 $0.08 $0.18 747 0.989 277,535 0.231 1.098 0.106
CMT 11 $0.06 $0.02 $0.01 $0.08 747 0.142 277,535 0.120 0.732 0.067
CNBC 11 $0.24 $0.04 $0.16 $0.30 747 0.217 277,535 0.313 1.185 0.170
CNN 11 $0.43 $0.05 $0.35 $0.52 747 0.550 277,535 0.701 1.744 0.319
Comedy Central 11 $0.11 $0.02 $0.08 $0.14 747 0.449 277,535 0.280 0.997 0.162
Discovery Channel 11 $0.27 $0.04 $0.22 $0.35 747 0.535 277,535 0.628 1.462 0.327
Disney Channel 11 $0.81 $0.06 $0.75 $0.91 747 1.171 277,535 0.246 1.074 0.116
E! Entertainment TV 11 $0.19 $0.02 $0.15 $0.21 747 0.315 277,535 0.201 0.788 0.137
ESPN 11 $2.81 $1.12 $1.14 $4.34 747 0.836 277,535 0.675 1.767 0.257
ESPN 2 11 $0.37 $0.14 $0.17 $0.58 747 0.262 277,535 0.334 1.220 0.151
ESPN Classic Sports 11 $0.14 $0.03 $0.10 $0.18 636 0.037 277,535 0.072 0.521 0.047
Food Network 11 $0.06 $0.03 $0.03 $0.14 747 0.411 277,535 0.396 1.364 0.175
Fox News Channel 11 $0.32 $0.18 $0.17 $0.70 747 0.785 277,535 0.697 1.961 0.267
FX 11 $0.34 $0.06 $0.27 $0.43 747 0.463 277,535 0.258 0.976 0.137
Golf Channel 11 $0.20 $0.05 $0.13 $0.26 580 0.065 277,535 0.084 0.633 0.041
Hallmark Channel 11 $0.04 $0.02 $0.01 $0.06 699 0.307 225,618 0.301 1.268 0.088
Headline News — — — — — 747 0.214 277,535 0.278 0.983 0.173
HGTV 11 $0.08 $0.04 $0.03 $0.14 747 0.500 277,535 0.397 1.446 0.162
History Channel 11 $0.18 $0.04 $0.13 $0.23 747 0.531 277,535 0.531 1.462 0.251
Lifetime 11 $0.21 $0.06 $0.13 $0.29 747 0.679 277,535 0.554 1.650 0.199
MSNBC 11 $0.14 $0.02 $0.12 $0.17 747 0.343 277,535 0.330 1.181 0.182
MTV 11 $0.27 $0.05 $0.20 $0.35 747 0.568 277,535 0.235 0.983 0.127
Nickelodeon 11 $0.37 $0.05 $0.29 $0.47 747 1.555 277,535 0.200 0.991 0.096
SyFy 11 $0.17 $0.04 $0.12 $0.22 747 0.427 277,535 0.301 1.207 0.126
TBS 11 $0.37 $0.12 $0.19 $0.54 747 0.905 277,535 0.497 1.345 0.243
TLC 11 $0.16 $0.01 $0.14 $0.17 747 0.422 277,535 0.342 1.151 0.173
truTV 11 $0.09 $0.01 $0.08 $0.10 747 0.384 277,535 0.233 1.081 0.101
Turner Classic Movies 11 $0.22 $0.03 $0.16 $0.27 580 0.286 277,535 0.268 1.142 0.105
TNT 11 $0.83 $0.16 $0.55 $1.10 747 1.219 277,535 0.592 1.553 0.263
USA 11 $0.46 $0.07 $0.36 $0.57 747 1.081 277,535 0.503 1.442 0.230
VH1 11 $0.12 $0.02 $0.09 $0.16 747 0.336 277,535 0.151 0.717 0.101
Weather Channel 11 $0.10 $0.01 $0.08 $0.12 747 0.234 277,535 0.380 1.046 0.326
Notes: Reported are average affiliate fees and viewership of the 38 non-RSN cable television networks included in
our demand system. The averages are over the years 2000-2010 for SNL Kagan affiliate fees, over DMA-years for
the Nielsen (DMA-level) viewership data, and over households and years for the MRI (2000-2007) and Simmons
(2008-2010) household-level viewership data. Affiliate fees are the monthly per subscriber fees paid by cable and
satellite distributors to television networks for the right to distribute the network’s programming to subscribers. The
Nielsen “rating” is the percentage of US households watching a given program on a given channel at a given time. We
average program-level ratings across programs within a channel-DMA-year, and report the across-DMA-year average
here. MRI/Simmons viewership is reported as the average number of hours watching that channel in a typical week.
It is converted to a Nielsen-equivalent “rating” by dividing by the number of hours in a week and rescaling it to lie
between 0 and 100. The average fraction of households viewing a channel at all (“Frac > 0”) is the average percentage
of households that reported positive viewing of a channel in a typical week.
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Table A.5: Simulated Market Outcomes for RSNs (1/6)
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
CABLE OWNED RSNs (1/2)
4SD Cable Mkt Share 0.74 0.1% 1.4%
Cox [0.66,0.77] [-0.7%,3.3%] [-0.1%,7.9%]
Pop 2.81M Sat Mkt Share 0.16 0.0% -5.6%
Footprint 100% [0.15,0.19] [-3.6%,2.6%] [-13.4%,0.5%]
WTP $1.54 Cable Carriage 0.49 0.0% 0.0%
[0.49,0.49] [0.0%,105.5%] [0.0%,105.5%]
Cable Prices 51.05 0.0% -0.2%
[50.00,55.39] [-2.3%,0.4%] [-4.5%,0.6%]
Foreclose: 69% Aff Fees to Sat 0.78 1.2% -
[-0.07,1.45] [-13.4%,18.9%] -
Cable + RSN Surplus 28.87 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 5.9%
[16.84,34.38] [0.0%,2.2%] [0.0%,87.9%] [0.0%,3.1%] [1.3%,93.5%]
Satellite Surplus 3.71 -0.1% -0.2% -2.3% -5.4%
[1.08,4.37] [-3.9%,2.5%] [-12.5%,14.6%] [-11.2%,0.0%] [-27.9%,0.0%]
Consumer Welfare 34.43 0.0% 0.7% -0.4% -8.3%
[18.90,38.61] [-0.3%,2.1%] [-18.9%,72.8%] [-1.8%,5.0%] [-32.8%,112.3%]
Total Welfare 67.01 0.0% 0.6% -0.2% -7.8%
[34.21,73.77] [-0.1%,1.6%] [-5.2%,148.2%] [-0.7%,2.3%] [-27.1%,165.7%]
CSN BAY AREA Cable Mkt Share 0.61 2.3% 2.2%
Comcast [0.57,0.65] [0.8%,7.5%] [0.8%,7.5%]
Pop 6.03M Sat Mkt Share 0.22 -1.9% -1.8%
Footprint 54% [0.21,0.24] [-7.3%,-0.8%] [-7.3%,-0.7%]
WTP $4.16 Cable Carriage 0.57 0.0% 0.0%
[0.48,0.62] [-8.1%,9.8%] [-8.1%,9.8%]
Cable Prices 55.64 -1.7% -1.7%
[53.77,58.92] [-4.6%,-0.2%] [-4.6%,-0.2%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 1.69 0.5% 17.7%
[0.76,2.01] [-3.8%,9.3%] [8.6%,32.7%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 23.96 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 1.9%
[13.04,26.89] [-0.4%,0.5%] [-3.6%,2.8%] [-0.2%,0.8%] [-1.6%,4.4%]
Satellite Surplus 5.62 -2.0% -2.7% -3.1% -4.2%
[1.69,6.16] [-8.2%,-0.9%] [-10.8%,-1.5%] [-9.5%,-1.6%] [-12.8%,-2.9%]
Consumer Welfare 33.25 1.3% 10.6% 1.3% 10.5%
[17.78,37.30] [0.5%,4.4%] [4.4%,37.6%] [0.5%,4.4%] [4.1%,37.5%]
Total Welfare 62.83 0.5% 8.3% 0.5% 8.2%
[29.93,68.46] [0.0%,1.8%] [1.3%,30.6%] [0.0%,1.8%] [1.2%,30.6%]
CSN CA Cable Mkt Share 0.61 0.4% 0.4%
Comcast [0.55,0.65] [-4.8%,4.8%] [-4.8%,4.8%]
Pop 3.86M Sat Mkt Share 0.26 -0.2% -0.2%
Footprint 10% [0.23,0.29] [-3.5%,6.4%] [-3.5%,6.4%]
WTP $1.04 Cable Carriage 0.36 0.0% 0.0%
[0.32,0.36] [0.0%,64.4%] [0.0%,64.4%]
Cable Prices 53.88 -0.2% -0.2%
[51.89,57.25] [-3.0%,3.3%] [-3.0%,3.4%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 0.14 0.2% 5.9%
[-0.08,0.61] [-26.0%,15.1%] [-8.4%,45.7%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 23.13 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
[12.36,26.22] [0.0%,0.4%] [-0.2%,14.8%] [0.0%,0.5%] [0.0%,16.9%]
Satellite Surplus 6.32 -0.2% -1.1% -0.2% -1.3%
[1.92,6.81] [-3.6%,6.7%] [-44.3%,24.5%] [-3.8%,6.6%] [-46.3%,24.1%]
Consumer Welfare 35.17 0.2% 6.6% 0.2% 6.6%
[18.63,39.77] [-2.2%,2.2%] [-54.6%,135.7%] [-2.2%,2.2%] [-54.7%,135.7%]
Total Welfare 64.62 0.1% 5.4% 0.1% 5.4%
[30.68,71.11] [-0.6%,1.0%] [-26.1%,109.5%] [-0.6%,1.0%] [-26.1%,109.4%]
CSN CHICAGO Cable Mkt Share 0.58 1.2% 0.8%
Comcast [0.57,0.62] [-0.1%,1.5%] [-0.1%,1.4%]
Pop 9.62M Sat Mkt Share 0.23 -0.8% -0.6%
Footprint 76% [0.22,0.23] [-1.5%,0.2%] [-1.4%,0.2%]
WTP $3.44 Cable Carriage 0.78 -1.3% -1.3%
[0.70,0.79] [-0.4%,19.4%] [-0.5%,18.8%]
Cable Prices 58.98 -0.7% -0.4%
[56.78,59.57] [-0.8%,0.3%] [-0.8%,0.3%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 1.59 0.2% 12.5%
[0.65,1.75] [-6.1%,1.1%] [4.4%,19.4%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 22.55 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.2%
[10.47,25.54] [0.0%,0.8%] [-0.2%,5.5%] [0.1%,1.0%] [0.9%,6.6%]
Satellite Surplus 5.78 -0.8% -1.4% -1.3% -2.2%
[1.81,6.21] [-1.4%,0.2%] [-2.0%,0.3%] [-2.4%,-0.4%] [-3.1%,-0.9%]
Consumer Welfare 31.69 0.6% 5.9% 0.4% 3.9%
[16.88,35.79] [-0.1%,1.1%] [-0.8%,10.5%] [-0.1%,1.0%] [-0.9%,9.1%]
Total Welfare 60.01 0.3% 4.5% 0.2% 2.9%
[27.90,66.79] [0.0%,0.7%] [-0.7%,11.8%] [0.0%,0.7%] [-0.7%,11.6%]
Notes: Simulated market outcomes across three integration scenarios. See Table 4 for details.
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Table A.6: Simulated Market Outcomes for RSNs (2/6)
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
CABLE OWNED RSNs (2/2)
CSN MID-ATL Cable Mkt Share 0.65 0.6% 0.3%
Comcast [0.62,0.66] [0.1%,3.4%] [-0.5%,3.7%]
Pop 6.55M Sat Mkt Share 0.18 -0.4% -0.1%
Footprint 70% [0.18,0.19] [-2.8%,0.0%] [-9.3%,0.2%]
Pred WTP $3.27 Cable Carriage 0.59 2.9% 5.5%
[0.42,0.82] [-17.6%,67.1%] [-26.2%,80.4%]
Cable Prices 55.63 -0.4% -0.1%
[55.08,57.75] [-1.7%,0.3%] [-1.5%,1.6%]
Foreclose: 20% Aff Fees to Sat 1.35 3.0% 38.2%
[0.49,1.59] [-10.3%,9.0%] [13.5%,53.3%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 23.95 0.1% 0.8% 0.5% 3.9%
[11.54,26.29] [-0.3%,1.6%] [-2.7%,11.0%] [-0.3%,2.0%] [-2.5%,14.0%]
Satellite Surplus 4.53 -0.6% -0.8% -2.3% -3.1%
[1.35,5.00] [-2.6%,0.1%] [-4.0%,0.1%] [-4.5%,-0.1%] [-6.1%,-0.2%]
Consumer Welfare 30.76 0.5% 4.5% 0.3% 2.5%
[15.74,33.88] [0.1%,2.4%] [1.7%,22.8%] [-3.1%,2.0%] [-26.8%,20.6%]
Total Welfare 59.24 0.2% 4.5% 0.2% 3.3%
[27.92,65.09] [0.2%,1.4%] [2.8%,24.1%] [-1.2%,1.3%] [-19.3%,23.8%]
CSN NE Cable Mkt Share 0.63 1.0% 1.7%
Comcast [0.61,0.66] [0.0%,1.6%] [0.1%,2.7%]
Pop 5.2M Sat Mkt Share 0.13 -1.1% -5.4%
Footprint 85% [0.12,0.13] [-1.8%,0.0%] [-7.2%,-0.2%]
WTP $1.47 Cable Carriage 0.77 12.2% 9.7%
[0.62,0.83] [3.3%,33.8%] [3.3%,35.5%]
Cable Prices 56.17 -0.5% -0.4%
[54.37,57.34] [-1.0%,0.2%] [-1.3%,0.5%]
Foreclose: 89% Aff Fees to Sat 0.78 -4.7% -
[0.20,0.91] [-3.8%,9.6%] -
Cable + RSN Surplus 26.78 0.2% 3.6% 0.6% 10.2%
[12.90,29.35] [0.0%,0.5%] [1.4%,9.7%] [0.2%,1.1%] [4.8%,18.7%]
Satellite Surplus 2.98 -1.0% -2.1% -2.4% -4.8%
[0.85,3.21] [-1.8%,0.0%] [-3.4%,-0.1%] [-3.7%,-0.5%] [-8.2%,-0.9%]
Consumer Welfare 29.21 0.8% 15.0% 0.1% 2.7%
[15.79,33.11] [0.1%,1.3%] [1.7%,28.7%] [-0.9%,1.4%] [-20.0%,31.8%]
Total Welfare 58.97 0.4% 16.5% 0.2% 8.1%
[28.89,64.91] [0.1%,0.7%] [4.5%,30.2%] [-0.2%,0.8%] [-6.9%,34.1%]
MSG PLUS Cable Mkt Share 0.66 3.1% 3.1%
Cablevision [0.65,0.70] [0.1%,5.1%] [0.1%,4.9%]
Pop 9.46M Sat Mkt Share 0.19 -4.6% -4.6%
Footprint 49% [0.17,0.19] [-7.5%,-0.4%] [-9.4%,-0.7%]
WTP $1.66 Cable Carriage 0.42 54.6% 54.6%
[0.41,0.89] [-0.3%,85.8%] [-23.0%,85.8%]
Cable Prices 59.59 -2.2% -2.2%
[57.46,61.09] [-4.0%,0.0%] [-3.8%,0.8%]
Foreclose: 6% Aff Fees to Sat 0.75 0.9% 31.1%
[0.32,0.89] [-17.8%,17.0%] [2.6%,64.0%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 32.81 0.6% 11.7% 0.7% 14.3%
[15.57,36.92] [-0.1%,0.9%] [-2.2%,17.0%] [-0.1%,1.3%] [-1.4%,24.0%]
Satellite Surplus 4.39 -4.7% -12.3% -5.6% -14.8%
[1.32,4.71] [-7.5%,-0.3%] [-19.7%,-0.9%] [-7.8%,0.0%] [-21.6%,-0.1%]
Consumer Welfare 35.59 3.2% 67.6% 3.1% 67.2%
[19.34,39.95] [0.4%,4.8%] [8.2%,110.9%] [-1.0%,4.5%] [-21.2%,108.9%]
Total Welfare 72.78 1.5% 67.0% 1.5% 66.7%
[33.33,80.75] [0.2%,2.1%] [10.0%,96.8%] [-0.2%,2.0%] [-9.4%,95.8%]
SNY Cable Mkt Share 0.63 3.8% 3.8%
Comcast, TWC [0.62,0.67] [0.5%,6.1%] [0.5%,6.1%]
Pop 11.7M Sat Mkt Share 0.18 -4.5% -4.5%
Footprint 35% [0.17,0.18] [-8.2%,-0.7%] [-8.2%,-0.7%]
WTP $2.51 Cable Carriage 0.79 1.9% 1.9%
[0.75,0.89] [-10.3%,8.3%] [-10.3%,7.7%]
Cable Prices 59.80 -2.9% -2.9%
[56.97,61.32] [-4.5%,-0.3%] [-4.5%,-0.3%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 1.40 -4.0% -3.9%
[0.45,1.54] [-6.2%,6.3%] [-6.0%,6.3%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 30.12 0.0% -0.6% 0.0% -0.6%
[14.34,33.64] [-0.6%,0.2%] [-9.6%,2.7%] [-0.6%,0.2%] [-9.6%,2.3%]
Satellite Surplus 4.16 -4.3% -7.2% -4.3% -7.2%
[1.26,4.49] [-8.4%,-0.7%] [-13.8%,-1.1%] [-8.4%,-0.7%] [-13.8%,-1.1%]
Consumer Welfare 33.69 3.3% 43.9% 3.3% 43.9%
[18.22,37.96] [0.4%,5.2%] [5.9%,72.8%] [0.4%,5.2%] [5.9%,72.8%]
Total Welfare 67.96 1.3% 36.1% 1.3% 36.1%
[31.47,75.26] [0.2%,2.0%] [4.2%,58.3%] [0.2%,2.0%] [4.2%,58.3%]
Notes: Simulated market outcomes across three integration scenarios. See Table 4 for details.
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Table A.7: Simulated Market Outcomes for RSNs (3/6)
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
SATELLITE OWNED RSNs
ROOT NW Cable Mkt Share 0.61 0.7% 0.6%
DirecTV [0.58,0.62] [-0.4%,2.8%] [-0.6%,2.6%]
Pop 4.15M Sat Mkt Share 0.23 -0.5% -0.4%
WTP $1.79 [0.22,0.23] [-2.3%,0.4%] [-2.1%,1.1%]
Cable Carriage 0.78 0.0% 0.0%
[0.52,1.00] [-13.4%,14.2%] [-31.3%,4.9%]
Cable Prices 52.90 -0.4% -0.4%
[51.94,54.61] [-1.9%,0.3%] [-2.0%,0.4%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Rivals 0.75 1.1% 6.4%
[0.26,0.98] [-7.8%,3.1%] [-3.4%,11.3%]
Cable Surplus 21.94 0.0% -0.3% -0.2% -2.4%
[9.99,25.20] [-0.2%,0.2%] [-2.1%,2.2%] [-0.6%,0.2%] [-5.8%,2.3%]
Satellite + RSN Surplus 6.69 -0.4% -1.4% 0.2% 0.9%
[2.25,7.14] [-2.3%,1.1%] [-7.7%,3.3%] [-3.1%,1.0%] [-10.9%,3.0%]
Consumer Welfare 33.05 0.4% 7.6% 0.4% 6.7%
[17.39,36.63] [-0.2%,1.7%] [-4.8%,31.3%] [-0.9%,1.6%] [-15.6%,28.9%]
Total Welfare 61.68 0.2% 5.9% 0.2% 5.2%
[29.41,67.77] [-0.3%,0.8%] [-9.1%,27.5%] [-0.7%,0.7%] [-23.7%,24.9%]
ROOT PITT Cable Mkt Share 0.62 1.6% 1.1%
DirecTV [0.60,0.63] [0.3%,2.4%] [-0.1%,2.1%]
Pop 5.09M Sat Mkt Share 0.16 -1.9% -1.2%
WTP $2.17 [0.16,0.16] [-2.2%,-0.2%] [-1.8%,0.7%]
Cable Carriage 0.62 0.0% -4.3%
[0.51,0.69] [-22.1%,5.0%] [-29.4%,0.0%]
Cable Prices 55.64 -1.2% -1.0%
[54.70,56.76] [-1.8%,-0.2%] [-1.9%,-0.1%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Rivals 1.24 -0.1% 8.4%
[0.53,1.51] [-2.2%,6.2%] [5.1%,19.7%]
Cable Surplus 23.54 0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -3.0%
[10.87,25.69] [-0.4%,0.0%] [-4.2%,0.4%] [-0.7%,-0.1%] [-7.2%,-1.1%]
Satellite + RSN Surplus 5.04 -1.4% -3.3% -0.1% -0.1%
[1.51,5.39] [-4.5%,0.0%] [-9.4%,0.1%] [-5.1%,1.0%] [-8.4%,2.3%]
Consumer Welfare 28.01 1.1% 14.5% 0.8% 10.7%
[14.67,31.16] [0.2%,1.8%] [2.5%,25.4%] [-0.1%,1.6%] [-1.0%,22.2%]
Total Welfare 56.59 0.4% 11.1% 0.3% 7.6%
[27.15,61.63] [-0.2%,0.6%] [-4.5%,16.5%] [-0.4%,0.5%] [-9.8%,13.2%]
ROOT ROCKY MTN Cable Mkt Share 0.50 0.0% 1.0%
DirecTV [0.44,0.53] [-5.1%,0.0%] [-7.0%,2.9%]
Pop 4.19M Sat Mkt Share 0.30 0.0% -0.3%
WTP $1.79 [0.29,0.33] [0.0%,4.5%] [-1.0%,5.6%]
Cable Carriage 0.59 0.0% -17.3%
[0.48,0.84] [-27.5%,0.0%] [-37.0%,0.0%]
Cable Prices 55.84 0.0% -0.7%
[54.03,59.28] [-0.2%,2.4%] [-1.5%,3.1%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Rivals 0.96 0.3% 7.9%
[0.26,1.29] [-0.5%,15.5%] [4.6%,28.7%]
Cable Surplus 13.89 0.0% -0.1% -0.4% -3.1%
[6.45,15.15] [-0.8%,0.0%] [-5.6%,0.2%] [-1.4%,-0.2%] [-10.2%,-0.7%]
Satellite + RSN Surplus 8.90 0.0% 0.2% -0.9% -4.3%
[3.10,9.44] [-1.2%,3.6%] [-4.0%,16.9%] [-2.7%,4.8%] [-13.9%,22.8%]
Consumer Welfare 32.59 0.0% -0.4% 0.3% 4.9%
[16.28,35.90] [-2.5%,0.0%] [-55.1%,0.3%] [-2.7%,0.9%] [-63.3%,19.7%]
Total Welfare 55.38 0.0% -0.3% -0.1% -2.4%
[25.12,60.28] [-1.1%,0.0%] [-47.3%,0.0%] [-1.3%,0.0%] [-50.2%,0.1%]
NON-INTEGRATED RSNs (1/4)
ALTITUDE Cable Mkt Share 0.54 0.2% 0.1%
*Comcast [0.48,0.57] [-0.9%,6.1%] [-1.0%,5.2%]
Pop 7.12M Sat Mkt Share 0.28 -0.1% -0.1%
Footprint 74% [0.26,0.30] [-5.9%,0.3%] [-5.2%,0.4%]
WTP $3.22 Cable Carriage 0.48 0.0% 0.0%
[0.23,0.60] [0.0%,213.0%] [0.0%,213.0%]
Cable Prices 56.41 -0.1% -0.1%
[54.26,59.69] [-2.8%,1.2%] [-2.6%,1.2%]
Foreclose: 1% Aff Fees to Sat 1.20 5.0% 33.8%
[0.39,1.48] [-21.2%,10.8%] [2.0%,52.8%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 16.97 0.1% 0.6% 0.7% 3.5%
[8.43,18.54] [0.1%,2.4%] [0.4%,13.2%] [0.5%,2.9%] [2.7%,16.5%]
Satellite Surplus 6.97 -0.4% -0.8% -1.7% -3.6%
[2.12,7.54] [-5.8%,0.2%] [-10.9%,0.4%] [-5.4%,-0.6%] [-12.1%,-0.8%]
Consumer Welfare 32.60 0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.4%
[16.47,36.56] [-0.2%,3.0%] [-2.6%,28.9%] [-1.0%,2.3%] [-10.0%,26.2%]
Total Welfare 56.54 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.3%
[26.28,62.37] [-0.1%,1.4%] [-1.2%,23.3%] [-0.4%,1.1%] [-6.3%,20.7%]
Notes: Simulated market outcomes across three integration scenarios. “Satellite + RSN Surplus” includes profits for both
DirecTV and Dish. See Table 4 for details.
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Table A.8: Simulated Market Outcomes for RSNs (4/6)
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
NON-INTEGRATED RSNs (2/4)
FS DETROIT Cable Mkt Share 0.56 3.1% 3.0%
*Comcast [0.54,0.58] [0.3%,6.4%] [0.2%,6.3%]
Pop 4.84M Sat Mkt Share 0.17 -3.7% -3.6%
Footprint 82% [0.17,0.18] [-7.1%,-0.4%] [-11.8%,-0.3%]
WTP $4.38 Cable Carriage 0.76 27.6% 27.6%
[0.55,0.87] [6.7%,77.4%] [6.7%,77.4%]
Cable Prices 50.34 -1.0% -1.0%
[49.71,51.44] [-3.0%,0.1%] [-2.8%,0.5%]
Foreclose: 7% Aff Fees to Sat 2.10 -11.4% 12.7%
[0.76,2.69] [-30.7%,2.4%] [-14.9%,33.3%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 20.37 1.2% 5.6% 1.6% 7.5%
[9.70,22.30] [0.3%,2.5%] [1.8%,11.5%] [0.7%,3.1%] [3.7%,13.0%]
Satellite Surplus 4.38 -2.8% -2.8% -4.6% -4.6%
[1.33,4.74] [-4.9%,-0.3%] [-4.8%,-0.4%] [-6.8%,-1.4%] [-6.3%,-1.8%]
Consumer Welfare 26.64 2.4% 14.4% 2.3% 13.9%
[13.84,29.68] [0.2%,5.2%] [1.4%,30.8%] [-1.5%,5.0%] [-9.2%,30.2%]
Total Welfare 51.38 1.5% 17.2% 1.4% 16.8%
[24.53,56.31] [0.2%,3.3%] [3.7%,38.5%] [-0.2%,3.2%] [-2.7%,36.6%]
FS FLORIDA Cable Mkt Share 0.60 0.8% 0.7%
*Comcast [0.59,0.61] [0.1%,3.4%] [-0.1%,3.1%]
Pop 6.20M Sat Mkt Share 0.23 -0.8% -0.7%
Footprint 67% [0.22,0.23] [-3.7%,-0.1%] [-9.6%,0.0%]
WTP $2.59 Cable Carriage 0.90 2.2% 2.2%
[0.53,0.94] [0.5%,68.6%] [0.0%,68.6%]
Cable Prices 54.19 -0.4% -0.3%
[53.95,54.93] [-1.4%,0.2%] [-1.1%,1.0%]
Foreclose: 9% Aff Fees to Sat 1.47 -0.7% 25.8%
[0.64,1.71] [-14.1%,5.5%] [3.3%,40.1%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 19.84 0.1% 0.9% 0.6% 4.4%
[8.90,21.98] [0.1%,1.6%] [0.5%,13.0%] [0.3%,2.1%] [3.5%,16.5%]
Satellite Surplus 6.08 -0.8% -1.9% -2.2% -5.2%
[1.79,6.69] [-3.3%,-0.2%] [-9.7%,-0.5%] [-4.5%,-0.6%] [-12.8%,-1.3%]
Consumer Welfare 31.20 0.5% 5.5% 0.4% 4.6%
[15.35,34.16] [0.1%,2.4%] [1.2%,35.4%] [-2.7%,2.2%] [-33.2%,32.5%]
Total Welfare 57.11 0.2% 4.5% 0.2% 3.9%
[24.93,62.59] [0.1%,1.3%] [1.3%,37.2%] [-1.2%,1.3%] [-25.1%,35.6%]
FS MIDWEST Cable Mkt Share 0.60 1.8% 1.7%
*Comcast [0.59,0.62] [0.1%,2.1%] [0.1%,2.1%]
Pop 10.40M Sat Mkt Share 0.21 -1.2% -1.2%
Footprint 26% [0.21,0.21] [-1.5%,0.0%] [-1.5%,0.1%]
WTP $2.44 Cable Carriage 0.43 29.5% 29.5%
[0.26,0.55] [3.3%,51.4%] [-13.9%,50.4%]
Cable Prices 52.15 -0.8% -0.7%
[51.19,52.45] [-1.0%,0.1%] [-1.0%,0.1%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 1.18 -1.5% 17.1%
[0.55,1.31] [-6.5%,3.1%] [10.5%,31.9%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 19.92 0.3% 2.8% 0.6% 4.7%
[9.44,21.77] [0.0%,0.6%] [0.0%,4.8%] [-0.1%,0.7%] [-0.9%,6.8%]
Satellite Surplus 5.26 -1.2% -2.6% -2.0% -4.4%
[1.69,5.66] [-1.4%,0.0%] [-2.7%,-0.2%] [-2.5%,-0.7%] [-4.7%,-1.9%]
Consumer Welfare 29.92 1.3% 15.8% 1.3% 15.6%
[15.57,33.40] [0.1%,1.4%] [1.2%,16.7%] [0.0%,1.4%] [0.1%,16.6%]
Total Welfare 55.10 0.7% 16.0% 0.7% 15.9%
[26.21,60.16] [0.1%,0.8%] [1.3%,16.6%] [-0.1%,0.8%] [-2.5%,16.5%]
FS NORTH Cable Mkt Share 0.61 0.1% 0.1%
*Charter [0.59,0.64] [0.0%,0.7%] [0.0%,0.7%]
Pop 5.77M Sat Mkt Share 0.15 -0.2% -0.2%
Footprint 12% [0.14,0.16] [-1.4%,0.0%] [-1.4%,0.0%]
WTP $4.50 Cable Carriage 0.87 0.0% 0.0%
[0.62,0.90] [0.0%,7.4%] [0.0%,7.1%]
Cable Prices 52.04 -0.1% -0.1%
[50.73,53.33] [-0.3%,0.1%] [-0.3%,0.1%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 2.42 0.5% 7.7%
[0.89,3.09] [-7.1%,1.7%] [-0.4%,12.6%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 23.02 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.6%
[10.75,25.23] [0.0%,0.4%] [0.0%,1.8%] [0.1%,0.4%] [0.6%,2.0%]
Satellite Surplus 3.71 -0.2% -0.2% -0.9% -0.8%
[1.22,4.00] [-1.1%,0.0%] [-0.8%,0.0%] [-2.0%,-0.5%] [-1.4%,-0.6%]
Consumer Welfare 27.70 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 0.6%
[14.35,31.04] [0.0%,0.6%] [0.0%,3.7%] [0.0%,0.6%] [-0.1%,3.6%]
Total Welfare 54.43 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5%
[25.87,59.69] [0.0%,0.3%] [0.0%,4.5%] [0.0%,0.3%] [-0.1%,3.9%]
Notes: Simulated market outcomes across three integration scenarios. See Table 4 for details.
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Table A.9: Simulated Market Outcomes for RSNs (5/6)
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
NON-INTEGRATED RSNs (3/4)
FS OHIO Cable Mkt Share 0.60 2.0% 2.0%
*TWC [0.60,0.62] [0.1%,2.4%] [0.1%,2.4%]
Pop 8.16M Sat Mkt Share 0.18 -1.7% -1.7%
Footprint 51% [0.18,0.18] [-2.5%,-0.1%] [-2.6%,0.0%]
WTP $3.70 Cable Carriage 0.72 5.3% 5.3%
[0.41,0.78] [0.0%,46.0%] [0.0%,46.0%]
Cable Prices 52.43 -1.2% -1.2%
[51.32,52.52] [-1.3%,0.2%] [-1.2%,0.3%]
Foreclose: 1% Aff Fees to Sat 1.72 2.4% 20.1%
[0.75,1.94] [-7.1%,8.8%] [5.4%,32.3%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 22.39 0.3% 1.6% 0.5% 3.0%
[10.30,25.14] [0.0%,1.4%] [0.3%,9.1%] [0.3%,1.7%] [1.7%,10.8%]
Satellite Surplus 4.47 -1.9% -2.2% -3.1% -3.7%
[1.39,4.76] [-2.3%,-0.2%] [-2.7%,-0.2%] [-4.0%,-0.6%] [-3.9%,-0.8%]
Consumer Welfare 28.65 1.4% 10.7% 1.4% 10.5%
[15.23,32.22] [0.1%,2.2%] [0.7%,17.3%] [0.0%,2.1%] [0.3%,16.0%]
Total Welfare 55.51 0.7% 10.0% 0.7% 9.9%
[26.41,61.52] [0.1%,1.4%] [0.8%,23.9%] [0.0%,1.4%] [0.7%,22.4%]
FS SOUTH Cable Mkt Share 0.62 0.3% 0.3%
*TWC [0.61,0.63] [-0.1%,1.0%] [-0.2%,1.0%]
Pop 13.20M Sat Mkt Share 0.21 -0.7% -0.7%
Footprint 33% [0.21,0.22] [-1.3%,0.2%] [-1.3%,0.3%]
WTP $1.63 Cable Carriage 0.83 12.1% 12.1%
[0.58,0.94] [-7.0%,37.3%] [-7.1%,37.3%]
Cable Prices 55.63 0.0% 0.0%
[55.40,56.48] [-0.6%,0.3%] [-0.6%,0.3%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 0.87 -7.2% 5.2%
[0.28,0.96] [-7.1%,5.6%] [-0.2%,23.1%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 22.29 0.3% 4.0% 0.4% 5.5%
[10.89,24.52] [-0.2%,0.6%] [-2.8%,9.1%] [-0.1%,0.7%] [-2.9%,10.5%]
Satellite Surplus 5.76 -0.4% -1.6% -0.8% -3.0%
[1.80,6.25] [-1.0%,0.2%] [-3.7%,0.6%] [-1.4%,-0.2%] [-5.0%,-0.8%]
Consumer Welfare 30.70 0.3% 5.9% 0.3% 5.7%
[15.81,33.88] [0.0%,0.8%] [-0.6%,15.9%] [0.0%,0.8%] [-0.8%,15.8%]
Total Welfare 58.75 0.2% 8.3% 0.2% 8.2%
[26.82,64.29] [-0.1%,0.6%] [-2.2%,23.3%] [-0.1%,0.6%] [-3.9%,23.2%]
FS SOUTHWEST Cable Mkt Share 0.57 2.5% 2.5%
*Cox [0.56,0.59] [0.3%,4.1%] [0.3%,4.1%]
Pop 12.70M Sat Mkt Share 0.23 -1.1% -1.1%
Footprint 37% [0.22,0.23] [-2.8%,-0.2%] [-2.6%,-0.1%]
WTP $3.07 Cable Carriage 1.00 0.0% 0.0%
[0.71,1.00] [-6.3%,28.8%] [-16.7%,22.3%]
Cable Prices 51.20 -1.3% -1.3%
[49.89,51.38] [-2.0%,0.0%] [-2.4%,-0.1%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 1.56 0.1% 8.4%
[0.62,1.74] [-10.4%,3.7%] [0.1%,21.4%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 18.87 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 1.4%
[8.25,20.63] [-0.2%,1.2%] [-1.5%,7.5%] [-0.8%,1.0%] [-5.0%,5.9%]
Satellite Surplus 5.98 -1.1% -2.2% -1.6% -3.2%
[1.90,6.39] [-2.2%,-0.2%] [-4.5%,-0.4%] [-2.9%,-0.5%] [-5.1%,-1.2%]
Consumer Welfare 29.80 1.3% 12.3% 1.3% 12.2%
[14.95,33.03] [0.2%,2.3%] [1.7%,21.4%] [0.1%,2.2%] [1.4%,21.1%]
Total Welfare 54.64 0.6% 10.6% 0.6% 10.5%
[24.40,59.98] [0.1%,1.3%] [1.3%,23.7%] [0.0%,1.1%] [-0.7%,19.2%]
FS WEST Cable Mkt Share 0.55 5.8% 5.7%
*TWC [0.51,0.56] [0.5%,7.7%] [0.5%,7.6%]
Pop 8.43M Sat Mkt Share 0.25 -4.2% -4.2%
Footprint 53% [0.24,0.26] [-5.9%,-0.3%] [-6.2%,-0.2%]
WTP $4.06 Cable Carriage 0.81 10.0% 10.0%
[0.63,0.99] [-10.8%,37.4%] [-10.8%,37.4%]
Cable Prices 53.50 -2.9% -2.9%
[52.57,55.80] [-3.9%,-0.1%] [-3.8%,-0.1%]
Foreclose: 1% Aff Fees to Sat 1.82 -2.5% 15.3%
[0.67,1.99] [-12.5%,8.8%] [-1.7%,36.4%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 19.56 1.0% 4.6% 1.3% 6.5%
[10.03,21.49] [-0.7%,1.8%] [-3.6%,9.4%] [-0.3%,2.2%] [-1.5%,11.1%]
Satellite Surplus 6.17 -4.1% -6.3% -5.3% -8.1%
[1.86,6.68] [-5.5%,-0.5%] [-7.9%,-1.0%] [-6.7%,-1.0%] [-9.7%,-3.0%]
Consumer Welfare 32.01 2.6% 20.8% 2.6% 20.5%
[16.15,35.45] [0.3%,3.8%] [2.6%,30.3%] [0.3%,3.7%] [2.2%,30.0%]
Total Welfare 57.75 1.3% 19.1% 1.3% 18.9%
[26.58,62.69] [0.0%,1.9%] [-0.5%,26.9%] [-0.1%,1.9%] [-1.7%,26.8%]
Notes: Simulated market outcomes across three integration scenarios. See Table 4 for details.
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Table A.10: Simulated Market Outcomes for RSNs (6/6)
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
NON-INTEGRATED RSNs (4/4)
MASN Cable Mkt Share 0.64 4.5% 4.4%
*Comcast [0.61,0.66] [1.0%,5.6%] [0.9%,5.5%]
Pop 8.25M Sat Mkt Share 0.18 -4.1% -3.9%
Footprint 52% [0.17,0.18] [-7.1%,-1.0%] [-10.7%,-1.0%]
WTP $2.21 Cable Carriage 0.51 10.2% 6.1%
[0.41,0.71] [2.6%,39.0%] [2.2%,39.0%]
Cable Prices 56.71 -2.5% -2.6%
[55.59,58.38] [-2.9%,-0.1%] [-2.8%,-0.1%]
Foreclose: 3% Aff Fees to Sat 1.47 0.2% 27.2%
[0.53,1.70] [-7.4%,6.8%] [13.9%,38.5%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 23.52 0.1% 1.0% 0.3% 3.3%
[11.47,26.15] [-0.1%,0.9%] [-1.6%,8.5%] [0.1%,1.5%] [1.3%,16.5%]
Satellite Surplus 4.44 -4.2% -8.4% -5.7% -11.4%
[1.34,4.87] [-6.6%,-0.9%] [-14.0%,-2.6%] [-7.5%,-1.5%] [-16.8%,-4.6%]
Consumer Welfare 29.80 3.4% 45.3% 3.3% 44.4%
[15.53,32.88] [0.8%,4.2%] [11.3%,65.2%] [-0.7%,4.2%] [-9.9%,64.3%]
Total Welfare 57.76 1.5% 37.9% 1.4% 36.3%
[27.68,63.28] [0.4%,1.9%] [12.7%,51.3%] [-0.1%,1.9%] [-1.8%,51.2%]
PRIME TICKET Cable Mkt Share 0.55 3.2% 3.2%
*TWC [0.51,0.56] [0.4%,7.1%] [0.5%,6.8%]
Pop 8.32M Sat Mkt Share 0.25 -2.2% -2.2%
Footprint 53% [0.24,0.26] [-4.7%,-0.3%] [-4.7%,-0.3%]
WTP $3.11 Cable Carriage 0.79 8.3% 8.3%
[0.60,0.87] [-1.0%,23.8%] [-1.0%,23.8%]
Cable Prices 53.29 -1.7% -1.7%
[52.73,55.97] [-3.6%,-0.1%] [-3.3%,-0.1%]
Foreclose: 1% Aff Fees to Sat 1.48 0.2% 18.3%
[0.59,1.70] [-8.3%,6.1%] [3.5%,34.2%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 19.19 0.5% 3.0% 0.8% 5.0%
[9.68,21.21] [0.0%,1.0%] [-0.1%,6.5%] [0.3%,1.5%] [1.8%,9.7%]
Satellite Surplus 6.09 -2.2% -4.3% -3.2% -6.2%
[1.86,6.69] [-4.6%,-0.4%] [-9.0%,-1.0%] [-5.7%,-0.9%] [-10.5%,-2.7%]
Consumer Welfare 32.33 1.5% 15.5% 1.5% 15.2%
[16.15,35.63] [0.3%,3.5%] [3.4%,34.9%] [0.3%,3.4%] [3.1%,34.6%]
Total Welfare 57.61 0.8% 14.2% 0.8% 14.1%
[26.19,62.28] [0.2%,1.7%] [3.9%,29.1%] [0.1%,1.6%] [3.5%,28.7%]
SUN SPORTS Cable Mkt Share 0.60 1.4% 1.3%
*TWC [0.59,0.61] [0.1%,2.2%] [0.1%,2.2%]
Pop 3.41M Sat Mkt Share 0.18 -1.2% -1.2%
Footprint 65% [0.17,0.18] [-1.8%,0.0%] [-1.8%,0.1%]
WTP $1.65 Cable Carriage 0.97 0.0% 0.0%
[0.84,0.97] [-2.0%,7.4%] [-2.0%,7.4%]
Cable Prices 55.39 -0.7% -0.7%
[54.84,56.06] [-1.1%,0.0%] [-1.1%,0.0%]
Foreclose: 0% Aff Fees to Sat 0.62 -0.2% 17.1%
[0.29,0.81] [-5.3%,6.1%] [8.8%,33.3%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 18.85 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 1.5%
[8.69,21.04] [-0.1%,0.5%] [-1.3%,5.7%] [0.0%,0.5%] [-0.2%,7.2%]
Satellite Surplus 4.61 -1.3% -3.5% -1.7% -4.7%
[1.36,4.94] [-1.7%,-0.1%] [-4.8%,-0.2%] [-2.3%,-0.3%] [-6.2%,-1.1%]
Consumer Welfare 27.02 1.0% 16.9% 1.0% 16.7%
[13.49,29.81] [0.1%,1.7%] [1.5%,26.7%] [0.0%,1.7%] [0.5%,26.7%]
Total Welfare 50.48 0.4% 13.7% 0.4% 13.5%
[22.93,55.42] [0.0%,0.9%] [1.2%,25.2%] [0.0%,0.9%] [1.1%,25.1%]
Notes: Simulated market outcomes across three integration scenarios. See Table 4 for details.
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Table A.11: Average Simulated Market Outcomes Across All RSNs (Satellite Adjusts Prices)
(i) No VI (ii) VI PARs (iii) VI No PARs
(vs. No VI) (vs. No VI) (vs. VI PARs)
Level %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP %∆lvl %∆WTP
ALL RSNs
Cable Mkt Share 0.61 1.5% 1.5% 0.0%
[0.61,0.62] [0.2%,2.1%] [0.4%,2.1%] [-0.2%,0.2%]
Sat Mkt Share 0.19 0.0% -0.5% -0.5%
[0.18,0.20] [-1.3%,1.1%] [-2.0%,0.8%] [-1.2%,0.3%]
Cable Carriage 0.75 5.8% 5.4% -0.4%
[0.69,0.80] [4.0%,15.9%] [3.4%,15.7%] [-2.4%,1.1%]
Cable Prices 55.06 -1.1% -1.0% 0.1%
[54.25,55.98] [-1.5%,-0.1%] [-1.4%,0.0%] [0.0%,0.4%]
Sat Prices 57.75 -0.8% -1.0% -0.1%
[56.34,61.30] [-1.5%,-0.1%] [-1.8%,0.0%] [-0.5%,0.3%]
Aff Fees to Rivals 1.48 -1.8% 16.5% 18.2%
[0.46,1.76] [-5.2%,1.7%] [1.9%,43.0%] [8.0%,50.3%]
Cable + RSN Surplus 23.10 0.2% 1.9% 0.5% 4.0% 0.3% 2.1%
[10.40,25.27] [0.2%,0.5%] [0.9%,7.5%] [0.3%,0.7%] [1.7%,14.2%] [0.1%,0.4%] [0.4%,5.5%]
Satellite Surplus 5.06 -1.9% -3.7% -2.8% -5.4% -1.0% -1.7%
[1.56,5.44] [-2.8%,-0.5%] [-9.4%,-0.3%] [-3.6%,-1.2%] [-12.1%,-0.9%] [-1.3%,-0.5%] [-3.5%,-0.4%]
Consumer Welfare 31.02 1.4% 17.4% 1.2% 15.6% -0.2% -1.8%
[13.10,34.10] [0.3%,1.8%] [2.4%,33.4%] [0.0%,1.6%] [-0.2%,29.5%] [-0.7%,-0.1%] [-10.0%,-0.2%]
Total Welfare 59.17 0.7% 15.7% 0.6% 14.2% -0.1% -1.5%
[24.85,64.45] [0.2%,0.8%] [2.6%,32.2%] [0.1%,0.8%] [1.4%,29.2%] [-0.3%,0.0%] [-8.7%,-0.3%]
# Foreclosed: 4/26 [1,9]
Notes: Average simulated market outcomes for all RSNs, weighted by the number of households in each RSN’s
relevant DMAs, where satellite prices are allowed to adjust. See Table 5 and Appendix C.4 for details.
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B Necessary Equilibrium Conditions for Affiliate Fee Bargaining
In this section, we describe and analyze an infinite-horizon extensive form bargaining game between non-
integrated channels and distributors that can motivate the necessary equilibrium conditions that we employ
in our analysis. We do not model a non-cooperative bargaining game within integrated firms, and assume
that internal affiliate fees are set in the Nash-in-Nash fashion described in the text. Implicitly we take these
internal affiliate fees as given here. We focus on bargaining between representatives for each channel and
distributor; as noted in the main text, pricing and carriage decisions, possibly determined by other agents
(e.g., local offices of each distributor), are taken as given by these bargaining agents.
Initially, assume that there are no agreements formed between any non-integrated channel and distrib-
utor. In each bargaining period, either distributors (in odd periods) or channels (in even periods) simulta-
neously make private offers to all counterparties with which they have not yet formed an agreement. An
offer to form an agreement between a channel c and distributor f specifies a linear affiliate fee τfc in the
set Tfc = [τfc, τ¯fc], where τfc = −ac and τ¯fc = max{τ : GFTMfc (τ, τ−fc) ≥ 0}. In each bargaining period,
those receiving offers simultaneously announce whether they will accept or reject the offer made to them. At
the end of each bargaining period, the set of agreements is observed by all players. Payoffs in a bargaining
period depend on the set of agreements in force following that period’s bargaining. Once an agreement is
reached between c and a distributor g, that agreement remains in force for the remainder of the game. The
channel has discount factor δc ≡ exp(−rcΛ) and each distributor has discount factor δd ≡ exp(−rdΛ) for
rc, rd,Λ > 0, where Λ represents the length of time between periods.
87 We assume that, in any subgame,
when receiving off-equilibrium path offers for that subgame, all agents have passive beliefs: that is, they
continue to believe that other firms have received their equilibrium offers (or no offers at all, if that is what
happens on the subgame’s equilibrium path).
This setup matches the structure studied by Collard-Wexler et al. (2017), with the exception that we
assume firms bargain over linear fees as opposed to lump-sum transfers.
B.1 Nash-in-Nash Conditions are Necessary with Immediate Agreement
In our sample of non-loophole markets, all agreements are reached between relevant RSNs and distributors
in each market; we thus focus on equilibria in which all agreements are eventually formed among all channels
and distributors. We first show that, when players have passive beliefs in a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, any equilibrium in which all open agreements are immediately formed following any history of
play yields the necessary conditions that we employ in estimating our model (under “No Integration” and
“VI with PARs”). This result can provide a non-cooperative motivation for the Nash-in-Nash approach
we adopt in the text for non-integrated firms in non-loophole markets. Our approach extends results from
Collard-Wexler et al. (2017) (in particular, Theorem 4.1) to our setting with linear fees. However, we do not
establish conditions under which equilibria must involve immediate agreement; this interesting question is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Notation and Assumptions. Assume that Nash bargaining parameters for each non-integrated dis-
tributor f and channel c are given by ζfc = rc/(rc + rd). We introduce the following notation:
• For any distributor-channel pair fc ∈ A, where A represents the set of all non-integrated distributor-
RSN pairs, we define the solution to their Nash bargaining problem given all other agreements A\ fc
are formed at fees τA\fc ≡ {τgd}gd∈A\fc as:
φNfc(τA\fc) =
(1− ζfc)GFTMfc (0, τA\fc, ·)− ζfcGFTCfc(0, τA\fc, ·)
Df
,
where Df =
∑
m∈Mfc Dfm (and t subscripts have been removed for this section). Denote by φ˜
N
fc ≡
{φ˜Nfc}fc∈A the vector of Nash-in-Nash fees that solves the fixed point for all agreements; i.e., φ˜Nfc =
φNfc(φ
N
−fc) ∀fc ∈ A. Given our assumptions on firm profits, this vector is unique and can be solved
87Our results can straightforwardly accommodate heterogeneous discount factors.
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for as the solution to φ˜N = (AN )−1BN , where each row of vectors φ˜N and BN and square matrix
AN corresponds to a particular distributor f and channel c pair, and AN and BN are functions
only of demand terms (which, given fixed downstream prices, are not influenced by affiliate fees),
marginal costs, advertising, and bargaining parameters (see (C.36)). We also denote by φ˜N (B, τB) ≡
{φ˜Nfc(·)}fc∈A\B the conditional Nash-in-Nash vector of affiliate fees given agreements B ⊂ A have been
formed at fees τB ≡ {τgd}gd∈B. Each element fc ∈ A \ B of this conditional Nash-in-Nash vector will
satisfy φ˜Nfc(B, τB) = φNfc({φ˜NA\(B∪fc)(·), τB}), and such a vector will also be unique for each (B, τB).
• Recall that (downstream) distributors make offers in odd periods; (upstream) channels make offers in
even periods. For any fc ∈ A, let {φRfc,D(τA\fc), φRfc,U (τA\fc)} represent downstream and upstream
“Rubinstein fees” that correspond to the odd- and even-period offers that are made in equilibrium in
a Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers game between just f and c, given all other agreements in A\ fc
have been (or are expected to be immediately) formed at affiliate fees τA\fc. Such Rubinstein fees
are:
φRfc,D(τA\fc) =
δc(1− δd)GFTMfct(0, τA\fc, ·)− (1− δc)GFTCfc(0, τA\fc, ·)
(1− δcδd)Df ,
φRfc,U (τA\fc) =
(1− δd)GFTMfct(0, τA\fc, ·)− δd(1− δc)GFTCfc(0, τA\fc, ·)
(1− δcδd)Df .
As with Nash-in-Nash fees, we define φ˜RD ≡ {φ˜Rfc,D}fc∈A and φ˜RU ≡ {φ˜Rfc,U}fc∈A to be the vector of
Rubinstein fees that solves the fixed point of the equations above; similarly, these vectors of fees are
unique for given discount factors (given pricing and carriage decisions), and can be solved for explicitly
as φ˜RD = (A
R
D(Λ))
−1BRD(Λ) and φ˜
R
U = (A
R
U (Λ))
−1BRU (Λ), where matrices {ARl (·),BRl (·)}l∈{D,U}
condition on Λ in addition to the terms used in AN and BN . As before, φ˜RD(B, τB) and φ˜RU (B, τB)
represent the vector of conditional Rubinstein fees for agreements in A \ B that solve the fixed point
of the Rubinstein fee equations above given other agreements in B have been formed at fees τB.
There are three properties of these fees that will be crucial for our results. First, it will be the case that
if a downstream (upstream) firm receives a Rubinstein offer in an even (odd) period and expects that all
other agreements will form, that firm will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer:
(1− δd)GFTMfc (0, τA\fc, ·) = [φRfc,U (τA\fc)− δdφRfc,D(τA\fc)]× [Df ] , (B.23)
(1− δc)GFTCfc(0, τA\fc, ·) = [δcφRfc,U (τA\fc)− φRfc,D(τA\fc)]× [Df ] . (B.24)
I.e., the first equation states that for a downstream distributor f , the one-period change in its gains-from-
trade (left-hand side) by rejecting an offer from c (given all other agreements form at fees τA\fc) is equal
to the difference between anticipated payments it would make if it agreed to upstream Rubinstein fees this
period, or downstream Rubinstein fees in the following period (right-hand side). Second, for any fc ∈ A and
τA\fc, φRfc,D(·) < φNfc(·) < φRfc,U (·); and limΛ→0 φRfc,D(·) = limΛ→0 φRfc,U (·) = φNfc(·). Third, (conditional)
Rubinstein fees also converge to (conditional) Nash-in-Nash fees: limΛ→0 φ˜RD = limΛ→0 φ˜
R
U = φ˜
N ; and
limΛ→0 φ˜RD(B, τB) = limΛ→0 φ˜RU (B, τB) = φ˜N (B, τB) for any set of agreements B and affiliate fees τB.88
B.1.1 Results.
Before proceeding, we state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider any set of affiliate fees τ ∗A ≡ {τ∗fc}fc∈A and set of agreements A1 ⊂ A such that A2 ≡
A\A1 only contains agreements involving a single channel c. Suppose that (i)
∑
m∈Mfc:c∈Bgm [∆fcDgm]/Df <
1/(n¯c − 1) for all distributors f and g that are present in any of channel c’s relevant markets, where n¯c is
the total number of distributors in c’s relevant markets; and (ii) τ∗fc ≥ φRfc,D(τ ∗A\fc) ∀fc ∈ A2. Then
φNfc(τ
∗,1
A\fc) > φ
N
fc({τ ∗,1A1 , {φ˜Rgc,D(A1, τ
∗,1
A1 )}gc∈A2\fc}) ∀fc ∈ A2.
88Note that limΛ→0ARD(Λ) = limΛ→0A
R
U (Λ) = A
Nash (which is invertible), and limΛ→0BRD(Λ) = limΛ→0B
R
U (Λ) =
BNash (and similarly for the matrices used to compute conditional Rubinstein and Nash fees).
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Remark. Condition (i) in the Lemma states that any distributor f that has an agreement with a channel c
loses no more than 1/(n¯c − 1) share of its subscribers in c’s relevant markets to some rival distributor g 6= f
upon disagreement with channel c; we confirm that this condition is satisfied for all distributor-RSN pairs
in our analysis.89
Proof. Let n = |A2| denote the dimension of A2—i.e., the number of agreements c has open in A2; and
let D ⊂ Rn denote the compact set of potential affiliate fees for agreements in A2. We first prove that the
mapping Γ : D → D, where Γ(τA2) = {φRfc,D({τ ∗A1 , τA2\fc})}fc∈A2 is a contraction. For any τA2 , τ ′A2 ∈ D,
let d ≡ τA2 − τ ′A2 , and ε ≡ Γ(τA2)− Γ(τ ′A2). By (C.35) and the definition of φRfc,D(·), we can write:
εfc = − (1− δc)
(1− δcδd) ×
∑
g 6=f,m∈Mfc:c∈Bgm
[∆fcDgm]
Df
dgc .
Since n ≤ n¯c, condition (i) implies that
∑
m∈Mfc:c∈Bgm [∆fcDgm]/Df < 1/(n − 1) for all f and g 6= f that
have an agreement with c, and we have:∑
gc∈A2
|εgc| ≤ 1− δc
1− δcδd ×
n− 1
n− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
q
×
∑
gc∈A2
|dgc| ;
hence ||ε||1 ≤ q×||d||1, where 0 ≤ q < 1. Thus, Γ(·) is a contraction with a unique fixed point φ˜RD(A1, τ ∗A1).
Next, note that both φRfc,D(·) and φNfc(·) are increasing in all fees {τgc}g 6=f : as c obtains greater demand
from another distributor g 6= f when it disagrees with f , GFTCfc(·) is decreasing in andGFTMfc (·) is unaffected
by τgc. If τ
∗
fc ≥ φRfc,D(τ ∗A\fc) ∀fc ∈ A2, it follows that ∀fc ∈ A2:
φRfc,D({τ ∗A1 , τ ∗A2\fc}) ≥ φRfc,D({τ ∗A1 , {φRgc,D({τ ∗A1 , τ ∗A2\gc})}gc∈A2}) (B.25)
≥ φRfc,D({τ ∗A1 , {Γ∞gc(τ ∗A2)}gc∈A2\fc)
= φ˜Rfc,D(A1, τ ∗A1) ,
where Γ∞(·) represents the fixed point of the contraction mapping Γ(·). In turn, this implies that:
φNfc(τ
∗
A\fc) ≥ φNfc({τ ∗A1 , {φRgc,D(τ ∗A\fc)}gc∈A2\fc}) ≥ φNfc({τ ∗A1 , {φ˜Rgc,D(A1, τ ∗A1)}gc∈A2\fc}) .
where the last inequality follows from (B.25).
Remark. Intuitively, the Lemma follows because the Nash bargaining outcome for pair fc involves a lower
affiliate fee if c’s affiliate fees with other distributors are lower (raising c’s gains from trade with f). Condition
(ii) in the Lemma implies that downstream Rubinstein fees are lower than τ∗fc for fc ∈ A2.
We now state and prove our main result for this subsection:
Proposition 2. For any ε > 0, there exists Λ¯ > 0 such that for all strictly positive Λ < Λ¯, in any no-delay
equilibrium (in which all open agreements in A immediately form after any history of play) where agreements
immediately form at affiliate fees τ ∗,1A , |φ˜Nfc − τ∗,1fc | < ε ∀fc ∈ A.
Proof. We establish this result in two steps.
Step 1: One Channel With Open Agreements in Period 2. Consider a subgame beginning in period 2 in which
A1 ⊂ A agreements have already been formed at affiliate fees τ ∗,1A1 , and all open agreements A2 ≡ A \ A1
89The maximum number of distributors in any RSN’s relevant markets is 7, and the largest predicted share of
subscribers lost by a distributor to a rival distributor in an RSN’s relevant markets upon disagreement with that
RSN is 0.14 (at estimated parameter values); this occurs when Dish does not carry NESN and loses subscribers to
Comcast.
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involve only a single channel c (who makes offers in this period). In any no-delay equilibrium, all agreements
in A2 immediately form at some set of fees τ ∗,2A2 . We prove that as Λ→ 0, these fees τ
∗,2
A2 must be arbitrarilty
close to the conditional Nash-in-Nash fees φ˜N (A1, τ ∗,1A1 ).
1. First, consider a deviation by some distributor f to reject an offer from c and form an agreement with c
in the following period at fees φRfc,D(τ
∗
A\fc), where τ
∗
A\fc ≡ {τ ∗,1A1 , τ
∗,2
A2\fc}; this is the unique subgame
outcome with one open agreement (Rubinstein, 1982). For such a deviation not to be profitable, it
must be that ∀fc ∈ A2:
(τ∗,2fc − δdφRfc,D(τ ∗A\fc))Df︸ ︷︷ ︸
Savings in affiliate fee payments
≤ (1− δd)GFTMfc (0, τ ∗A\fc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
One period gross profit change
(⇔) τ∗,2fc ≤ φRfc,U (τ ∗A\fc)
where the substitution follows from (B.23).
2. Next, consider a deviation by channel c to not form some agreement fc ∈ A2 in period 2 (by demanding
from f a sufficiently high fee or simply not making f an offer), but still form all other agreements
A2\fc at fees τ ∗,2A2\fc. Following this deviation, channel c expects agreement fc to form in the following
period at fee φRfc,D(τ
∗
A\fc). Thus, for channel c to not find such a deviation profitable, it must be that:
(1− δc)GFTCfc(0, τ ∗A\fc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
One-period gross profit change
≥ (δcφRfc,D(τ ∗A\fc)− τ∗,2fc )×Df︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gains in affiliate fee payments
(⇔) τ∗,2fc ≥ δcφRfc,D(τ ∗A\fc)−
(1− δc)GFTCfc(0, τ ∗A\fc)
Df
3. Consider now a sequence Λk ≡ 1/k, and period 2 no-delay equilibrium fees τ ∗,2A2,k associated with Λk.
Define f(τ ∗,2A2 ) = [φ
N
fc(τ
∗
A\fc)]fc∈A2 , and functions gk(τ
∗,2
A2 ) = [δc(Λk)φ
R
fc,D(τ
∗
A\fc; Λk)−
(1−δc(Λk))GFTCfc(0,τ∗A\fc)
Df
]fc∈A2
and hk(τ
∗,2
A2 ) = [φ
R
fc,U (τ
∗
A\fc; Λk)]fc∈A2 . Note that gk(·) and hk(·) are continuous and converge uni-
formly to f(·) as k → ∞, and f(·) has a unique fixed point φ˜N (A1, τ ∗,1A1 ). We have shown that
τ ∗,2A2,k ∈ [gk(τ
∗,2
A2,k), hk(τ
∗,2
A2,k)] (for k ≥ 2). Thus, as affiliate fees are restricted to a compact set, it
follows that τ ∗,2A2,k must converge to a fixed point of f(·)—i.e., to φ˜N (A1, τ
∗,1
A1 ) as k →∞.
Step 2: All Agreements Open in Period 1. Now consider a no-delay equilibrium where all agreements in A
immediately form in period 1 at fees τ ∗,1A . We now prove that our proposition holds for offers formed in
period 1 (when distributors make offers).
1. First, consider a deviation by some channel c to reject an offer from a distributor f and form an
agreement with f in the following period at fees φRfc,U (τ
∗,1
A\fc) (by the arguments above). For such a
deviation to not be profitable, it must be that ∀fc ∈ A:
(1− δd)GFTCfc(0, ·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
One period gross profit change
≥ (δdφRfc,U (·)− τ∗,1fc )Df︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gain in affiliate fee payments
(⇔) τ∗,1fc ≥ φRfc,D(τ ∗,1A\fc)
where the substitution follows from (B.24).
2. Next, we show that for any sequence {Λk} → 0 with Λk > 0 for all k, there exists a corresponding
sequence {εk} → 0 with εk > 0 for all k such that τ∗,1fc,k ≤ φNfc(τ ∗,1A\fc,k) + εk ∀fc ∈ A. We proceed by
contradiction: assume not, so that there exists ε > 0 such that for some Λ¯ > 0, for all Λk < Λ¯ we have
τ∗,1fc,k > φ
N
fc(τ
∗,1
A\fc,k) + ε for some fc ∈ A. Consider now any such Λk and a deviation by distributor
f to make channel c an unacceptable offer (or no offer at all). Channel c may, upon receiving the
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unacceptable offer, reject some set of offers A2 (that include fc and offers made to it by distributors
other than f); all other agreements A1 = A \ A2 form in period 1. Now, observe that there exists a
Λ¯′ > 0 such that, for all Λk < Λ¯′, for any set of agreements A2 ⊆ A that only involve channel c and
include fc:
i. if c rejects agreements A2 in period 1 and they form in period 2 at equilibrium fees τ ∗,2A2 , then
|δdτ∗,2fc − φ˜Nfc(A1, τ ∗,1A1 )| < ε/3 (as we have proven that in any equilibrium, if A2 only contains
agreements involving a single channel, they must form at fees which converge to φ˜N (A1, τ ∗,1A1 ));
ii. the absolute value of the one-period gross profit changes for f fromA2 forming is less than ε/3×Df
(as profits for f are bounded for any set of finite affiliate fees);
iii. |φNfc({τ ∗,1A1 , {φ˜Rgc,D(A1, τ
∗,1
A1 )}gc∈A2\fc)− φ˜Nfc(A1, τ
∗,1
A1 )| < ε/3 (as conditional Rubinstein fees con-
verge to conditional Nash-in-Nash fees).
Then, for any Λ < min{Λ¯, Λ¯′}, distributor f ’s gains from this deviation (regardless of which set of
offers A2 that c rejects) are proportional to (where we suppress the subscript k):
(τ∗,1fc − δdτ∗,2fc )×Df︸ ︷︷ ︸
Savings in affiliate fee payments
−(GFTMf,A2(0, τ ∗,1A\fc)− δdGFTMf,A2(0, {τ ∗,1A1 , τ
∗,2
A2\fc})︸ ︷︷ ︸
One-period gross profit change
)
>
(
ε+ φNfc({τ ∗,1A1 , {φ˜Rgc,D(A1, τ
∗,1
A1 )}gc∈A2\fc})︸ ︷︷ ︸
< τ∗,1fc by assumption and Lemma 1
− (φ˜Nfc(A1, τ ∗,1A1 ) + ε/3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
> δdτ
∗,2
fc by condition (i)
)
×Df − (ε/3)Df
>
(
ε− ε/3− ε/3− ε/3
)
×Df = 0
where the second line follows from our contradictory assumption (τ∗,1fc > φ
N
fc(τ
∗,1
A\fc)+ε) and Lemma 1,
and conditions (i) and (ii) (where GFTMf,A2(·), representing distributor f ’s one-period gross profit
change from agreements in A2 forming, does not depend on {τgc}g 6=f ); and the last line follows from
condition (iii). There is therefore a profitable deviation; contradiction.
3. Consider now any sequence {Λk} → 0 with Λk > 0 for all k, and period 1 no-delay equilibrium fees
τ ∗,1A,k associated with Λk. By the previous step, there exists an associated sequence {εk} → 0 with
εk > 0 for all k such that τ
∗,1
fc,k ≤ φNfc(τ ∗,1A\fc,k) + εk for all fc ∈ A. Define f(τ ∗,1A ) = [φNfc(τ ∗,1A\fc)]fc∈A,
and functions gk(τ
∗,1
A ) = [φ
R
fc,D(τ
∗,1
A\fc; Λk)]fc∈A and hk(τ
∗,1
A1 ) = [φ
N
fc(τ
∗,1
A\fc)+εk]fc∈A. Note that gk(·)
and hk(·) are continuous, converge uniformly to f(·) as k →∞, and f(·) has a unique fixed point φ˜N .
We have shown that τ ∗,1A,k ∈ [gk(τ ∗,1A,k), hk(τ ∗,1A1,k)]. Thus, as affiliate fees are restricted to a compact
set, it follows that τ ∗,1A,k converges to a fixed point of f(·)—i.e., to φ˜N as k →∞.
B.2 Negative Three-Party-Surplus as a Necessary Condition for Non-Supply
For the rest of this section, we consider a single channel negotiating with a single cable distributor f and
two satellite providers (labeled here as g and g′) in an environment where there are no program access rules
in effect. Consider the situation in which neither satellite distributor is supplied with channel c and we
have equilibrium bundles Bo, bundle prices po, affiliate fees τ o, and implied bundle marginal costs mco.90
We focus on stationary perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which continuation play depends only on the set of
agreements already reached.
We now show that if three-party-surplus, given by the left-hand side of (22), is positive, then there
cannot be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs in the bargaining game described above in
which, starting in any subgame with no deals yet reached (including at the start of the game), it is certain
90For expositional convenience, we suppress the bargaining with the integrated distributor. The channel’s deviation
described below could be done once the channel has reached its internal agreement.
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that no deals will be reached in the continuation game. To do so, we show that if that was the case, then
at channel c’s first opportunity to make an offer it could deviate and simultaneously make affiliate fee offers
τ˜gc to distributor g and τ˜g′c to distributor g
′ having the properties that:
(i) both satellite distributors anticipate greater expected profit by accepting their offer than if no agree-
ments are reached, regardless of each satellite distributor’s beliefs regarding whether the other satellite
distributor will be supplied;
(ii) channel c’s profits are greater if both offers are accepted than if no agreements are reached.
By hypothesis, if channel c makes these offers, then—given passive beliefs—each distributor, say distrib-
utor g, believes that the rival distributor g′ will not reach an agreement in this bargaining period. Thus,
distributor g believes that no deals will be reached in this period if it rejects the offer made to it, and hence
no deals will occur in the continuation play either. On the other hand, if g accepts, then while only g will
accept this period, once it has accepted channel c and the rival distributor g′ may reach a deal in the future.
If pt denotes the probability that a deal is reached between channel c and the rival distributor g
′ exactly t
periods after the deal with g (where p0 ≡ 0), then g’s expected payoff from acceptance is a weighted average
of its payoffs when only it accepts offer τ˜gc and when distributor g is also immediately supplied (recall that
g’s payoff depends only on whether g′ reaches an agreement with channel c, not on the level of the affilliate
fee c and g′ agree to), where the weight on the latter payoff is φg ≡
∑
t=0 δ
t
dpt. Thus, property (i) implies
that distributor g will prefer to accept channel c’s offer regardless of its belief about φg. Since this is true
for both distributors, property (ii) implies that the deviation is profitable for channel c.
In the remainder of this appendix we show that if three-party-surplus, given by the left-hand side of (22),
is positive and a certain positive margin condition holds (which we verify in our empirical work), then there
is a pair of affiliate fees (τ˜gc, τ˜g′c) at which properties (i) and (ii) hold. This motivates our use of negative
three-party-surplus as a necessary condition for non-supply of both satellite distributors g and g′ to be an
equilibrium, as otherwise c would find it profitable to make such offers.
Notation. Define
Dg(A) =
∑
m
Dgm(Bom ∪ A,pom, ·) ,
pig(A) =
∑
m
Dgm(Bom ∪ A,pom, ·)× (po,pre-taxgm −mcogm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
margogm
,
to be distributor g’s demand and profits when the distributor-channel pairs contained in A are added to all
bundles; e.g., Dg(gc, ∅) =
∑
mDgm(Bom ∪ {gc}, ·) and Dg(gc, g′c) =
∑
mDgm(Bom ∪ {gc, g′c}, ·). Define
[∆BDg(A)] =
∑
m
Dgm(Bom ∪ A, ·)−Dgm(Bom ∪ {A \ B}, ·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆BDgm(A)
,
[∆Bpig(A)] =
∑
m
(Dgm(Bom ∪ A, ·)−Dgm(Bom ∪ {A \ B}, ·))× (po,pre-taxgm −mcogm) ,
for B ⊆ A to be distributor g’s change in demand and profits when the distributor-channel pairs contained
in B are removed from A: e.g., ∆gcpig(gc, g′c) represents the difference in distributor g’s profits from when
both g and g′ carry channel c versus when only g′ carries c (not including and affiliate fees paid to channel
c). In terms of notation used in the main text,
pig(gc, g
′c) ≡
∑
m
ΠMgm(Bom ∪ {gc, g′c}, pom, τ ′),
∆gc,g′cpig(gc, g
′c) ≡
∑
m
∆gc,g′cΠ
M
gm(Bom ∪ {gc, g′c}, pom, τ ′),
where τ ′ ≡ {τ o ∪ (τgc = 0, τg′c = 0)}.
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Acceptable Offers. Satellite distributor g will accept an affiliate fee offer τ˜gc from channel c and carry
the channel if its expected increase in profits from doing so exceeds the expected payments; i.e., if the
following inequality holds:(
φg × [∆gcpig(gc, g′c)] + (1− φg)× [∆gcpig(gc, ∅)]
)
> τ˜gc
(
φg ×Dg(gc, g′c) + (1− φg)×Dg(gc, ∅)
)
,
where φg ∈ [0, 1] represents distributor g’s discounted probability that after accepting deviant offer τ˜gc from
channel c, the other distributor g′ is also supplied. This condition is equivalent to:
τ˜gc <
(
φg × [∆gcpig(gc, g′c)] + (1− φg)× [∆gcpig(gc, ∅)]
)
(
φg ×Dg(gc, g′c) + (1− φg)×Dg(gc, ∅)
) . (B.26)
Define
Ag ≡ [∆gcpig(gc, g
′c)]
Dg(gc, g′c)
, Bg ≡ [∆gcpig(gc, ∅)]
Dg(gc, ∅) .
Note that the numerators of both Ag and Bg are positive: i.e., the change in g’s profits from carrying
channel c equals the increase in g’s demand due to carrying channel c multiplied by strictly positive margins
in every market (which is the case in the data for both satellite distributors at estimated marginal costs).
The derivative of the right-hand side of (B.26) with respect to φg is weakly positive if Ag ≥ Bg, and strictly
negative otherwise. Thus, if:
τ˜gc(ε) = min
( [∆gcpig(gc, g′c)]
Dg(gc, g′c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ag
,
[∆gcpig(gc, ∅)]
Dg(gc, ∅)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bg
)
− ε , (B.27)
for ε > 0, then (B.26) is satisfied for any φg ∈ [0, 1], and g will accept τ˜gc(ε). Define τ˜g′c(ε) similarly.
Profitable for Channel c to Make Offers. Consider now the decision by channel c to offer both
satellite distributors the set of affiliate fees {τ˜gc(ε), τ˜g′c(ε)} as defined in (B.27), where ε > 0. Assume that
the following positive margin condition holds:
(po,pre-taxgm −mcogm − τ˜gc(0)) > 0 for all m,
a condition that we have verified holds for each satellite distributor in every market for every RSN when
program access rules are not enforced.
We now establish that if three-party-surplus is positive, then c wishes to make such offers; i.e.,:91
∑
m
[
[∆gc,g′cΠ
M
gm({Bom ∪ {gc, g′c}}, ·)] + [∆gc,g′cΠMg′m({Bom ∪ {gc, g′c}}, ·)] . . . (B.28)
+ [∆gc,g′cΠ
C
cm({Bom ∪ {gc, g′c}}, ·)]
]
≡ E > 0
implies that, for sufficiently small ε > 0,∑
m
[∆gc,g′cΠ
C
cm({Bom ∪ {gc, g′c}}, ·)] +Dg(gc, g′c)τ˜gc(ε) +Dg′(gc, g′c)τ˜g′c(ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π˜C(ε)
> 0 ,
where all profit changes are evaluated at prices po and affiliate fees τ ′. Using (B.28) and our previously
91For simplicity, we suppress the notation for the arguments of the profit functions; note, however, that, given
bundle prices po, the three party surplus is unaffected by the levels of (τgc, τg′c).
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defined notation, the left-hand side of the previous equation can be re-written as
Π˜C(ε) = E −
(
[∆gc,g′cpig(gc, g
′c)]−Dg(gc, g′c)τ˜gc(ε)
)
(B.29)
−
(
[∆gc,g′cpig′(gc, g
′c)]−Dg′(gc, g′c)τ˜gc(ε)
)
where the terms subtracted from E on the right-hand side are the realized changes in either g or g′’s profits
when both satellite distributors are supplied with c at affiliate fees {τ˜gc(ε), τ˜g′c(ε)}. Consider the following
two cases:
• If Ag ≤ Bg, then
[∆gc,g′cpig(gc, g
′c)]−Dg(gc, g′c)τ˜gc(ε)
= [∆gcpig(gc, g
′c)] + [∆g′cpig(∅, g′c)]−Dg(gc, g′c) [∆gcpig(gc, g
′c)]
Dg(gc, g′c)
+Dg(gc, g
′c)ε
= [∆g′cpig(∅, g′c)] +Dg(gc, g′c)ε
≤ Dg(gc, g′c)ε (B.30)
≤ Dg(gc, ∅)ε , (B.31)
where the third line follows because ∆gc,g′cpig(gc, g
′c) = ∆gcpig(gc, g′c) + ∆g′cpi(∅, g′c) and from sub-
stituting for τ˜gc(ε) from (B.27), using the fact that Ag ≤ Bg; and the final inequality follows from g
obtaining weakly more subscribers when g′ doesn’t carry c, which implies (under the positive margin
condition) that [∆g′cpig(∅, g′c)] ≤ 0.
• If Ag > Bg, then:
[∆gc,g′cpig(gc, g
′c)]−Dg(gc, g′c)τ˜gc(ε)
= [∆g′cpig(gc, g
′c)] + [∆gcpig(gc, ∅)]− (Dg(gc, g′c)−Dg(gc, ∅))︸ ︷︷ ︸
[∆g′cDg(gc,g′c)]
τ˜gc(ε)−Dg(gc, ∅)τ˜gc(ε)
= [∆g′cpig(gc, g
′c)]− [∆g′cDg(gc, g′c)]τ˜gc(ε) + [∆gcpig(gc, ∅)]−Dg(gc, ∅)τ˜gc(ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dg(gc,∅)ε
=
[∑
m
[∆g′cDgm(gc, g
′o,pre-tax
gm −mcogm)
]
− [∆g′cDg(gc, g′c)]τ˜gc(ε) +Dg(gc, ∅)ε
=
∑
m
[∆g′cDgm(gc, g
′c)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0 ∀m
× (po,pre-taxgm −mcogm − τ˜gc(ε))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 ∀m
+Dg(gc, ∅)ε
≤ Dg(gc, ∅)ε (B.32)
where the fourth line follows from re-arranging terms, and the last inequality holds under the positive
margin condition.
Similar conclusions apply for g′ when Ag′ ≤ Bg′ and when Ag′ > Bg′ .
Substituting the inequalities in (B.30) and (B.32) for both g and g′ into (B.29) implies that:
Π˜C(ε) ≥ E − ε× (Dg(gc, ∅) +Dg′(∅, g′c)) .
Thus, if ε > 0, Π˜C(ε) > 0 for any ε ≤ E/(Dg(gc, ∅) + Dg′(∅, g′c)), and channel c will find it profitable to
make offers to g and g′ that will be accepted.
Remark. The idea behind this necessary condition is as follows. If a satellite distributor’s willingness to
pay for channel c is lowest when the rival satellite distributor also has access to channel c, then the affiliate
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fee offers described above make each satellite distributor indifferent to accepting given that its rival will
have access. But its resulting profit level is lower than when neither satellite distributor has access (granting
access to just its rival lowers a satellite distributor’s profit when margins are positive). As a result, if three-
party surplus from supply to both distributors is positive, channel c’s profit would increase by making these
offers. Suppose, instead, that a satellite distributor’s’ willingness to pay for channel c is lowest when the rival
satellite distributor does not have access to channel c. Then the above offers make the satellite distributor
indifferent to accepting if its rival does not have access. But, when its rival does gain access (which happens
with these simultaneous offers), each satellite distributor’s profit falls below its level when neither has access
(given positive margins) and, again, three-party surplus being positive implies that channel c’s profit rises
when both distributors accept.
C Modeling & Estimation Details
C.1 Ownership and Control Shares
We begin by defining the ownership variables OMfct, O
C
fct, and O
CC
cdt that we use in our estimation, then
discuss the motivation behind these choices, and finally calculate our measures in a few examples.
Definitions. For any MVPD f and channels c and d, we define:
OMfct ≡
∑
j∈Of (ojft × ojct)/(ojft + ojct)∑
j∈Of (ojft)
2/(ojft + ojct)
,
OCfct ≡
∑
j∈Oc(ojct × ojft)/(ojct + ojft)∑
j∈Oc(ojct)
2/(ojct + ojft)
,
OCCcdt ≡
∑
j∈Oc(ojct × ojdt)/(ojct + ojdt)∑
j∈Oc(ojct)
2/(ojct + ojdt)
,
where Og represents the set of owners of firm g (either MVPD or channel), ojgt represents the ownership
share of firm g by owner j, OMfct represents the ownership coefficient used by an MVPD f when weighting an
integrated channel c’s profits, OCfct represents the ownership coefficient used by a channel c when weighting
an integrated MVPD f ’s profits, and OCCcdt represents the ownership coefficient used by a channel c when
weighting the profits of a channel d’s with which is shares a common owner.
Motivation. For the following discussion, assume that µ = 1.
If vertical integration always involved full ownership there would be no question of how to form firms’
objective functions. The difficulty comes when there is partial ownership, such as when an MVPD buys
a partial stake in an RSN. In that case, the various owners of the channel may have differing preferences
over the actions that the channel should take. While some papers have proposed partial ownership measures
(e.g., Bresnahan and Salop, 1986; O’Brien and Salop, 2000), little is known empirically about how conflicting
objectives among a firm’s owners translates into the firm’s behavior.
Our approach to this issue and resulting measures can be understood as follows: consider, as an example,
a channel c that is partially owned by an MVPD f (and owned by no other entity with ownership stakes in
another distributor or channel). Denote the channel-specific profits as pic and MVPD-specific distribution
profits as pif . We assume that (the manager of) channel c maximizes an objective that is an ownership-share
weighted average (with weights representing “shares of control”) of its owners’ “normalized” preferences over
channel and MVPD distribution profits:
Π˜ct =
∑
j
ojct︸︷︷︸
Ownership Shares
[ ojct
ojct + ojft
pic +
ojft
ojct + ojft
pif︸ ︷︷ ︸
Relative “Cash Flows”
]
(C.33)
∝ pic +OCfct × pif ,
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where the normalization for each owner j places weights on pic and pif that sum to 1. Similar logic underlies
the other ownership variables (OMfct and O
CC
cdt ).
One can imagine various approaches to this issue. Our measures differ from those used in the literature
cited above on partial ownership by normalizing cash-flows for each owner (e.g., in (C.33), the weights on
pic and pif for each owner j sum to 1), and in using ownership shares as the control weights. Recent work by
Azar et al. (2016), for example, uses ownership shares as control weights as we do, but does not normalize
the cash flows. Absent this normalization, in the above example channel c would maximize instead an
objective proportional to pic + O˜
C
fctpif , where O˜
C
fct = (
∑
j∈Oc ojct× ojft)/(
∑
j∈Oc o
2
jct). Of course, these two
approaches do not exhaust the possibilities. For example, one could assume that a firm’s owners bargain
efficiently, resulting in behavior that maximizes their joint payoff. In that case, channel c would maximize
an objective proportional to pic +O
C
fctpif , where O
C
fct = (
∑
j∈Oc ojft)/(
∑
j∈Oc ojct).
One reason that we depart from these two approaches is that these other measures can lead to some
counterintuitive predictions. For example, consider a situation in which an MVPD owns share x of channel
c, while N other shareholders each own share (1 − x)/N of channel c and nothing else. In that case,
O˜Cfct = x/(x
2 + (1 − x)2/N), OCfct = 1, and our measure is OCfct = x. As N goes to ∞, the first measure
O˜Cfct → 1/x. That is, no matter how small the MVPD’s ownership share x is, as N gets large the channel’s
behavior comes to be what the MVPD would want. The N shareholders with common interests are essentially
powerless. Indeed, for small x the channel simply maximizes the MVPD’s distribution profits. This outcome
puts even more weight on the MVPD’s distribution profits than the jointly efficient weight O
C
fct, which leads
the channel to maximize (pic + pif ) regardless of how small the MVPD’s ownership share x is. In contrast,
in this example our measure puts a weight on the MVPD’s distribution profits that equals the MVPD’s
ownership share in the channel (which is less than the jointly efficient weight).
We next prove an important feature of our measure: if an MVPD and channel share at most a single
common owner (i.e., an entity that has positive ownership stakes in both firms), then OMfct = O
C
fct.
Lemma 3. Consider MVPD f and channel c. If there exists at most one owner j such that ojft× ojct > 0,
then OMfct = O
C
fct.
Proof. Let ojct = x and ojft = y. The numerators for O
M
fct and O
C
fct are equivalent. The denominator
for OMfct equals y
2/(x + y) + (1 − y). The denominator for OCfct equals x2/(x + y) + (1 − x). Both equal
(x+ y − xy)/(x+ y). 
This property holds for all MVPD and channel pairs that we consider in our analysis.
Finally, note one important empirical advantage of our measure OCfct: it is invariant to the distribution
of ownership among owners with no ownership interests in any other firms within the industry. For example,
in the above example, we would also have OCfct = x if instead there was a single firm owning the (1 − x)
share of channel c (and nothing else). As a result, we do not need data on the pattern of ownership except
that among firms who are vertically integrated.
Examples. We provide two examples of our ownership variables.
1. Unitary MVPD ownership. Consider an MVPD f that owns ofct = x share of channel c. In this
case, there is a single owner j of MVPD f , where ojft = 1. Then the MVPD f places weight O
M
fct on
channel c’s profits (relative to its own profits) when making decisions, where:
OMfct =
(1× x)/(1 + x)
(1)/(1 + x)
= x .
For the channel c, there are essentially two owners: one that owns (1 − x) of c (and none of MVPD
f), and MVPD f that owns x of c. Here, channel c places weight OCfct on MVPD f ’s profits (relative
to its own profits) when making decisions, where:
OCfct =
(x× 1)/(1 + x)
(1− x)2/(1− x) + (x)2/(1 + x) =
x
(1 + x)(1− x) + x2 = x .
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Thus, OMfct = O
C
fct when a channel only has a single integrated owner.
2. Channel Conglomerates. Assume that a 3rd party owns x share of channel c and y share of channel
d. Then channel c places weight OCCcdt on channel d’s profits (relative to its own profits) when making
decisions, where:
OCCcdt =
(x× y)/(x+ y)
(1− x)2/(1− x) + (x)2/(x+ y) =
x× y
(x+ y)(1− x) + x2 =
x× y
x+ y − x× y .
C.2 Solving for Negotiated Affiliate Fees and Bundle Marginal Costs
We omit the subscript on Ψfct ≡ (1 − ζfct)/ζfct for the expressions in this subsection. Let BRfmt be the
observed set of RSNs carried by f in market m in period t.
Consider MVPD f bargaining with channel c over affiliate fee τfct, where c has at most a single integrated
owner. Closed form expressions for MVPD and channel “GFT” terms in (9) are:
GFTMfct =
∑
m∈Mfct
[[
µfctDfmt −D\fcfmt
]
τfct + µfct × (Dfmt +
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt])acmt + µfct
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt]τgct
+
∑
d∈Vft\c
∑
g∈Fmt:d∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt]µfdt × (τgdt + admt) + [∆fcDfmt]
(
ppre-taxfmt −mcfmt
)]
, (C.34)
GFTCfct =
∑
m∈Mfct
[
(Dfmt − µfctD\fcfmt)τfct + (Dfmt +
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt])acmt +
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt](τgct)
+
∑
g∈Fmt
λR:fct[∆fcDgmt]
∑
d∈Bgmt\c
µCCcdt × (τgdt + admt) +
∑
g∈Fmt
µgctλR:fct[∆fcDgmt]
(
ppre-taxgmt −mcgmt
)]
,
(C.35)
where: D
\fc
fmt is the demand for f in market m if it dropped channel c; λR:fct = λR if f and c are not
integrated, and λR:fct = 1 otherwise; µfct = µ×OMfct; µCCcdt = µ×OCCcdt ; and Vft ≡ {c : Ofct > 0} is the set
of channels owned by MVPD f in period t.
Focus on the bargain between an RSN c and MVPD f .92 Using (C.34) and (C.35), the Nash Bargaining
first-order condition ∀f ∈ Fmt, c ∈ CRt given by (10) (GFTCfct = ΨGFTMfct) can be re-written as:
τfct
∑
m∈Mfct
[
(1 + Ψ)(1− µfct)Dfmt
]
+
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
τgct
∑
m∈Mfct
(1−Ψµfct)[∆fcDgmt] (C.36)
+
∑
g∈Fmt
∑
d∈Bgmt\c
τgdt × ((Ψ− µfct)1g=f + µCCcdt −Ψµfdt)
∑
m∈Mfct
[∆fcDgmt] + (Ψ− µfct)
∑
m∈Mfct
mc
\R
fmt[∆fcDfmt] =
∑
m∈Mfct
[
(Ψ− µfct)[∆fcDfmt]ppre-taxfmt
]
−
∑
m∈Mfct
[
acmt ×
(
(1−Ψµfct)Dfmt + (1−Ψµfct)
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt]
)
+
∑
g∈Fmt
∑
d∈Bgmt\c
admt × (µCCcdt −Ψµfdt)([∆fcDgmt])
]
,
where mc
\R
fmt represents non-RSN marginal costs: i.e., mc
\R
fmt ≡ mcfmt −
∑
d∈BRfmt τfdt.
We can also re-write the pricing first-order condition in (5), which provides the optimal set of prices for
92In estimation, we are assuming that λR = 0 in the “non-loophole” markets, and thus omit terms that would
otherwise enter (e.g., if c were integrated with a rival MVPD f ′). In the counterfactuals, we re-introduce these terms.
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every cable provider f in every market m, as:∑
g∈Fmt
∂Dgmt
∂pfmt
(
mc
\R
gmt1g=f +
∑
d∈BRgmt
(1g=f − µfdt)τgdt
)
= (C.37)
[ Dfmt
1 + taxfmt
+
∂Dfmt
∂pfmt
ppre-taxfmt +
∑
g∈Fmt
∂Dgmt
∂pfmt
∑
d∈BRgmt
µfdtadmt
]
.
However, if f is a satellite provider (denoted f ∈ Fsat), we assume that there is a single national price
pft and non-RSN marginal cost mˆc
\R
fmt that applies across all markets; this implies that there is only a single
pricing first-order condition for satellite firms:∑
m
∑
g∈Fmt
∂Dgmt
∂pft
(
mc
\R
gt 1g=f +
∑
d∈BRgmt
(1g=f − µfdt)τgdt
)
= (C.38)
∑
m
( Dfmt
1 + taxfmt
+
∂Dfmt
∂pft
ppre-taxft +
∑
g∈Fmt
∂Dgmt
∂pfmt
∑
d∈BRgmt
µfdtadmt
)
∀f ∈ Fsat .
Equations (C.36), (C.37), and (C.38) express affiliate fees and marginal costs as a function of demand
parameters, prices, and advertising rates. We thus solve for the vector of RSN affiliate fees {τfct}∀f,t,c∈CRt
for all RSNs and non-RSN bundle marginal costs {mc\Rfmt}∀fmt via matrix inversion when evaluating the
objective for any parameter vector θ.
National Channels. We use our estimates of RSN affiliate fees and non-RSN bundle marginal costs to
recover {τfct}∀ft,c/∈CRt for non-RSN channels via matrix inversion on the following:
τfct
∑
m∈Mfct
[
Dfmt + ΨD
\fc
fmt
]
+
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
τgct
∑
m∈Mfct
[∆fcDgmt] = (C.39)
∑
m∈Mfct
[
Ψ× [∆fcDfmt](ppre-taxfmt − mˆcfmt)
]
+
∑
g∈Fmt
∑
d∈Bgmt\c
µfdtΨτˆgdt
∑
m∈Mfct
[∆fcDgmt]
−
∑
m∈Mfct
[
acmt ×
(
Dfmt +
∑
g 6=f :c∈Bgmt
[∆fcDgmt]
)
+
∑
g∈Fmt
∑
d∈Bgmt\c
admt × (−Ψµfdt)([∆fcDgmt])
]
,
where we construct estimates of each bundle’s marginal costs from our recovered non-RSN marginal costs
as follows: mˆcfmt ≡ mˆc\Rfmt +
∑
d∈BRfmt τˆfdt. We assume away integration incentives for non-RSNs so that
µfct = 0 ∀ft, c /∈ CRt .
C.3 Further Estimation and Simulation Details
Construction of Disagreement Payoffs. Computation of several moments in estimation require
constructing values of ∆fc[Π
M
fmt(·)] and ∆fc[ΠCcmt(·)] for each MVPD f and channel c that contract in
each period. These “gains from trade” for each pair are functions of both agreement and disagreement
profits. Profits from agreement (as a function of θ) are computed using (4) and (7) with observed prices
and bundles. Consistent with our timing assumptions (i.e., bundle prices, channel carriage, and affiliate fees
are simultaneously determined), profits from disagreement between MVPD f and channel c are computed
by removing c from all bundles offered by f and holding fixed: (i) bundle prices for all cable and satellite
MVPDs; (ii) carriage decisions for other MVPDs (B′gmt = Bgmt ∀ g 6= f); and (iii) affiliate fees τˆ−fc,t for all
other MVPD-channel pairs.
Importance Sampling. We follow the importance sampling approach of Ackerberg (2009) to estimate
our model. We begin by simulating 350 households per market from an initial distribution of random
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preferences, so that each household is characterized by a vector of preferences for each channel and satellite
distributor. For each of these simulated households, we solve the viewership problem given by (1) for each
downstream firm in the household’s market. To evaluate candidate parameter vectors in the estimation
objective function, we approximate the relevant integrals (e.g., for implied market shares or mean viewership
by channel) by weighting the initial simulated households by the implied importance sampling weights that
depend on the initial distribution and the candidate distribution. For example, if one were to draw from an
N(0, 1) distribution initially, and want to approximate the mean of an N(0.5, 1) distribution, one would put
relatively more weight on the initial draws near 0.5, and relatively less weight on negative draws.
The approximation is more accurate the closer is the initial distribution to the candidate distribution.
Therefore, we iteratively updated the initial distribution several times through the process. That is, after
moving in the parameter space to lower objective function values, we re-simulated an initial distribution
from the distribution of preferences implied by the then current best parameter vector.
Estimation of Channel Decay Parameters. We allow for households to have variance in their
values of νS in order to estimate this parameter using importance sampling. Without allowing for variance
in νS , we would not be able to obtain any benefits of the importance sampling procedure as we would have
to resolve the viewership problem for each simulated household at each objective function valuation. We
assume that households’ had a value of νS drawn from a normal distribution with a common mean and
standard deviation of 0.015.
As discussed in footnote 54, we estimate νS on a coarse grid (with values contained in {0.8, 0.91, 0.95, 0.99});
the objective function was minimized for νS = 0.95. The computational difficulty of estimating νS using
the same procedure as with νNS is the following: with positive variance in both νS and νNS , and given
that values of channel viewership utilities ρ are independent of decay parameters, there would commonly
be households whose parameter draws implied very unrealistic viewership patterns (e.g., spending 90% of
their full day watching a single channel). Such outlier households would imply very inelastic demand for
cable or satellite bundles, and consequently implausibly high mark-ups in certain markets. Although these
households would have negligible weight absent simulation error, memory and computational limitations
prevented us from using more than 350 household simulations per market in estimation.
To examine the sensitivity of our results to different values of νS , we have also computed our counter-
factual simulations using parameter estimates obtained when νS = 0.91 and νS = 0.99. In both cases, we
find that average simulated changes in surplus or welfare across all RSNs are not statistically different from
those reported in Table 5 (which are computed using parameter estimates obtained when νS = 0.95); and
our main findings do not change.
C.4 Computing Counterfactual Equilibria
For each RSN channel c and each integration scenario—no vertical integration, vertical integration with
PARs, and vertical integration without PARs—we compute predicted outcomes in all of the RSN’s relevant
markets in 2007. We also recompute outcomes for the integration scenario that is “observed” in the data for
each RSN.
We maintain the following assumptions: (i) if supplied, satellite distributors carry c in all of c’s relevant
markets; (ii) cable carriage decisions and affiliate fees for c are allowed to adjust, but those for all other
channels are held fixed. In our main counterfactual results (reported in the main text and in Tables A.5-
A.10), we allow only cable prices to adjust in each RSN’s relevant markets and hold fixed national satellite
prices at levels observed in the data. In a robustness test, we allow satellite prices to adjust under the
assumption that they are set at the DMA level; results from this specification are reported in Table A.11.
As discussed in the main text and in footnote 72, if we are examining the vertical integration scenario
without PARs, we also allow for the channel’s supply decision to adjust: e.g., if RSN c is a cable-owned
RSN (or is non-integrated and assigned a cable owner under the vertical integration scenarios), we compute
outcomes under four “supply scenarios”—the channel is supplied to both satellite distributors, supplied to
only DirecTV or Dish, or supplied to neither satellite distributor—and test which supply scenario is robust
to deviations by the channel.
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For each RSN c, integration scenario, supply scenario, and set of carriage disturbances {∆fcωfmt}f,m,93
we compute outcomes in all of the RSN’s relevant markets by iterating over the following procedure until
prices, fees, and carriage decisions converge:94
1. Given affiliate fees and carriage decisions, we update bundle prices for all cable (and satellite, when
appropriate) distributors to maximize profits.
2. Given bundle prices and carriage decisions, we update affiliate fees {τCFfct }f using the following system
of equations:
τCFfct
∑
m∈Mfct
[
(1 + Ψ)(1− µfct)DCFfmt
]
+
∑
g 6=f :c∈BR,CFgmt
τCFgct
∑
m∈Mfct
(1−Ψµfct − µgctλR)[∆fcDCFgmt]
+
∑
g∈Fmt
∑
d∈BR,CFgmt \c
τCFgdt × ((Ψ− µfct)1g=f + µCCcdt −Ψµfdt − µgctλR)
∑
m∈Mfct
[∆fcD
CF
gmt] =
∑
m∈Mfct
[
(Ψ− µfct)(ppre-tax,CFfmt − mˆc
\R
fmt)[∆fcD
CF
fmt]− µf ′ctλR × (ppre-tax,CFf ′mt − mˆc
\R
f ′mt)[∆fcD
CF
f ′mt]
]
−
∑
m∈Mfct
[
acmt ×
(
(1−Ψµfct)DCFfmt + (1−Ψµfct)
∑
g 6=f :c∈BR,CFgmt
[∆fcD
CF
gmt]
)
+
∑
g∈Fmt
∑
d∈BR,CFgmt \c
admt × (µCCcdt −Ψµfdt)([∆fcDCFgmt])
]
∀f, c , (C.40)
where f and f ′ represent the MVPDs with which c is potentially integrated. Equation (C.40) differs
from (C.36) insofar as we now allow for the possibility that λR > 0, and that c may be integrated
with a rival MVPD f ′ when bargaining with f . We only update {τfct}∀f for the given channel c that
is being examined, and not for other channels d that may be active in c’s relevant markets.
3. Given bundle prices, affiliate fees, and carriage disturbances, we update carriage decisions by checking
in each relevant market whether or not the cable distributor wishes to carry the channel using (20).
93 We draw a vector of carriage disturbances {∆fcωfmt}f,m for all MVPDs and relevant markets for RSN c, where
each element ∆fcωfmt is drawn from a truncated normal distribution with variance 4σˆ
2
ω to rationalize observed
carriage decisions in the data given by (20). I.e., for every market m where c ∈ Bfmt, we draw ∆fcωfmt conditional
on it being less than ∆fcpi
M
fmt(Bmt, ·); and for every market m where c /∈ Bfmt, we draw ∆fcωfmt conditional on it
being greater than ∆fcpi
M
fmt(Bmt ∪ fc, ·). All counterfactuals outcomes are computed for and averaged over 10 sets
of carriage disturbance draws.
94We iterate until the sum of absolute differences between all RSN affiliate fees and all downstream prices does not
change by more than 10−3.
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